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CASE COMMENTS

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE REQUIRING LICENSE
FOR MEETING IN PUBLIC PARK. [New Hampshire]

Although it was long thought that the prohibitions of the First
Amendment' applied solely to the Federal government, 2 it is now
definitely established that the Fourteenth Amendment 3 has made
these prohibitions applicable not only to state statutes 4 but also to
local ordinances, which, being passed under state legislative authority,
are deemed to be state action. 5
On this theory, an ordinance of Portsmouth, New Hampshire
was brought under attack in the recent case of State v. Derrickson.6
""Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. Const., Amend. I.
2"... neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restrictions about
Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Cheek, 259
'freedom of speech' .
U. S. 530, 543, 42 S. Ct. 516, 522, 66 L. ed. 1o44, 1053 (1922).
3"No state shall make or enfore any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S. Const. Amend. XIV §x; "If the
Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed them [the privileges and immunities of earlier
articles of the bill of rights], the process of absorption has had itssource in the
belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 326, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L. ed. 288, 292 (1937);

"What it does require [the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] is
that state action, whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions and not infrequently are designated as 'law of the land'."
Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 316, 47 S. Ct. 103, 104, 71 L. ed. 270, 273 (1926).

"There is some modicum of freedom of thought, speech and assembly which
all citizens of the Republic may exercise throughout its length and breadth, which
no State, nor all together, nor the Nation itself, can prohibit, restrain or impede."
Thomas v. Collins, Sheriff, 323 U. S.516, 543, 65 S. Ct. 315, 328, 89 L. ed. 430, 447
(1945); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 31o U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. ed. 1213 (194o)

(religion); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. ed. 278 (1937)
(assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. ed. 1357 (1931)
(press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925) (speech).
o
5Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 at 45 , 58 S. Ct. 666 at 668, 82 L. ed. 949
at 953 (1938); King Manufacturing Company v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U. S.
ioo at 104, 48 S. Ct. 489 at 490, 72 L. ed. 8oi at 8o6 (1928); Home Telephone &
Telegraph Company v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U. S.278, 33 S. Ct. 312, 57 L. ed. 510
(1913).

681 A. (2d)

312 (N. H. 1951).
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The ordinance provided that, "no parade or procession upon any
public street or way, and no open air public meeting upon any ground
abutting thereon shall be permitted unless a license therefore shall
first be obtained from the City Council." 7 Defendants, members of
Jehovah's Witnesses, applied for a permit to hold a meeting in a park,
but the request was denied by the council, it being observed that
the council members "'had never received a petition of a religious
group to use the public parks and they were fearful of creating a disturbance if the application was granted and the assembly held'."8
Thereafter, the defendants started their meeting without a permit,
but were arrested and prosecuted for violation of the ordinance. Their
defense was that the ordinance as applied was unconstitutional and
void as denying their constitutional freedom of religion, speech, and
assembly.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire sustained the constitutionality of the ordinance and the decision of the city council, by holding
that "While these freedoms can not be prohibited, they may be subjected to reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulation in order that
the constitutional rights of others may be equally protected in the
interest of public order and convenience." 9 The facts were stressed that
this one particular park was small and not the only one in Portsmouth,
that no occasion was known on which it had ever been used for religious meetings or sectarian purposes, and that there was a "definite
and systematic policy"' 0 to treat all religions alike. It was asserted that
one small park could be set aside for nonreligious purposes, so that the
public could be allowed "to seek peace and sanctuary in a public park,
...

to be let alone ... not to be subject[ed] to oral aggression of a relig-

ious nature on Sunday..

The construction already placed on the

same ordinance in State v. Cox,12 in which the courts limited the ap-

parently arbitrary discretion of the city council to allow or reject an application for a permit, by requiring a "systematic, consistent and just
order of treatment .... ,13 was accepted as controlling. Both the con7State v. Derrickson, 81 A. (2d) 312 (N. H. 1951).
'State v. Derrickson, 81 A. (2d) 312, 313 (N. H. 1951).
'State v. Derrickson, 81 A. (2d) 312, 313 (N. H. 1951).
"State v. Derrickson, 81 A. (2d) 312, 314 (N. H. 1951).
"State v. Derrickson, 81 A. (2d) 312, 314 (N. H. 1951).
"291 N. H. 137, 16 A. (2d) 5o8 (194o) aff'd, Cox v. New Hampshire,

312

U. S. 569,

61 S. Ct. 762, 85 L. ed. 1049 (1941).
""The discretion thus vested in the authority is limited in its exercise by the
bounds of reason, in uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination. A systematic, consistent and just order of treatment ... is the statutory
mandate." State v. Cox, 91 N. H. 137, 16 A. (2d) 508, 513 (1940).

1952]

CASE COMMENTS

struction and application of the ordinance were held to be nondiscriminatory in regard to the denial of the petition in the instant case. The
court definitely stated that it was not deciding whether a city council
could prohibit all religious meetings in its parks, but was deciding
that one small park, where more were available, could be set aside for
"nonreligious purposes under a system which is administered fairly
14
and without bias or discrimination."
One of the two cases cited as supporting the principal decision
was State v. Cox,15 which sustained a provision in the same ordinance
prohibiting parades on streets without a permit. However, the Cox
decision may be distinguishable in that the regulation of streets is a
more essential element of providing for the public safety and convenience than is the maintenance of parks, 16 and the New Hampshire
court's opinion in the Cox case specifically recognized the possibility
that even though the license could be required for use of the streets, its
requirement for a park meeting might be invalid. In the other case
cited the license ordinance was declared unconstitutional, and the
support derived for the principal decision from that case is by way of
dicta.17
The freedom of religion of the First Amendment involves two
aspects-freedom of belief and freedom to act. The first is held
absolute, but the second can be regulated's to the same degree as the
other freedoms of the First Amendment. These freedoms are said to
be "susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate
1 9
danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect."3
The
United States Supreme Court has stated that a municipality "may
uState v. Derrickson, 81 A. (2d) 312, 315 (N. H. 1951).
u9i N. H. 137, 16 A. (2d) 508 (1940).

8The United States Supreme Court, in affirming this decision, said: "They
were not prosecuted ... for holding a public meeting.... Their right ... apart from

engaging in a 'parade or procession' upon a public street is not here involved and
the question of the validity of a statute addressed to any other sort of conduct ... is
not before us." Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 573, 61 S. Ct. 762, 764, 85 L.
ed. 1049, 1052 (1941).
17See Commonwealth v. Gilfedder, 321 Mass. 335, 73 N. E. (2d) 241, 244 (1947).
'Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S.296 at 3o3, 6o S. Ct. goo at 903, 84 L. ed.
1213 at 1218 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. ed. 244 (1878)
(bigamy); Sellers v. Johnson, 69 F. Supp. 778 (S. D. Iowa 1946) (religious meeting
barred on threat of mob violence); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.
(2d) 972 (1942) (ordinance against using snakes in worshipping); Hopkins v. State,
69 A. (2d) 456 (Md. App. 1950) (statute against soliciting marriages).
uWest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S.624, 639, 63 S.Ct.
1178, 1186, 87 L. ed. 1628, 1638 (1943).
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enact regulations in the interest of the public safety, health, welfare
or convenience ..... "20 and that there can be general and nondiscriminatory regulations as to the time and place of holding meetings
on streets in order to safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of
the community. 21 Though streets are a natural and proper place to
disseminate information, and the abridging of liberty of expression
in appropriate places cannot be justified by saying that it can be exercised in another place, 22 this does not mean that every street at any
time is an appropriate place to disseminate information by any means
whatsoever; and it cannot mean that every park, also a natural and
proper place to disseminate information, is an appropriate place
under any and all conditions. The smallness of the park could mean
that any person in it would have to listen to the speech or go somewhere else.

28

Prior to 1939, the tendency was to allow city authorities practically
complete control of outside meetings. 24 But in that year, in Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization,5 an ordinance was held unconstitutional which forbade distribution of printed matter and the
holding of public meetings in streets or other public places unless a
permit was secured, the Director of Public Safety being empowered to
refuse permits when he thought such action necessary to prevent riots,
disturbances, or disorderly assemblage. However, that decision does
not require the invalidation of the ordinance involved in the principal
case, because the Hague case did not hold invalid a permit system
where antagonistic interests were balanced, but held invalid an ordinance which local politicians had used to suppress, in an arbitrary
and capricious manner, activities unfavorable to them. Even while
declaring this ordinance unconstitutional the United States Supreme
Court stated:
"The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the
streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute,
-'Schneider v. State, Bo8 U. S. 147 at 16o, 6o S. Ct. 146 at 150, 84 L. ed. 155
at 164 (1939)nCantwell v. Connecticut, 3io U. S. 296 at 3o4, 6o S. Ct. goo at go3 , 84 L. ed.
1213 at 1218 (1940).
2Schneider v. State, So8 U. S. 147 at 163, 6o S. Ct. 146 at 151, 84 L. ed. 155 at
166 (ig3g).
'See Note (1952) 9 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 46.
-4Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941) 412.
2'307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. ed. 1423 (1939).
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but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace
and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied."2
The abridgement of rights was not in the ordinance, but in its application where permits were refused even when there was no danger
of riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblages.
In Niemotko v. Maryland,27 no ordinance was in issue, but in the
city involved it was the custom to obtain a permit from the Park
Commissioner to hold a meeting in a park. Such permission was there
denied Jehovah's Witnesses, and when they held their meeting they
were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. Convictions were
reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that defendants were
denied the equal protection of the laws, because the park had been
used by other religious groups and for public meetings, and the main
basis for refusal of the permit to defendants was seemingly the dislike
for the Jehovah's Witnesses. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring
opinion observed:
"The location and size of a park; its customary use for the
recreational, esthetic and contemplative needs of a community;
the facilities, other than a park or street corner for airing views,
are all pertinent considerations in assessing the limitations the
Fourteenth Amendment puts on State powers in a particular
28
situation."
The New Hampshire court in the principal case weighed the
interests of the religious organization versus the public, in the use of
this one small park, and held it could be set aside for nonreligious
uses. In Saia v. New York, it was said that community interests had
to be balanced when passing on the constitutionality of regulations
concerning the First Amendment, but also that, "in that process they
should be mindful to keep the freedoms of the First Amendment
in a preferred position." 29 And, therefore, while the right to assemble
freely is -a paramount right, "its application does not require the
'Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515, 59 S. Ct.
1423, 1437 (1939).

954, 964, 83 L. ed.
"734o

U. S. 268, 71 S. Ct.

325,

95 L. ed. 267

(1951).

-See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 273, 282, 71 S. Ct. 328, 333, 95 L. ed. 271,
276 (1951).
'334 U. S. 558, 562, 68 S. Ct. 1148, 1151, 92 L. ed. 1574, 1578 (1948); "When
we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people
to enjoy freedom of press and religion ... we remain mindful of the fact that the
latter occupy a preferred position." Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 509, 66 S. Ct.
276, 28o, 90 L. ed. 265, 270 (1946).
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destruction of the rights of the balance of the public ... "30 In the
principal case in this process of balancing the liberties guaranteed by
the First Amendment on one side and the rights that will be diminished
on the other side if those liberties are given an uncontrolled absolute
freedom, the rights of the people to quiet and comfort in this one
small park were held adequately important to deny its use for any
meeting while other meeting places were available. No constitutional
rights were abridged in this holding.
Contrary to the assumption of the New Hampshire court, the
ordinance appears to be invalid on its face, because the prohibition
can be avoided only by securing a permit, and no definite standards,
rules or conditions are stated by which the city council is limited in
its discretion to allow or deny the issuance of a permit on an application. Similar ordinances have generally been declared unconstitutional.3 ' However, by the construction placed on the ordinance in
3OFreedman v. Moses, 99 N. Y. S. (2d) 780, 781 (195o); "Our present task then, as
so often the case with courts, is to reconcile two rights in order to prevent either
from destroying the other." Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 31o U. S. 586,
594, 60 S. Ct. 1010, 1012, 84 L. ed. 1375, 1379 (194o); "... the exercise of a right
is essentially different from an abuse of it. The one is no legitimate inference from
the other. Common sense here promulgates the broad doctrine, ... so exercise
your own freedom as not to infringe the rights of others, or the public peace and
safety." 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (4th ed.
1873) 616; "Our citizenship presupposes responsibilities and obligations as a condition to its benefits. Enjoyment of one entails the corresponding yoke of the
other." Note (1948) 34 Va. L. Rev. 77, 83.
31 For example: Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 71 S. Ct. 312, 95 L. ed. 280
(1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S.558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L. ed. 1574 (1948); Marsh v.
Alabama, 826 U. S.501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L. ed. 265 (1946); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U. S.105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L. ed. 1292 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S.444
58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. ed. 949 (1938). "In order to get a well-rounded understanding
of the present state of law, these few opinions upsetting convictions must be placed
alongside a much larger number of memorandum decisions where the Court allowed convictions under other permit ordinances to stand undisturbed by refusing
to review them. It then seems that the Court has set its face against ordinances
actually or easily used for suppression, and not against every permit ordinance
that might conceivably stifle an unpopular group." Chafee, Free Speech in the
United States (1941) 408; Owen, Jehovah's Witnesses And Their Four Freedoms
(1951) 14 U. of Detroit L. J. 111; Antieau, The Limitation Of Religious Liberty
(1949) 18 Fordham L. Rev. 221; Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious
Freedom (1946) 41 Ill. L. Rev. 53; Howerton, Jehovah's Witnesses and the Federal
Constitution (1946) 17 Miss. L. J. 347; Note (1951) 19 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 637; Notes
(1944) 152 A. L. R. 322, (1941) 133 A. L. R. 1402. Some of those which have been
upheld are: Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S.315, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L. ed. 295 (1951);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S.77, 69 S. Ct. 448, 93 L. ed. 513 (1949); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. ed. 645 (1944); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. ed. 1031 (1942); City of Manchester v.
Leiby, 117 F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941); Jones v. City of Moultrie, 196 Ga. 526,
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the principal case,3 2 the court has fulfilled its duty to sustain the
validity of legislation where legally possible by giving a valid interpretation to an otherwise questionable ordinance,3 3 and this construction becomes the law,3 4 which "is as binding ...as though the
precise words had been written into the ordinance."33 Whether an
ordinance is narrowly drawn, providing proper standards so as not to
allow any previous restraint or censorship over the First Amendment
liberties by allowing an official arbitrary discretion over their exercise,
or whether such limitations are read into the ordinance by judicial
interpretation, the effect is the same. Although the statement in the decision that the city council had followed a consistent policy applicable
to all alike seems nullified by the fact that this was the first petition for
a permit to hold a meeting in a park, this decision does not stand as a
precedent for the future and the city is bound to a consistent policy
applying to all alike, the same as if an ordinance embodying those
principles had just been enacted.
The ordinance authorizes nondiscriminatory regulation with a view
to reasonable protection of the public welfare, and so is valid. If the
city council should abuse this authority by arbitrary or discriminaC1E H. BLoEmKm
tory action, the action would be enjoined.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF RELEASED TIME RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

PROGRAMS. [United States Supreme Court]

The controversy over the constitutionality of "released time religious education" programs, fanned by the Supreme Court's equivocal
ruling in McCollum v. Board of Education' in 1948, has recently given
27 S.E. (2d) 39 (1943); Commonwealth v. Pascone, 3o8 Mass. 591, 33 N. E. (2d) 522
(1941); People v. Haas, 299 N. Y. 19o, 86 N. E. (2d) 169 (1949); People v. Nahman,
298 N. Y. 95, 81 N. E. (2d) 36 (1948); Commonwealth v. Geuss, 168 Pa. Super. 22,
76 A. (2d) 500 (1950).
2See note 13, supra.
83Jones v. City of Moultrie, 72 Ga. App. 282, 33 S. E. (2d) 561 at 562 (1949); State
v. Cox, 91 N. H. 137, 16 A. (2d) 508 at 512 (1940); "We may not impute to a legislative body an intent to adopt a statute or ordinance which might be used as an
instrument for the destruction of a right guaranteed by the Constitution which
executive and legislative officers of government, no less than judges, are sworn to
maintain." People v. Barber, 289 N. Y. 378, 46 N. E. (2d) 329, 332 (1943).
"Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 at 316, 47 S. Ct. 103 at 104, 71 L. ed. 27o at
273 (1926).
8Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4, 69 S. Ct. 894, 895, 93 L. ed. 1131, 1134
(1949).
Illlinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No. 71,
Campaign County, Illinois, 333 U. S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L. ed. 649 (19i48).
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rise to the fourth decision in two years sustaining the validity of the
Weekday Religious Education program in New York. 2 Though the
attack on the legality of the practice has been concentrated almost
entirely in the last half-decade, 3 released time instruction was originated in 1914 as one of the forms of promotion of religious education
by the churches of Gary, Indiana which provided classes that were
worked into the daily schedules of the public schools.4 By 1947, almost
2,ooo,ooo school children in 2200 communities in 46 states participated

in similar religious education programs. 5 As the practice became more
widely employed, its legality was assailed in a few instances, but the
courts in New York, 6 Illinois,7 and California8 expressly sustained

the local systems tested before them. No adverse decision was encountered until the United States Supreme Court in the now famous
McCollum case declared the released time program of the Board of
Education of Champaign County, Illinois, unconstitutional.
Though a great deal of misunderstanding has been generated in
regard to the scope of the decision,9 it is quite clear from the four
separate opinions written in the case that the Court did not intend
2Zorach v. Clauson, 99 N. Y. S. (2d) 339 (1959), 102 N. Y. S. (2d) 27 (1951), 303
N. Y. 161, loo N. E. (2d) 463 (1951), 72 S. Ct. 679, 96 L. ed. 6o9 (1952).

-The earliest case to be found was decided in 1925, but of the six cases which
specifically raise the issue prior to the Zorach decision, four did not arise until 1946:
Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N. Y. Supp. 822 (1925); People ex rel. Lewis v.
Graves, 245 N. Y. 195, 156 N. E. 663 (1927); People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of
Education, 394 Ill. 228, 68 N. E. (2d) 35 (1946); Gordon v. Board of Education of
City of Los Angeles, 178 (2d) 488 (Cal. App. 1941); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 2o3, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. ed. 649 (1948); People ex rel. Lewis v. Spaulding, 85 N. Y. S. (2d) 682 (1948).
4See Frankfurter concurring in the McCollum case, 333 U. S. 203, 212, 68 S. Ct.
461, 466, 92 L. ed. 649, 659 (1948). "The initiation of the movement may fairly
be attributed to Dr. George U. Wenner. The underlying assumption of his proposal,
made at the Interfaith Conference of Federation held in New York City in 19o5, was
that the public school unduly monopolized the child's time and that the churches
were entitled to their share of it. This, the schools should 'release'." 333 U. S. 203,
222, 68 S. Ct. 461, 470, 92 L. ed. 649, 664 (1948).
'1947 Yearbook, International Council of Religious Education, p. 76; New York
Times, September 21, 1947, p. 22.
OPeople ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N. Y. 195, 156 N. E. 663 (1927).

7People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education, 394 Ill. 228, 68 N. E. (2d) 3o 5
(1946).

'Gordon v. Board of Education, 178 P. (2d) 488 (Cal. App. 1947).
'For example, see editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 5, 1952, P. 12, col.
s: "Justice Black wrote the opinion in the McCollum decision, which declared
,released time' religious instruction for school children unconstitutional. ... If it is
in violation of the Constitution to release children from regular school schedules for
one hour a week in order to attend religious instruction 'off the premises' at their
own church or synagogue...."
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to declare a blanket disapproval of all released time religious instruction, but was passing only on the validity of the specific plan before
it.10 Nevertheless, the adverse ruling renewed the efforts of opponents
of released time religious education to invalidate all such programs.
The most recent decision resulting from this insistent pressure was
handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Zorach v.
Clauson.11 The New York plan, authorized by a 194o amendment
to the State Education Law,12 permits the release of pupils from public
schools for not more than one hour weekly upon the request of their
parents, to enable them to attend classes in sectarian religious instruction outside the school buildings and grounds. The place for instruction is not dictated by the school, there is no supervision by the school
authorities of the classes or the teachers thereof, no public monies are
used, and no promotion of the program or compulsion of attendance is
attempted by school administrators.
The petitioners in the Zorach case, parents of New York school
children, sought mandamus directing the respondents, Commissioner
of Education and the Board of Education of New York City, to discontinue the program. Both the trial term and the Appellate Division
courts of New York refused to issue the writ,'3 and the Court of Ap-

peals, in affirming,14 sustained the validity of the New York program,
relying heavily on the 1927 case of Lewis v. Graves, in which Judge
Pound had pointed out that "Neither the Constitution nor the law
discriminates against religion. Denominational religion is merely put
"°Justice Black, writing for the Court stated: "The foregoing facts ...show the
use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation
between the school authorities and the religious council in promoting religious
education.... This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and
tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith."
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 209, 68 S. Ct. 461, 464, 92 L. ed.
649, 658 (1948). Even more specific is Justice Frankfurter's observation in a concurring opinion that "Of course, 'released time' as a generalized conception, undefined by differentiating particularities, is not an issue for Constitutional adjudication." 333 U. S. 203, 225, 68 S. Ct. 461, 472, 92 L. ed. 649, 666 (1948). Justice
Jackson noted that "it is important to circumscribe our decision with some care,"
333 U. S. 203, 234, 68 S. Ct. 461, 476, 92 L. ed. 649, 670 (1948), while Justice Reed,
who dissented, pointed out that the majority justices "seem to leave open for
further litigation variations from the Champaign plan." 333 U. S. 203, 239, 68 S. Ct.
461, 479, 92 L. ed. 649, 673 (1948).
1172 S.Ct. 679, 96 L. ed. 609 (1952).
"1New York Education Law (194o) subdivision 1, paragraph b, § 321o. The
system predated the statute, but the amendment gave legislative sanction to the program.
1
3Zorach v. Clauson, 99 N. Y. S. (2d) 339 (1950), aff'd, 102 N. Y. S. (2d) 27 (1951).
1
'Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N. Y. 161, ioo N. E. (2d) 463 (1951).
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in its proper place outside of public aid or support."'15 Speaking for the
court, Judge Froessel, observing that the United States Supreme Court
had not held "that all released time programs are per se unconstitutional,"' 16 carefully set out the distinctions between the Champaign,
Illinois, and the New York plans. The main objections to the Champaign plan-lack of statutory authority, the use of school buildings for
religious training and the use of school teachers and officials for supervision and encouragement of the program, dictation of place for instruction, hiring of teachers, segregation of students according to faiths
in preparation for religious instruction, and compulsion of attendance
-were not present in the New York plan.' 7 It was declared that "separa,Lewis v. Graves, 245 N. Y. 195, 156 N. E. 663, 664 (1927).
"6Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N. Y. 161, 1oo N. E. (2d) 463, 465 (1951).
17In a similar proceeding, Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66, 85 N. Y. S. (2d) 682
(1948), decided by Special Term, Justice Elsworth of the Supreme Court, sustained
the constitutionality of the released time program in New York, and dismissed the
petition. After the submission of briefs by counsel in the Court of Appeals, petitioner
announced through counsel his intention of withdrawing and discontinuing the
appeal. In the Spaulding case, the New York Supreme Court reasoned that released time programs were not per se unconstitutional, but that the test is to be
applied to the facts of each particular program. The Board of Education of the
City of New York submitted an affidavit containing a factual analysis of the Champaign and New York plans. See Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66, 85 N. Y. S. (2d)
682, 688 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 99 N. Y. S. (2d) 339, 345 (195o):
New York Plan
Champaign Plan
"1. No underlying enabling State stat1. Education Law, § 3210 is the enabling statute which provides that
ute.
'Absence from required attendance shall
be permitted only for causes allowed by
the general rules and practices of the
public schools'; and further provides
that 'absence for religious observance
and education shall be permitted under
rules that the commissioner shall establish.'
2. Religious training took place in
2. Religious training takes place outthe school buildings and on school propside of the school buildings and off
school property.
erty.
3. The place for instruction is des3. The place for instruction was designated by the religious organization in
ignated by school officials.
cooperation with the parent.
4. No element of segregation is pres4. Pupils taking religious instrucent.
tion were segregated by school authorities according to religious faith of pupils.
5. No supervision or approval of
5. Schools officials supervised and apreligious teachers or course of instrucproved the religious teacher.
tion by school officials.
6. Pupils were solicited in school
6. School officials do not solicit or recruit pupils for religious instruction.
building for religious instruction.
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tion of church and state does not mean that every state action remotely
connected with religion must be outlawed,"18 and that the action of the
state legislature merely authorizing students to be absent from public
school classes for one hour a week to receive religious instruction in no
way infringes constitutional rights of freedom of religion.
Judge Fuld, dissenting with deep conviction, 19 called upon the
broader implications of the McCollum decision to the effect that the
First Amendment prevents the passage of any laws "which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another;" 20 and in
his view, the New York enabling statute and the program operating
under it result in "the use of the state's compulsory public school
machinery, its atmosphere and its momentum"'21 to promote the teaching of religion, in the same manner, if not to the same degree, that the
Champaign plan did.
The United States Supreme Court, in a 6 to 3 decision, affirmed the
judgment of the New York courts. 22 Justice Douglas, writing for the
7. Registration cards distributed by
school. In at least one instance, the registration cards were printed at the expense of school funds.
8. Non-attending pupils isolated or
removed to another room.

7. No registration cards furnished by
the school or distributed by the school.
No expenditures of public funds involved.
8. Non-attending pupils stay in their
regular classrooms continuing significant
educational work.
9. No credit given for attendance at
the religious classes.
io. No compulsion by school authorities with respect to attendance or
truancy.
11. No promotion or publicizing of
the released time program by school officials.
12. No public moneys are used."
Judge Elsworth in the Spaulding case concluded: "In view of the opinion herein
expressed that the decision in the McCoUum case ...does not make 'Released Time'
as such unconstitutional, the program challenged in this proceeding can only be
condemned upon a finding that they are in aid of religion.... This court cannot
so find. It believes the New York plan free from the objectionable features which
motivated the United States Supreme Court to declare the Champaign plan unconstitutional.... Judged in the light of those essential requirements, this court can
neither in law nor in conscience hold that the programs here assailed are constitutionally condemned by the McCollum decision." Lewis v. Spaulding, 139 Misc.
66, 85 N. Y. S. (2d) 682, 689, 690 (1948).
'sZorach v. Clauson, 303 N. Y. r61, 1o N. E. (2d) 463, 467 (1951).
DZorach v. Clauson, 303 N. Y. i6l, 1OO N. E. (2d) 463, 474 (1951).
0McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 21o, 68 S.Ct. 461, 465, 92 L. ed.
649, 658 (1948).
"Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N. Y. 161, 1oo N. E. (2d) 463, 477 (1941)2Zorach v. Clauson, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L. ed. 609 (1952).
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majority, distinguished the McCollum case by pointing out that in the
New York system the school classrooms are not used for religious
instruction and no public funds are applied to the support of the
program. 23 In testing the validity of the New York plan, he stated
that while the Constitution "reflects the philosophy" that government
shall be separated from the church, "the First Amendment ... does
not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of
church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency
one on the other."24 Looking at the specific situation before the Court,
the majority Justices could see no way in which New York has prohibited the "free exercise" of religion, because "no one is forced to go
to the religious classroom and no religious exercise or instruction is
brought to the classrooms of the public schools." 25 Nor has the state
violated the prohibitions against making any "law respecting an establishment of religion," for there is "no constitutional requirement
which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and
to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. 26 Rather, it is only required that the "government
27
...be neutral when it comes to competition between sects."
Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson, though dissenting in separate opinions, all found the same basic fault with the New York
system-that the New York released time program is a use of the State's
power of coercion over school children. Though children are not compelled to attend the religious instruction classes, they are not released
from school unless they will attend. In Justice Jackson's words, "if the
youngster fails to go to Church school [the truant officer] dogs him
back to the public school room ... [which] serves as a temporary
"From Justice Douglas' discussion, it seems clear that the plan upheld in 1947
by the California decision of Gordon v. Board of Education of Los Angeles, 178 P.
(2d) 488 (Cal. App. 1947) would be struck down by the Supreme Court. Although
in the California plan classes are not held in the public school buildings, most of
the other specific objections of the Champaign program are found in the California
plan. The expenses of registration were paid by the school system, and teachers and
superintendents of schools were directed to keep attendance records and oversee the
working of the plan. The additional fact that the California court relied on the
Illinois Supreme Court's favorable decision in the McCollum case, S96 Ill. 14, 75
N. E. (2d) 161 (1947), may cast further doubt on the holding in the Gordon case.
in the light of the United States Supreme Court's reversal of the Illinois decision.
1aZorach v. Clauson, 72 S. Ct. 679, 683, 96 L. ed. 6o9 ,613 (1952).
272 S. Ct. 679, 682, 96 L. ed. 6o9, 612 (1952).
2672 S. Ct. 679, 684, 96 L. ed. 609, 614 (1952).
172 S. Ct. 679, 684, 96 L. ed. 6o9, 614 (1952).
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jail for a pupil who will not go to Church. ' 28 Without such sanctions,
it was argued that most children would not attend the religious instruction, and therefore the power of the State is used to support a
religious organization. In the view of Justice Black, such activity violates
the fundamental principle that government should not be allowed
to "steal into the sacred area of religious choice," and he concluded: "Before today, our judicial opinions have refrained from
drawing invidious distinctions between those who believe in no religion and those who do believe. The First Amendment has lost much
if the religious follower and the atheist are no longer to be judicially
' 29
regarded as entitled to equal justice under the law.
The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, made applicable
to state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Historical construction of this Amendment, based on writings of contemporaries of the Constitution, has developed a view espousing very strict prohibitions against any connection between government and religion. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between church and state," 30 and that concept has
become the metaphorical starting point interpreting the freedom of religion guarantee of the First Amendment. Madison 3l is regarded as having made a "broadside attack upon all forms of 'establishment of religion,' both general and particular, nondiscriminatory or selective ...
Madison opposed every form and degree of official relation between religion and civil authority. For him religion was a wholly private mat32
ter beyond the scope of civil power either to restrain or to support."
'72 S. Ct. 679, 689, 96 L. ed. 609, 615 (1952).
'72 S. Ct. 679, 687, 96 L. ed. 609, 620 (1952).
'8 Works of Thomas Jefferson (Ford's ed. 19o4) 113; Note (1948) 17 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 516. Jefferson wrote a letter to a group of Baptists in Connecticut in which
he declared the First Amendment had as its primary purpose the erection
of a "wall of separation between church and state." See Reynolds v. United States,
98 U. S. 45, 164, 25 L. ed. 244, 249 (1879).
*"Madison in his "Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments,"
written in 1785, is the most relied on contemporary writing of the Constitution to
formulate an interpretation of the First Amendment. It is set out in Everson v.
Board of Education, 33o U. S. 1, 12, 63 ff., 67 S. Ct. 504, 509, 543 if., 91 L. ed. 711,
721, 748 if. (1947); 2 Writings of James Madison 183-191.
2Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. i, 37, 67 S. Ct. 504, 522, 91 L. ed. 711,
734 (1947)- For a pertinent discussion of Madison's conception of an "establishment
of religion" in 1785 in a local Virginia religious liberty political fight and the question of the meaning of the First Amendment, see Corwin, A Constitution of Powers in
a Secular State (1951) ioo. Professor Corwin says in reference to the "Remonstrance"
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However, Judge Desmond, concurring in the New York Court of
Appeals decision in the Zorach case, 33 correctly points out that there
never has been a total separation of religion from government, and, in
his belief, the real meaning of the "establishment" clause is expressed
by the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut: "It forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship." 34 Justice Douglas, in the Supreme Court opinion in
the Zorach case, supports this point of view, advocating the policy
that government "shows no partiality to any one group and ...let's
each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of
its dogma." 35 He argues that to set forth as a constitutional requirement that government must maintain a complete indifference to
religion would be to prefer "those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe."3 6 Professor Corwin endorses this point of view
in asserting: "All that it [the establishment of religion clause] does,
is to forbid Congress to give any religious faith, sect, or denomination
a preferred status. 37 He argues that the core of the First Amendment
is no preference. It does not mean government must refuse to take
notice of religious sentiment throughout the nation.
That the Supreme Court has not embraced the theory of complete
separation of the activities of church and State is further demonstrated
by Everson v. Board of Education,3s where it was held in a 5 to 4 decision that the transportation of children to parochial schools by the
state does not violate the First Amendment. The majority opinion
rejected the Madisonian view of the breadth of the restrictions on the
government in this field, declaring rather that "The 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church ...can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another."3 9 The strong Everson dissent contended that not merely
and Supreme Court interpretation in the Everson and McCollum cases: First, the
"Remonstrance" antedated the Amendment by four years; second, Madison himself
never offered it as an interpretation of the Amendment; third, he was not the
author of the Amendment in which form it was proposed to the state legislatures;
fourth, the "Remonstrance" itself is evidence that "establishment of religion" meant
in 1785 a religion enjoying a privileged legal position; fifth, Madison's personal
assertions would appear to discourage it.
3o3 N. Y. 161, oo N. E. (2d) 463 (1951).
-310 U. S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. goo, 903, 84 L. ed. 1213, 1218 (1940).
'72 S. Ct. 679, 684, 96 L. ed. 6og, 614 (1952).
"72 S. Ct. 679, 684, 96 L. ed. 6o9, 614 (1952).

'Corwin, A Constitution of Powers in a Secular State (1951) 99.
133o U. S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L. ed. 711 (1947).
"330 U. S. 1, 15, 67 S. Ct. 504, 511, 91 L. ed. 711, 723 (1947).
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is an established church forbidden, but also "every form of public aid
or support for religion." 40 This latter opinion takes on added importance from the fact that these same dissenting Justices later became
parties to the concurring opinion in the McCollum case, and three of
them reiterated their stand in the Zorach case dissents.
In view of the substantial doubt created by lack of unanimity
among the Justices in the Everson, McCollum, and Zorach cases, uncertainty necessarily remains as to where the line of legality is to be
drawn in regard to released time religious education. Loose references
to "a wall between Church and State which must be kept high and
impregnable" 41 are not meaningful, for as the New York Court of
Appeals observed, "No metaphorical 'wall' that mere words can build
42
ever precisely and mathematically delineates a constitutional right."
Since the courts seem to agree that "the Constitution does not demand
that every friendly gesture between church and State shall be discountenanced," 43 proponents of Weekday Religious Education are left
to surmise how much connection with the public school system is to
be permitted.
Substantial judicial sentiment seems to exist in favor of allowing released time programs to continue, but it appears that the courts are
trying to bring constant pressure on advocates of the respective programs to operate as independently from the public school system as is
possible. Indeed, the supporters of the programs favor the largest
feasible degree of independence as insurance against domination of
the projects by school authorities. Release of school time seems necessary to the success of the programs, and prior to the Zorach case, the
judges had not voiced any substantial opposition to that phase of the
plan. Even the Zorach case dissenters concede the power of the state
to release school time for religious activities, but they would require
40Justice Rutledge points out that the Amendment was broadly but not loosely
phrased. "The Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation. ... But the
object ... was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public
aid or support for religion." 33o U. S. 1, 31, 67 S. Ct. 504, 519, 91 L. ed. 711, 731 (1947).

,"McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212, 68 S. Ct. 461, 465, 92 L. ed.
649, 659 (1948).
'2Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N. Y. 161, 1oo N. E. (2d) 463, 467 (1951).
',Zorach v. Clauson, 3o3'N.-Y. 161, 1oo N. E. (2d) 463, 467 (1951). Justice Douglas
confirmed this observation by declaring that the state and religion are not required
to be hostile, suspicious, or unfriendly to each other. "When the state encourages
religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule
of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions." 72 S. Ct.
679, 684, 96 L. ed. 609, 614 (1952).
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that all children be excused from school during those periods, without the condition of attendance at the religious instruction classes
being imposed.44 The use of the school buildings for the classes is
also a highly important part of the plan, and is probably essential in
rural areas. Such use of public property was one of the features of the
Champaign plan mentioned with disapproval in the McCollum case,
though that factor was not stressed. However, in the Zorach opinion,
Justice Douglas refers four times to this use of school classrooms as
45
one of the reasons why the Court held the Champaign plan invalid.
On the other hand, Justice Black, in his Zorach dissent, implies that
this is not an important consideration,4 6 and thus it cannot be known
whether that factor alone would be sufficient to invalidate any local
program. If any employment of public funds or activity by public
school teachers or administrators is involved in the promotion of the
program, the limits of legality have doubtless been passed. But with
careful local planning, the support and supervision of the work could
generally be kept separate from the public school system to a sufficient
degree to satisfy a majority of the Supreme Court as now constituted.
D.

CONTRACTS-ENFORCEABILITY
ENANT NOT

To

OF REASONABLE

HENRY NORTHINGTON

RESTRICTIONS

OF COV-

COMPETE DRAWN IN INDIVISIBLE FOaM WITH UN-

REASONABLY BROAD RESTRAINTS.

[Kentucky]

In order to protect the goodwill transferred in the sale of an
established business, courts of equity may enforce the covenant of a
vendor not to compete in a like enterprise for a limited period of time,
"The dissenting Justices seem to assume that the programs would quickly die
under that system because not many children would attend classes. Justice Frankfurter notes: "The unwillingness of the promoters of this movement to dispense with
such use of the public schools betrays a surprising want of confidence in the inherent
power of the various faiths to draw children to outside sectarian classes-an attitude
that hardly reflects the faith of the greatest religious spirits." 72 S. Ct. 679, 688, 96 L.
ed. 6o9, 617 (1952).
.Also, Professor Corwin appears to put a great deal of weight on the fact that
the program took place in the public school buildings. Although he opposes the
view, he states that the McCollum case "held that a school board may not constitutionally permit religious groups to use on equal footing any part of a school
building for the purpose of religious instruction to those who wish to receive it."
Corwin, A Constitution of Powers in a Secular State (1951) 96. See also Note (1949)
49 Col. L. Rev. 836, 839, where the writer feels the McCollum decision is based on
unconstitutional use of tax-supported public property.
"'72 S. Ct. 679, 685, 96 L. ed. 6o9, 618 (1952).
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if the restriction is confined to a designated area no broader than the
territorial limits of the business.1 When asked by the vendee to enjoin
threatened competition, the court must first determine whether the
prohibitions contained in the agreement are reasonable. The test is said
to be whether the restraint "'is such only as to afford a fair protection
to the interest of the party in favor of whom it is given and not so
large as to interfere with the interest of the public'." 2 If upon the
application of this test the agreement is found to be objectionable, the
court must further determine whether the whole ancillary contract
not to compete is void, or whether it can be enforced in a modified
form. Even if all the restrictive provisions are not reasonable as to time
and space, if they are disjunctively described and in divisible form so
that the parts which are unreasonably in restraint of trade can be
deleted by applying the "blue-pencil" test, leaving perfectly valid
provisions unaltered, the courts are unanimous in enforcing the remaining parts. 3 But the decisions are in conflict as to the enforceability
of unreasonable covenants in restraint of trade which are not severable
or divisible in form. In the majority of American jurisdictions, and in
England, the courts have taken the position that such covenants are
completely void.4 However, the modem trend is for the court to ex'Hedrick v. Perry, 1o2 F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A. ioth, 1939); United States v. Addyston
Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898); Ladd v. Pittsburgh Consolidated
Coal Co., 309 Ky. 405, 217 S. W. (2d) 807 (1949); Johnson v. Stumbo, 277 Ky. 3oi,
126 S. W. (2d) 165 (1939); Mitchell v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711); Restatement,
Contracts (1932) § 516.
'Automobile Club of Southern New Jersey v. Zubrin, 127 N. J. Eq 202, 12 A.
(2d) 369, 370 (1940).
3Attwood v. Lamont, [192o 3 K. B. 571, 577: "... it is still the law that a
contract can be severed if the severed parts are independent of one another and can
be severed without the severance affecting the meaning of the part remaining. This
is sometimes expressed ... by saying that the severance can be effected when the
part covered can be removed by running a blue pencil through it." For additional
cases on the blue pencil test see: Ember v. Ferne, 23 Ohio App. 218, 155 N. E. 496
(1926); Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346, 153 Eng. Rep. 1222 (1847). Also see 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1659.
Once the court determines the restrictive covenants are divisible or separate
in form, there is no hesitation in enforcing the valid parts, while holding the remainder invalid. Hunter v. Superior Court in and for Riverside County, 36 Cal.
App. (2d) 100, 97 P. (2d) 492 (1939); Roberts v. H. C. Whitmer Co., 46 Ga. App.
839, 169 S. E. 385 (1933); Bennett v. Carmichael Produce Co., 64 Ind. App. 341, 115
N. E. 793 (1917); Credit Rating Service v. Charlesworth, 126 N. J. Eq. 36o, 8 A. (2d) 847
(1943); Redgrave v. Wilkinson, 208 S. W. (2d) 15o (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); 5 Williston
Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) § i66o; Note (1949) 6 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 197.
4
Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A. (2d) 161 (1948); Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N. E. io48 (1895); Lemire v. Haley, 91 N. H. 357, 19 A.
(2d) 436 (1941); Stevens & Thompson Paper Co. v. Brady, 1o6 N. J. Eq. 410, 151 Ad.
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amine the contract and impose reasonable restrictions consistent with
the intention of the parties, even though the expressed terms of the
agreement imposed a much greater restraint.5
This view is well illustrated by the recent Kentucky case of Ceresia
v. Mitchell.6 Defendant, who had owned and operated a small wholesale fruit and vegetable business in Central City, Kentucky for many
years, sold the business and leased the premises to the plaintiffs for
$io,ooo for a period of ten years with right of renewal. The contract
provided that the vendor "is forever barred and prevented from engaging in any kind of business of whatsoever kind ... in the County of
Muhlenberg and State of Kentucky. This forever preventing and barring from engaging in business ... also extends to his children, his
Executors and Administrators... .,7 After about two years, defendant
reentered the wholesale fruit and vegetable business in the city, and
plantiffs sought to enjoin him from engaging in that enterprise in violation of his covenant not to compete. The lower court granted an
injunction restraining defendant from entering the fruit and vegetable
business in the same county and city for a period coextensive with
the terms of the lease. The defendant appealed on the grounds that he
was unaware of the contents of the instrument at the time he signed it,
that the provisions not to compete were unreasonable, that they were
not capable of a divisible construction, and were therefore void and
unenforceable. Although the Court of Appeals found the covenants
as originally drafted far too broad to be enforceable, it affirmed the
decision of the lower court as "practicable and just," on the theory
that the injunction as granted in no way prejudiced the public interest
or imposed any undue burden on the vendor, but was necessary to
give the vendees' interest the adequate protection which the parties
intended to provide. Two justices dissented on the ground that there
was no sound legal basis on which the court could reform or rewrite
the illegal contract and then enforce it "after we have whittled it down
to conform to our notions of decency." 8
92 (1930); Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R. I. 3, 19 Atl. 712 (i8go); General Bronze
Corp. v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N. W. 469 (1932); Attwood v. Lamont,

[192o ]

3 K. B. 57,; 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) § 166o; Restatement, Contracts
(1932) § 518.
'Hill v. Central West Public Service Co., 37 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1930);
Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 S. (2d) 240 (1944); Edwards v. Mullin, 22o Cal. 379,
30 P. (2d) 997 (1934); Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N. E. 856
(1935); Hartman v. Everett, 158 Okla. 29, 12 P. (2d) 543 (1932).
0242 S. W. (2d) 359 (Ky. 1951).
'Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S. W. (2d) 359, 362 (Ky. 1951).
Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S. W. (2d) 359, 365 (Ky. 1951).
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The minority view applied in the principal decision, which would
allow partial enforcement even though the covenants are not divisible
in form, is based on the logical contention that "Questions involving
legality of contracts should not depend on form," 9 but rather on
"whether partial enforcement is possible without injury to the public
and without injustice to the parties themselves."' 0 This view had been
adopted in a number of the well-reasoned recent decisions," and is
stated as the proper rule by Professor Corbin and is now sanctioned
by Professor Williston, though the opposite rule was adopted by the
Restatement. 12 In many cases, courts which purport to support the
majority view actually distort the language and intent of the parties
in order to give to agreements the technical "divisible" form requisite
for enforcement. Thus, although not recognizing the modem rule, these
courts are in fact applying it.' 3
The enforcement of so much of an unreasonable restraint as would
be reasonable under the circumstances, regardless of whether or not
the agreement is by its terms divisible, is the only way to protect the
purchaser's interest and at the same time prevent the seller from being
unjustly enriched by the abrogation of his own covenant. In the instant
case the market value of the physical assets of the business did not
amount to half of the purchase price. This means that approximately
14
$5,oo was paid by the purchasers for the goodwill of the business.
05 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) 4683.
106 Corbin, Contracts (1951) 499.
"John T. Stanley Co., Inc. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F. (2d) 112, 116 (S. D. N. Y. 1931):
'..
where the restraint is over an excessive territory, it should be enforced as to
the part of such territory where restraint is reasonable, irrespective of the divisible
character of the language used in the agreement." For additional cases note 5,
supra.
"6 Corbin, Contracts (1951) 500: "In the best considered modern cases however, the court has decreed enforcement as against a defendant whose breach has
occurred within an area in which restriction would dearly be reasonable, even
though the terms of the agreement imposed a larger and unreasonable restraint."
For Williston's view see (1948) 23 Conn. Bar J. 40. For the view adopted by the
Restatement, see Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 518"Fleckenstein Bros. Co. v. Fleckenstein, 76 N. J. L. 613, 71 At. 265, 266 (1908)
(Where the agreement was not to compete "within five hundred miles from the
City of Jersey City, N. J.... within the period of twenty years," it was held to be
divisible and thus enforceable to the extent reasonable.);Trenton Potteries Co v.
Olyphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 Ati. 723, 725 (1899) (Where the contract bound the
vendor "within any state in the United States of America, or within the District of
Columbia, except in the state of Nevada and the territory of Arizona, for the period
of fifty years," the court held that the description of the places was divisible, embracing several areas disjunctively described.)
uCeresia v. Mitchell, 242 S. W. (2d) 359 at 362 (Ky. 1951).
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The agreement entered into for the protection of the purchasers' interest was admittedly too broad, but if no part thereof were enforceable, the goodwill bought and paid for by the purchasers would be
rendered valueless. For a "court of conscience" to allow such an obvious
injustice would be anomalous.
One of the major objections raised to the adoption of the partial
enforceability rule is that purchasers possessing superior bargaining
power would insist upon including the most unreasonable restrictions
in the contract, knowing that the court will in any event enforce the
covenant to the legal maximum, if not in full. 15 To grant partial relief is to encourage efforts to contract for unreasonable advantages,
while to render the unreasonable covenant totally void is to warn
vendees to impose only fair restrictions on their vendors. This might
be a very persuasive argument if the courts were called on to enforce
the contract as written, and were faced with determining the maximum
permissible boundaries of legal restraint. But such a general determination is rarely necessary since the "question usually is whether a restriction against what the defendant has in fact done or is threatening
would be a reasonable and valid restriction."'1 Another objection asserted is that the court, in whittling down the restriction and enforcing a part thereof, is in effect creating a new contract to which the
parties did not agree. 17 It is submitted, however, that the intention
of the parties is given no less consideration in cases in which the restrictions are stated in indivisible terms than in those in which the
provisions are disjunctively stated, and yet in the latter cases no such
obstacle has been encountered by the courts in enforcing the valid
divisible provisions. Assuming the basic intent of the parties was to
5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) § 166o; Notes (1937) 22 Corn. L. Q.
246 at 248; (1948) 26 N. C. L. Rev. 402.
16 Corbin, Contracts (1951) 502 [italics supplied].
"7Such reasoning is manifested in a recent federal case in which the court said:
"The court must be guided by the contract that was entered into between the
parties and cannot by judicial decision create a new and different contract. If
the contract had contained separate restrictive clauses applying to separate geographical areas, even though one may have been included within another, it would
seem that if the evidence showed that plaintiff's reasonable interests being subjected
to injury extended over any one or more of the limited areas, the covenants applicable to them, being lawful, could be enforced and the illegal covenants disregarded.... But where the contract contains but a single territorial covenant and it
is void as being in unreasonable restraint of trade it seems that the entire contract
must fall." Interstate Finance Corporation v. Wood, 69 F. Supp. 278, 279 (E. D. Ill.
1946). Also see Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A. (2d) 161 (1948); Automobile Club
of Southern New Jersey v. Zubrin, 127 N. J. Eq. 202, 12 A. (2d) 369 (1940).
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protect the purchaser's investment, such intent would be easily effectuated in both situations since the court is enforcing the reasonable
part of the restrictions by which the parties contracted to be bound.
The lesser restraint imposed was necessarily included in the larger
restraint originally agreed to, and the seller should not be heard to
complain since he is getting a better bargain than he was entitled to
under the contract as executed by the parties.
It must be remembered that a distinction is to be made between
covenants which form part of a plan to obtain a monopoly or some
other unlawful result and those merely intended to protect the buyer's
interests.' 8 As to the former, the consideration is paid for an illegal
purpose, malum in se, and no part of such a restraint should ever be
enforced. Since there is no indication that the buyers in the instant
case ever formed any scheme to monopolize the wholesale fruit and
vegetable business in their city, it is difficult to see how that principle
could be used as a basis for striking down the contract under consideration, though some of the authority cited by the dissenting justices
suggests that approach.1 9
In the Ceresia case the original agreement is dearly unreasonable
in at least four respects. The restraints as to time, space, type of businoss, and persons bound are all too broad to be upheld as reasonable
covenants not to compete. Admittedly, multiple provisions which are
unduly harsh and restrictive might be some indication of an attempt
on the part of the buyer to defraud the seller, but once the court is
convinced the parties only intended to protect the goodwill transferred,
"Where the parties attempt to create a monopoly, such restriction is against
public policy and therefore void in its inception. To hold in such an instance
"that the vendor should be bound not to carry on his business, because he has
received an adequate consideration for his agreement, is no answer to the objection that the agreement tends to foster the formation of a monopoly, and is
therefore against public policy." Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli, 57 Ohio St. 596, 49
N. E. 1oo, 1034 (1898). Also see 6 Corbin, Contracts (1951) § 139o, n. 52.
"Evidently the dissenting justices failed to take into consideration this distinction between covenants to safeguard the goodwill of the business and covenants designed to aid in the creation of a monopoly, since they cite the case of Johnson v.
McMillin, 178 Ky. 707, 199 S. W. 1070 (1918), in support of the stand taken by them.
In that case a note and mortgage were given for consideration, a part of which
was illegal because it was given for the obstruction of justice. It was held that the
note was unenforceable on account of the illegality of a part of its consideration.
However, in following this rule of law, the court observed that the opposite is
true "where the consideration or all of the considerations, if there be more than
one, are legal, and they are relied upon to support several promises made because of
these considerations, some of which are legal and others illegal." 178 Ky. 707, 199
S. W. 1070, 1072 (1918).
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it should attempt to effectuate that intent, regardless of how crudely or
ineptly the contract may be worded. Any other result will mean an
unjust enrichment for the seller and a corresponding hardship or loss
to the buyer. After the court became satisfied the buyers contracted in
good faith, it was faced with the question of whether the defendant's
act amounted to a breach of his covenant not to infringe upon the
goodwill sold with the business by competing within the territorial
limits of the business.20 Having ascertained that the defendant's new
business was within the area in which a valid restraint could be imposed, the court had to decide how long the restraint should last 2 ' and
what types of business should be included. 22 Manifestly, the plaintiffs' interest would only last so long as the lease ran and would
only be affected by defendant's opening another wholesale fruit
and vegetable business. Since plaintiffs asked for an injunction
against only the seller, the court did not go into the question of
whether or not the seller's children, executors and administrators
could also be bound, as was provided in the contract. That question
was not pertinent other than in determining the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the entire covenant. However, it is clear that only
the seller could be enjoined under the general rule that the "restraint
cannot exceed the promisor's own life or the lives of those for whose
forbearance he has contracted and who helped create the goodwill
23
sold."
If there is any reason to doubt the wisdom of the decision, it arises
from the shockingly broad scope of the restrictions which the plaintiffs
placed on the defendant by the contract. Conceding that the modern
trend of partial enforcement is generally fair and realistic, it is arguable
that the vendees in this instance have attempted to take such an un"John T. Stanley Co., Inc. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F. (2d) 112, 115 (S. D. N. Y.
1931): To meet the reasonable requirement, the injunction "must be no wider than
is necessary to protect the business sold."
-It has been held that a covenant not to compete if unlimited as to time is
valid so long as it is reasonable in other respects. Griffin v. Guy, 172 Md. 510, 192 Atl.
359 (1937). However, a better rule would seem to be the one adopted by the South
Carolina court: "In determining whether a contract is reasonable in respect to
length of time during which the restriction is to run ... it would seem that the
fair and full protection of the business, good will and trade name which the vendee
has purchased and paid for, may well be accepted as the test." Reeves v. Sargeant,
200 S. C. 494, 21

S. E. (2d) 184, 188

(1942).

-The court construed the covenant not to compete in any business whatsoever
as limited to the particular business sold-the wholesale fruit and vegetable
business. See 6 Corbin, Contracts (1951) § 1390.
"6 Corbin, Contracts (1951) 508.
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conscionable advantage of the vendor by the imposition of so extremely
unreasonable limitations that equitable relief should be withheld.
However, the court found the evidence indicated that the plaintiffs
were innocent of actual fraudulent intent, and, in such circumstances,
to refuse to enforce any restraints against the defendant would allow
him to derive an undeserved benefit from the repudiation of his
pledge not to interfere with the vendees' operation of the business.
CHARLES F.

TUCKER

DAMAGES-POWER OF TRIAL COURT TO ORDER REMITrITUR or ExcEssIVE
DAMAGES.

[Utah]

Although determination of the amount of damages is generally
a question of fact for the jury, the court can interfere with a verdict
where the sum set is clearly excessive.1 This seems actually to be a
usurpation by the court of a jury function, but it is said that "the
court is not substituting its judgment for that of the jury; it is merely
deciding that a part of what the jury awarded was not an excessive
2
amount."
The tests used to determine whether a verdict is excessive3 are
typically stated as: (i) whether the total damage awarded falls somewhere within limits of fair and reasonable compensation in the par"Arkansas Amusement Corp. v. Ward, 204 Ark. 130, 161 S. W. (2d) 178 (1942);
Cheasapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Arrington, 126 Va. 194, 101 S. E. 415 (1919).
2
See Note (1935) 21 Va. L. Rev. 666, 672, citing Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure
in Actions at Law (1922) 122. Florida E. C. Ry. Co. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 1O, 64 So. 504
(1914).

Olt is certain from the cases that in determining whether a jury's verdict awarding
damage for personal injury is excessive, each case must be determined primarily
on its own facts. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Houston, 209 Ark. 217, 189 S. W. (2d)
904 (1945); Kirschbaum c. McCarthy, 5 Cal. (2d) 191, 54 P- (2d) 8 (1936). But some

courts say that where the facts as to injuries inflicted and losses sustained are similar,
though perhaps not identical, there should be a reasonable uniformity as to the
amount of verdicts in the various cases. Mudrick v. Market Street Ry. Co., ii Cal. (2d)
724, 81 P. (2d) 950, ix8 A. L. R. 533 (1938); Muller v. Herrin Motor Lines, 184 So.
4o6 (La. App. 1938); Joice v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 34 Mo. 439, 189 S. W.
(2d) 568, 161 A. L. R. 383 (1945). The courts are, however, careful to point out that
the dollar has decreased in value since earlier cases were decided and that this
should be borne in mind. Jones v. Atlantic Refining Co., 55 F. Supp. 17 (E. D. Pa.
1944); Boboricken v. U. S., 76 F. Supp. 70 ( W. D. Wash. 1947); Brown v. Boehm,
178 P. (2d) 49 (Cal. App. 1947); Raimondi v. Ziffrin Truck Lines, 329 Ill. App. 65o,
70 N. E. (2d) 221 (1946); Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170, 19 N. W. (2d) 327 (1945);
Henderson v. Dolas, 217 S. W. (2d) 554 (Mo. 1949).

WASHINGTON

230

AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. IX

ticular case, or whether the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to
compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake, or corruption; 4 (2)whether it appears, as a matter of
law, that the sum awarded is unsupported by evidence or is such as to
suggest passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury; 5 (3)
whether the award substantially exceeds a rational appraisal of the
damages; 6 or (4) whether the award exceeds a definite limit fixed by
7
a rule of law.
Once the court has decided that the verdict is excessive, s there are
usually two courses open to correct it. First, the court can set aside the
verdict and order a new trial or it can grant a remittitur. If a new trial
is ordered, when the sole objection is to the amount of damages a needless retrial of all the issues is often avoided by limiting it to the issue of
damages.9 Second, most courts have assumed the authority to give the
plaintiff a choice of remitting the part of the award considered excessive
instead of suffering a new trial. x0 This is done out of strong policy
aimed at ending litigation, thus relieving crowded court dockets and
minimizing costs of litigation."
2
The recent Utah case of Duffy v. Union Pacific Railroad Company'
illustrates the lengths to which courts will go to give effect to this
policy. In this case, a personal injury action, the court considered a
remittitur proper even though there had been error in the instruction
to the jury which may have affected the amount of unliquidated
damages awarded. The trial judge had instructed the jury that plaintiff
'Silks v. Monzani,

128

Conn. 470,

24

A. (2d) 247

(1942).

'Hunton v. California Portland Cement Co., 64 Cal. App. (2d) 876, 149 P. (2d)
471 (1944), opinion supplemented 64 Cal. App. (2d) 876, 150 P. (2d) 221 (1944).
OAllbritton v. Sunray Oil Corp., 88 F. Supp. 54 (S. D. Tex. 1949).
7N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (ig5o) §1o9; Fiato v. News Syndicate, 195 Misc. 181, 91 N. Y.
S. (2d) 391 (1949).
8'The size of the verdict alone is not sufficient evidence of excessiveness, even
though it is the largest verdict ever rendered in the jurisdiction. Evans v. Star Publishing Company, 124 Misc. 777, 209 N. Y. Supp. 267 (1925). But if a prior verdict
returned is substantially the same, this is some indication that the verdict is not
excessive. Russ v. The Steamboat War Eagle, 14 Iowa 363 (1862).
'Gasoline Products Co. Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494, 51 S. Ct.
513, 75 L. ed. xi88 (1931) (partial new trial held constitutional); Mathewson v.
Colpitts, 284 Mass. 581, 188 N. E. 6oi (1933); Busse v. White, 287 S. W. 6oo (Mo.
1926).

1

0'he trial court cannot order a reduction in the amount of damage awarded
in a personal injury case without the consent of the plaintiff, and he must be accorded
the option of taking a new trial. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 9 S. Ct. 696, 33 L. ed.
iso (1889); Cazzell v. Schofield, 319 Mo. 1169, 8 S. W. (2d) 580 (1928).
"See Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs (1942) 49 W. Va. L. Q. 1, 20.
2218 P. (2d) io8o (Utah 1950).
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could be given compensation for future pain and suffering, whereas
it did not appear from the record that there had been any pain and
suffering for some time before the trial or that the injury was of such
nature that future pain and suffering could be inferred. Therefore,
the instruction was erroneous. The verdict of the jury was that plaintiff had sustained damages in the amount of $12,5oo from which the
jury deducted $3,500 for contributory negligence of the plaintiff. It
had been stipulated that the plaintiff had lost $i,3oo in wages due to
the injury, and the majority of the Utah Supreme Court asserted that
it must be assumed that the jury awarded this amount, leaving $11,2oo
general damages. This sum both the majority and minority of the
court considered excessive, but disagreement arose as to the cause of
the error in computing the award. The majority considered it the
product of passion and prejudice which would be cured if the plaintiff elected to remit .4,ooo rather than suffer a new trial; but to the
dissenting judge the only proper conclusion was that the jury considered the erroneous instruction and gave weight to the elements of
recovery covered by it.
The dissent evidently was based on the view that the jury must
either have acted with complete disregard for the instruction and returned the verdict as a product of passion and prejudice or have based
its verdict on the erroneous instruction, thus entering into the realm
of speculation, and that in such a situation the jury will be assumed
to have acted on the instruction. The dissenting judge, therefore, concluded that the defendant had been prejudiced by the erroneous
instruction and that the majority mistakenly assumed that the verdict
would have been for about the same amount even though the instruction as to the future pain and suffering had not been given. Thus, the
majority was regarded as having assumed that the jury acted with
passion and prejudice rather than on an erroneous instruction.
It seems strange that a court would consider that the jury, which is
composed of laymen, acted properly by refusing to give effect to the
erroneous instruction which was given by the trial judge, and then
consider that the jury acted with some improper motive when passing
on the other elements of damage covered by the correct instructions.
Such an inconsistent approach seems to be contrary to reason, and
a jury should be credited with having attempted to follow the directions of the trial court rather than be condemned for acting arbi3
trarily.1
"Union Traction Co. v. Cameron, 155 N. E. 265 (Ind. App. 1927); Indianapolis
Traction & Terminal Co. v. Hensley, 186 Ind. 479, 115 N. E. 934 (1917).
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When the factor of erroneous instruction is not involved, a remittitur is clearly proper where the damages are determinable by
relatively fixed standards, and courts will generally employ that procedure if the plaintiff consents to it in lieu of a new trial.' 4 When, as
in the principal case, damages must be based on very indefinite considerations, some courts disclaim authority to order a remittitur, because in such situations it is felt that the court would clearly have to
substitute its opinions for those of the jury, thus usurping jury functions. 15 However, other courts reason that the power to determine
whether the damages awarded are excessive necessarily implies authority to determine an amount that would not be excessive;' 6 and in
giving the plaintiff an option to remit the excess or submit to a new
trial, it is argued that the court is not usurping the function of the jury
by arbitrarily fixing the amount of recovery, but is merely indicating the
7
greatest amount which could have been allowed to stand.'
If the practice of granting a new trial is to be recognized as the basic
method of relieving the defendant from the consequences of an excessive
verdict, then the use of remittitur would appear to be unfair. "It would
seem to be something a little short of justice and consistency to tell
the defendant that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury has
not treated him fairly, and then to tell him that he must forego the
privilege because the court and the plaintiff have agreed upon a
scheme for disposing of the case without the aid of a jury."' s This is
particularly true where the damages are of such a nature that the
proper measure of recovery is largely within the discretion of the jury
between broad flexible limits. Courts which allow a remittitur in such
a case may admit that it is illogical and even be critical of the practice, yet follow it because it has become firmly entrenched in the
particular jurisdiction's law.' 9 Some courts employ the practice in
"'Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Meyers, 15o Ky. 841, 151 S. W. 19 (1912).

nTifton, T. & G. Ry. Co. v. Chastain, 122 Ga. 250, 50 S. E. 105 (1905); Thompson
v. Davis Colliery Co., 104 W. Va. 493, 140 S. E. 489 (1927).

'Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 13o U. S. 69, 9 S. Ct. 458, 32 L. ed.
854 (1889). See Note (1934) 44 Yale L. J. 318, 32o. But cf. Carlin, Remittiturs and
Additurs (1942) 49 W. Va. L. Q. i, 16.
:'Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 1o, 64 So. 504, 7 A. L. R. 131o
(1914).

"8Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs (1942) 49 W. Va. L. Q. i, 20. Also see Note
(1935) 21 Va. L. Rev. 666, 671, attacking the soundness of the practice by way of
demonstration that the court's absolute discretion is applicable only to the extent
of determining whether there ought to be a new trial, and not to a determination of
the proper course of procedure after it has been decided that a new trial ought to
be granted.
"Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Ebert, 74 Ill. 399 (1874).
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such situations only where there is no evidence of passion and prejudice,2 0 whereas others sanction a remittitur despite the fact that
passion and prejudice is shown,21 and yet in other jurisdictions the
presence of passion and prejudice is the only basis upon which a remittitur will be allowed. 22 It may be that the courts committed to
these three views will reach the same result, upon identical facts,
23
despite their differences in the basis for granting remittitur.
Where the court has given an erroneous instruction, as in the
principal case, and an excessive verdict is returned, the difficulty is
increased by the necessity of determining whether the excess was due
to some improper motive on the part of the jury or to the erroneous
instruction. If the excess is attributable to an erroneous instruction as
to a mathematically calculable element of damage such as interest,
all courts will allow a remittitur.24 However, if the excess is attributable to an erroneous instruction but the exact amount of the excess
cannot be identified, the courts differ as to whether the excessiveness
can be cured by a remittitur.25 The principal case, involving an er2If the courts of these jurisdictions decide that the verdict was the product of
passion and prejudice a new trial is required because the improper motives of the
jury may have led to an incorrect verdict on the question of liability as well as
damages. Minneapolis, St. Paul and Saulte Ste. Marie Ry. Co. v. Maguin, 283 U. S.
520, 51 S. Ct. 501, 75 L. ed. 1243 (1931); Southern Pacific Co. v. Fitchett, 9 Ariz. 128,
8o Pac. 359 (1905); Wabash Ry. Co. v. Billings, 212 Ill. 37, 72 N. E. 2 (19o4); Cain v.
Osler, 168 Iowa 59, i5o N. W. 17 (1914); Carpenter v. Village of Dickey, 26 N. D. 176,
143 N. W. 964 (1913).
"1Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 7 S. E. (2d) 38 (1928); Brown v. Southern
Pac. Ry. Co., 7 Utah 288, 26 Pac. 579 (1891); Matsuda v. Hammond, 77 Wash. 120, 137
Pac. 328 (1913); Beach v. Bird & W'Vells Lumber Co., 135 Wis. 550, 116 N. W. 245 (1908).
-Even if there is a showing of excessiveness in these jurisdictions, in the absence
of a showing of passion and prejudice the verdict of the jury will not be interfered
with. Hart v. Farris, 218 Cal. 69, 21 P. (2d) 432 (1933); Pulsifer v. City of Albany, 47
S. W. (2d) 233 (Mo. App. 1931); Halverson v. Zimmerman, 56 N. D. 607, 218 N. W.
862 (1928). But cf. Burdict v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 123 Mo. 221, 27 S. W. 453 (1894).
nIn Gladstone v. Fortier, 22 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 70 P. (2d) 255 (1937) it was said that
the only means of measuring a verdict to determine whether or not it was influenced
by passion or prejudice is by comparing the amount with the evidence. And in Day v.
General Petroleum Corp., 32 Cal. App. (2d) 220, 89 P. (2d) 718 (1939) the court said
that saying the verdict is influenced by passion and prejudice is but one way of
stating that the verdict exceeds any amount justified by the evidence. Thus, if the
court feels the verdict is excessive and not justified by the evidence the verdict will
be labeled a product of passion and prejudice.
21A representative jurisdiction is Georgia. McConnel v. Selph, 3o Ga. App. 795,
119 S. E. 438 (1923) (interest improperly included in verdict under improper instruction remitted). See Note (1934) 44 Yale L. J. 318, 319.
'Denying remittitur: Where the error was submission of issues unwarranted by
evidence; Kimmie v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 334 Mo. 596, 66 S. W. (-d) 561 (1933);
Holmes v. Jones, 121 N. Y. 461, 24 N. E. 701 (189o); where the error was incorrect
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roneous instruction as to such unsegregatable damages, apparently
takes the view that a remittitur cannot be allowed if the excess is
attributable to the erroneous instruction, because there has been a
26
prejudical error which can only be cured by a new trial.
Even where a remittitur is considered proper in a particular case
involving unliquidated damages, there is still a split of authority as
to the manner of arriving at the proper amount. The principal decision gives no indication of its position in this regard, but three different rules are followed in American courts. One view is that the
court will leave the award at the highest possible amount a jury could
have returned without its being considered excessive. 27 This view
is justified on the basis that since the plaintiff has the choice to remit
or not, he cannot complain that the amount is insufficient and since
the defendant is benefitted by the reduction, he cannot object. 28 An-

other view goes to the other extreme of leaving the verdict at the
lowest amount a jury could properly award without its being considered inadequate. 29 This result gives recognition to the fact that
since the defendant is the party who may be compelled to submit to
the remittitur, the award should be set at such a sum as to give him the
full benefit of any reduction he could properly receive in a new trial
before a jury.30 Most courts, however, follow the rule that the amount
the plaintiff is entitled to recover is what the court thinks a properly
functioning jury would have found.3'
This latter view, while supposedly resulting in a correct award,
can obviously be attacked as involving a direct invasion of the province
of the jury. In so fixing the amount the court must admittedly be
substituting its own opinion for that of the jurors, on the exact issue
which the jury has decided. The lowest award rule, while not widely
instructions, Smothers v. Chicago, R. I. &-P. Ry. Co., 15 S. W. (2d) 884 (Mo. App. 1929).
Allowing remittitur: Baird v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 179 Minn. 127, 228
N. W. 552 (ig3o); Miles v. Fall River County, 50 S. D. 240, 2o9 N. W. 360 (1926).
2"But, before the court is justified [in requiring a remission] .. ., it should clearly
be maae to appear that ... [the excessive verdict] be attributable ... only to passion
or prejudice." Duffy v. Union Pac. R. Co., 218 P. (2d) so8o, io83 (Utah 195o).
2Interurban Ry. Co. v. Trainer, 55o Ark. 19, 233 S. W. 816 (1921), noted (1922)
35 Harv. L. Rev. 616.
2See Note (1934) 44 Yale L. J. 318, 320; Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs (1942)
49 W. Va. L. Q. 1, 17.
"'Baxter v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 104 Wis. 307, 80 N. W. 644 (1899). See Note
(1934) 44 Yale L. J. 318, 325 commending the practice.
10See Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs (1942) 49 W. Va. L. Q. 1, 8.
1St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 74 Ark. 326, 86 S. W. 287 (igo5). See
Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs (1942) 49 W. Va. L. Q. 1, 8.
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followed, seems best designed to preserve the jury function while still
preventing unjustifiably high verdicts and attaining the policy of
ending litigation without undue prejudice to either party.
JAMES

W. H.

STEWART

DAMAGES-RECOVERY UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH ACr AGAINST HUSBAND
WHO HAS TORTOUSLY CAUSED DEATH OF WIFE. [Illinois]

At common law no remedy was recognized for wrongful death,
either in the form of an action by the estate for the damages which

would normally be recoverable by an individual for personal injuries
or in the form of an action by the dependents of the deceased for
damages for loss of support.' It was reasoned that the personal action
must die with the injured party2 and that the value of a life was not
measurable in terms of money damages to the surviving dependents. 3
The passage of legislation altering this phase of the common law
4
began in England with the adoption of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846.
Since that date, statutes allowing recovery in cases of wrongful death
have been passed in every state,5 and are generally divisible into two
distinct categories. 6 The "Survival" type legislation provides that the
personal injury action of the victim survives his death and becomes
enforceable by his personal representative in behalf of his estate, while
the "Death" type statute creates a new cause of action in the dependents of the victim for loss of pecuniary contributions to their support.
An action of the Death type is also usually brought by the personal
representative of the deceased, but the representative acts in behalf
'Prosser, Torts (1941) 954;

25 C. J. S. 1072.
2See: Hyba v. C. A. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N. E. (2d) 564 565
(1939); Melnik v. Perwak, 295 Mass. 512, 4 N. E. (2d) 329, 33o (1936); Greco v. S. S.
Kresge Co., 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. (2d) 557, 560, 115 A. L. R. 1020, 1024 (1938); Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A. (2d) 461, 462 (1939); Virginia Electric & Power
Co. v. Decatur, 173 Va. 153, 3 S. E. (2d) 172, 174 (1939).
'See: Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U. S. 342, 345, 57 S. Ct. 452, 453, 81
L. ed. 685, 687 (1937); Lucier v. Hittleman, 125 Conn. 635, 7 A. (2d) 647, 648 (1939);
Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P. (2d) 105 (1931). The leading English
case, Baker v. Bolton, 1 Comp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (18o8), cites no authority for
its holding.
'Stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
'See McCormick, Damages (1935) 366 for a note collecting excerpts from the
statutes of each state setting out the general standard of damages the particular
jurisdiction was adopted.
O16 Am. Jur., Death § 65; 25 C. J. S., Death §§ x5, 6.
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of the beneficiaries designated by the statutes rather than for the estate.
In a Survival action, the elements of damages are of the same nature
as those in a personal injury suit, in that recovery may be had for
medical expenses, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and
loss of earning capacity. The damages recoverable in the newly-created
Death action are generally measured by loss of support and contributions which it is estimated would have been received by the named
beneficiaries from the deceased during the period of his remaining
1
life expectancy.
Although one or both of these causes of action are recognized in all
jurisdictions,8 the Death Acts commonly provided that the designated
relatives may recover only when the defendant's "act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action... .-9 This condition precedent has
given rise to frequent controversies in regard to the enforceability of a
wrongful death remedy against a husband who has tortiously inflicted
death on his wife. This problem was presented in a case of first impression to the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1951 by Welch v. Davis,10
Wherein the estate of a husband, who had killed his wife and then
committed suicide, was sued by the wife's administrator for the benefit
of a minor child. After the jury had awarded plaintiff $14,ooo damages,
the trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment nothwithstanding the verdict. The Appellate Court, while recognizing that no
Illinois court had definitely determined whether a wife might sue her
husband in tort, held that no such right existed under the state's Married Women's Act." The trial court's denial of recovery was therefore
upheld on the ground that the condition precedent of the Illinois
Death Act had not been met, since the common law immunity of the
husband from tort actions brought by the wife would have defeated
any suit by her had she lived. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois
reversed the decision, with directions that judgment for the plaintiff
be entered. It was deemed unnecessary to determine whether the Married Women's Act had abrogated the common law immunity of the
7McCormick, Damages (1935) 337-340.
'Where both statutes exist in the same jurisdiction, great care must be -exercised in selecting the proper elements of damage, as an excessive- award under
one statute may preclude recovery under the other. Hindmarsh v. Sulpo Saline Bath
Co., 1o8 Neb. 168, 187 N. W. 8o6 (1922).
'The quoted clause is that of Lord Campbell's Act, Stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
410 111. 130, 101 N. E. (2d) 547 (1951), noted in 1951 Ill. L. Forum 681.
"1342 Ill.
App. 69, 95 N. E. (2d) io8 (195o).
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husband from suit in tort by his spouse, because "whatever may be
the present vitality of that immunity in other contexts, no reason exists
for reading it into the Wrongful Death Act to bar recovery in this
case."' 2 Emphasizing the remedial nature of the Death Act, the
Supreme Court held that while recovery might be defeated by a substantive defense inhering in the tort, such as contributory negligence
or assumption of risk by the deceased, mere "personal immunities"
from liability between the defendant and the deceased were no bar
to a suit for the distinct wrong done to dependents of the deceased. It
was further pointed out that the only justification for the inter-spouse
immunity at the present time is the fostering of marital tranquillity,
a consideration wholly absent in the case at bar since both spouses
were dead.
In actions of the Survival type, it seems clear that generally no recovery could be obtained against the tortfeasor husband for the benefit
of the wife's estate, because the Survival Acts provide merely that the
death of the victim shall not terminate any cause for damages which
would have existed had the victim not died. 13 Since the wife could not
have recovered damages from her husband had she lived, there is no
cause of action to survive her and be enforced by her administrator.
Where, as in the principal case, the action is of the Death type, the
right stems not from a continuation of the victim's cause of action but
from a specially created and independent cause of action for the direct
benefit of the dependents. 14 Nevertheless, a literal application of the
conditioning proviso in the Death Statutes requires that recovery be
denied to the dependents of the deceased because the wife could not
have sued her husband had she lived, and therefore infliction of the
death was not an act "such as would, if death had not ensued, en111. 13o, ioi N. E. (2d) 547, 548 (1951).
32Boyle v. Bornholtz, 224 Iowa 9o, 275 N. W. 479 (1937); Davis v. Ruzika, 17o Md.
112, 183 At. 569 (1936); Soden v. Trenton & Mercer County Traction Co., 1o N. J. L.
393, 127 At. 558 (1925); Wellston Iron Furnace Co. v. Rinehart, 1o8 Ohio St. 117, 140
N. E. 623 (1923); Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 2o8 N. W. 9oi (1926).
However, a Survival action might be brought in those few jurisdictions in which the
Married Women's Acts are construed to grant to wives the right to sue their husbands
in cases other than Wrongful Death actions. See note 20, infra.
1
'Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939); In re Lister's Estate, 22
Ariz. 185, 195 Pac. 1113 (1921); Tann v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 39 Cal. App. 377, 178
Pac. 971 (1919); Shipley v. Daly, io6 Ind. App. 443, 20 N. E. (2d) 653 (1939); Hend.
rick v. Kauffman, 340 Mo. 74, 101 S: W. (2d) 84 (1936); U. S. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Adirondack Power & Light Corporation, 2o6 App. Div. 584, 201 N. Y. Supp. 643
(1923); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 Ati. 663, 1o4, A. L. R. 1267
(1936); Ryan v. Poole, 182 Wash. 532, 47 P. (2d) 981 (1935).
1410
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titled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages."' 5
Courts taking this restrictive view have construed their Married
Women's Acts as conferring no additional substantive rights upon
married women but rather as merely giving them the remedy of suit
in their own name for violations of rights they possessed at the time of
the Act's passage.' 6 Under this interpretation, a married woman may
sue to obtain redress for the invasion of any right on which, prior to the
Married Women's Act, she might have sued by joining with her
husband. Of course, no such procedure could be followed in a suit by a
wife against her husband, because the husband would have to be both
a plaintiff and the defendant in the same suit. Since there was no
remedy, there was no right. For such a right to exist there must be "a
legal personality, of a married woman, separate and apart from the legal
personality of her husband, during coverture. Such a right a married
17
woman had not, and has not at common law."'

It is a venerable maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law will be strictly construed. With this principle in mind, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia observed:
"If the legislature had intended to confer upon married
women the substantive civil right of a legal existence and legal
personality separate and apart from the husband, during coverture, nothing was easier than for it to have said so in language of
no uncertain meaning. If it intended not to confer such a substantive right, but merely to enlarge the remedies of married
women with respect to other substantive rights of theirs existing
at common law ... the language of the statute was appropriate
to accomplish the latter purpose, and its object is fully accomplished when the statute is given that meaning. It is not necessary, therefore, that any further meaning be given to it. This being so, we cannot, under the rule of construction above referred
to, give any further meaning to it."S
"Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 7o, § x. The wording of the proviso in Lord Campbell's Act, Stat. 9 & 1o Vict. c. 93 (1846) (see note 4, supra) was incorporated verbatim into the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.
"Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. ed. 118o, so L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1153 (191o); Ness v. Coffer, 42 Idaho 78, 244 Pac. 145 (1925); Maine v. James
Maine &Sons, Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 2o N. W. 20, 37 A. L. R. 161 (1924); David v. David,
161 Md. 532 157 At. 755, 81 A. L. R. 1100 (1932); Wilson v. Barton, 153 Tenn. 250,
283 S. W. 71 (1926); Childs v. Childs, 107 S. W. (2d) 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S. E. 315, 1 A. L. R. 439 (1918).
'7Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 161, 96 S. E. 315, 316, 1 A. L.
R. 439, 441 (1918).
"Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 163, 96 S. E. 315, 317, 1 A. L. R.
439, 442 (1918).
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On the other hand, the highest courts of several states have reached
the same decision as that of the Illinois Supreme Court in the principal
case.' 9 In some instances, the wording of the Married Women's Act
enabled the courts to allow recovery by ruling that the statute granted
to a wife the right to sue her husband, 20 and so the condition precedent
of the Wrongful Death Act was satisfied. In other cases, courts have
contrived to allow recovery despite the fact that they were bound by
judicial construction to acknowledge that a wife was given no right
to sue her husband by the Married Women's Acts. 2 ' In sustaining re-

covery under the Death Acts, these courts have insisted that a wife had
a cause of action at common law for personal injuries inflicted by her
22
husband, although he possessed a personal defense to such an action.
23
Such a view is opposed to established legal theory and seems explainable only as a result-getting device. Having adopted this legal
phantasy, however, the courts proceed to reason that the husband's
personal defense ended with the death of the only person against
whom it could have been asserted and is, therefore, no bar to a Death
action brought by dependents of the deceased.24 As commendable as
"'Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 13o, iol N. E. (2d) 547 (1951).
"Johnson v. Johnson, 2o Ala. 41, 77 So. 335, 6 A. L. R. 1o31 (1917); Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S. W. 832 (1916); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42,
89 At. 889, 52 L. R. A. (N. s.) 185 (1914); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95 At. 657
(1915); Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 14o Pac. 1022, 52 L. R. A. (N. s.) 189 (1914).
"Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P. (2d) 221 (1944); Robinson's Adm'rs v. Robinson, 188 Ky. 49, 220 S. W. 1074 (1920); Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Nelson, 54 S. (2d) 476 (Miss. 1951); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 At.
663, 104 A. L. R. 1267 (1936).
-The principal case apparently finds support for this idea in the statement of
Judge Cardozo in Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E.
42, 43, 64 A. L. R. 293, 295 (1928) that "a trespass, negligent or willful, upon the
person of a wife, does not cease to be an unlawful act, though the law exempts the
husband from liability for the damage." In the Schubert case, the plaintiff was
negligently injured by a truck driven by the plaintiff's husband, an employee of
the defendant, and recovery was allowed. However, that the quoted passage does
not refer to a trespass by the husband is indicated by the opening sentence of the
paragraph preceding the passage: "An employer commits a trespass by the hand of his
servant upon the person of another." [italics supplied]. The Schubert case soundly
applies rules of agency, but the Illinois court seemingly has miscontrued an ambiguous statement in the opinion.
"Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 11o, 153 N. E. 93 (1925); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 660 (1939); Sykes v. Speer, 112 S. W. 422, 424 (rex. Civ.
App. 19o8): "That a wife cannot sue her husband for torts committed by him against
her person ...is not an open question .... The reason for this holding is that there
is no liability, not merely that the wife is incapable of maintaining an action against
her husband." [italics supplied].
"Robinson's Adm'r v. Robinson, 188 Ky. 49, 220 S. W. 1074 (1920); Deposit
Guaranty Bank 9&Trust Co. v. Nelson, 54 S. (2d) 476 (Miss. 1951); Kaczorowski v.
Kalkosinki, 321 Pa. 438, 184 Ad. 663, 104 A. L. R. 1267 (1936).

240

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. IX

this result may be, it is attained only through a deliberate confusion
of terms. A "right" is a legally protected interest,2 5 and a cause of
action arises when a right is invaded.2 6 At common law, a wife was not
protected by any civil action whatsoever for negligent or willful injury
inflicted by her husband, and the point never arises as to what defenses
a husband possesses, because the wife never had any substantive right
to assert against him.
In permitting Death Act recoveries by nullifying the plain effect
of the proviso that the deceased must have had a cause of action had she
lived, these courts have apparently been motivated by the desire to
carry out the purpose of wrongful death legislation to protect the
dependent against injury to the relationship he has with the one
who financially aids in his support. Under this approach, the husband's
immunity from civil suit for injuries or death inflicted on the wife
would not be an immunity against suit for injury to the rights possessed by others in the wife's well-being. The husband may be legally
privileged to injure the wife without incurring civil liability to her,
but he should not thereby be legally privileged to injure the relational
27
interest existing between the wife and her dependents.
In decisions awarding damages on facts similar to those of the
principal case, much space is usually devoted in the opinions to
arguing that married women should be allowed to sue their husbands.28
The bases existing at common law for denial of the right to sue 29 have
been gradually eliminated until "today the immunity can be based
solely upon the ground that domestic tranquillity is fostered by the
2"A right, as the term is used in the Restatement, is a legally enforceable
claim of a person against another that the other shall do a given act or shall not

do a given act." Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 42 (b).
2" 'A cause of action is generally held to be a union of the right of the plaintiff and its infringement by the defendant'." Columbia Bank v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc., 79 App. Div. 6oi, 61o, 8o N. Y. Supp, 428, 434 (19o3). Accord: Hales v.
Raines, 162 Mo. App. 46, 141 S. W. 917 (91); Mangum v. Lane City Rice Milling
Co., 95 S. W. 605 (Tex. Civ. App. i9o6); Telulah Paper Co. v. Patten Paper Co.,
132 Wis. 425, 112 N. W. 522 (1907).
'Green, Relational Interests (1934) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 46o at 469-473.

'Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Nelson, 54 S.(2d) 476 (Miss. 1951); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 At. 663, 104 A. L. R. 1267 (1936).

-"It has been stated that the chief justifications of the common law rule are:
"(a) unity of husband and wife; (b) preservation of the peace and harmony of the

home; (c) failure of a cause of action to arise, due to the nature of the relationship;
(d) transformation of the wife's causes of action into those of the husband upon
marriage; and (e) adequacy of the wife's remedy in the criminal and divorce courts."
Note (1949) 6 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 213, 215.
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prohibition...."o Not only does this purpose cease to be relevant
when one of the spouses dies, but further, not all courts are willing to
recognize the barring of suits between living spouses as helpful in
accomplishing that purpose. For example, it has been said that no
domestic tranquillity remains to be preserved when one spouse is ready
to sue another, and to prohibit suits is to leave the partners "to
answer one assault with another and one slander with another slander
until the public peace is broken and the criminal law invoked against
them." 31 However forceful these contentions may be, they have absolutely no pertinency when the Married Women's Acts have already
been construed as not having conferred new substantive rights on wives.
The arguments advanced by the courts seem to indicate their dissatisfaction with the original construction of the Married Women's Acts
and their frustration at being logically forced by this construction
to deny recovery in situations like that of Welch v. Davis. But if the
court does not wish to overrule such a construction, arguments questioning its logic or utility cannot help to allow recovery for wrongful
death.
If the Illinois court and its compatriots have not been faithful to
logic, they have nevertheless rendered a more important service in
being faithful to the purpose of the Wrongful Death Acts. Against
the maxim that statutes in derogation of common law should be strictly
construed can be set the maxim that remedial statutes should be
broadly construed. It is dear, that in giving relatives a new cause of
action wholly apart from a Survival action by the deceased's estate
and in establishing a different measure of damages for the Death recoveries, the legislature intended to give redress for the injury to the relational interests existing between the relative and the deceased. In all
probability, the case of the killing of one spouse by another was not
taken into consideration when the conditioning proviso was placed in
the Death Acts, and no thought was given to the effect of that proviso on
such cases. However, the basic purpose of the legislature to provide a
means by which damages could be recovered by persons suffering
pecuniary injuries from the wrongful death of another certainly extends to the dependents of one spouse killed by the other spouse.
Despite the lack of a lucid explanation, the Illinois court appears to
have looked through form to substance in achieving an eminently just
result. The decision is in full accord with the views of leading legal
-"Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill.iso, 1o N. E. (2d) 547, 549 (1951).
"Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 At. 889, 892, 52 L. R. A. (N. s.) 185, 188 (1914).
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writers 32 and adds further strength to the current trend toward more
3
liberal construction of wrongful death legislation. 3

THOMAS C. DAMEWOOD

EQUITY-JURISDICTION To GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST INTERFERENCE WITH MARITAL RELATIONS. [Ohio]
Equity's traditional attitude of non-intervention

in controversies

concerning marital relations is regarded as springing from a self-imposed limitation resting on considerations of convenience and discretion rather than from an inherent lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.' Nevertheless, the courts have generally declined to
enjoin wrongs in the nature of alienation of affections, illegal cohabitation, and other acts depriving a spouse of consortium.2 The historic
dictum of Lord Eldon that equity will not protect a purely personal
right is the standard basis for refusing to grant injunctive relief where
no property right is invaded.4 Some authorities reject the "property
right" argument as artificial, and contend that the real reason for
'Prosser, Torts (1941) 967; 3 Vernier, American Family Laws (1935) 269; Green,
Relational Interests (1934) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 46o.
"A recent decision in full accord with the principal case is Deposit Guaranty
Bank : Trust Go. v. Nelson, 54 S. (2d) 476 (Miss. 1951), noted in (1952) 23 Miss. L.
J. 153, where a strikingly similar situation was before the court.

'McClintock, Equity (2d ed. 1948) §§ 157, 162; Walsh, Equity (1930) § 52.
'Bank v. Bank, 18o Md. 254, 23 A. (2d) 700 (1942); White v. Thomson, 324
Mass. 140, 85 N. E. (ad) 246 (1949); Hadley v. Hadley, 323 Mich. 555, 36 N. W. (2d)
144 (1949); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N. W. 624, 9 A. L. R. 1064 (192o)
noted in 4 Minn. L. Rev. 538; Marquis v. Marquis, 18o Misc. 702, 35 N. Y. S. (2d)
675 (1942).
'Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (818). Inasmuch as Lord
Eldon did restrain the publication of certain letters on the basis of a technical
property right found therein, his comment as to non-protection of personal rights
by equity was no more than dictum. It has been argued that Eldon's statements
were not even intended to be a recognition of the rule of law, but that he meant
that the court would not decide whether that was the law, because it would not
have been applicable in the case at bar, there being a property right involved. McClintock, Equity (2d ed. 1948) § 157.
'Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (W. D. Mo. 1912); Bank
v. Bank, i8o Md. 254, 23 A. (2d) 700 (1942); Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33
At. 542 (1896). See In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 21o, 8 S. Ct. 482, 487, 31 L. ed.
402, 405 (1888); Blanton v. Blanton, 163 Ga. 361, iS6 S. E. 141, 142 (1926); Edison
v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392, 394 (1907); McClintock,
Equity (2d ed. 1948) § 157.
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refusing relief lies in the difficulty of enforcing the injunctive order
against such wrongdoing. 5
Discounting the force of both the technical and practical arguments
against granting relief in marital relations controversies, a few courts
in recent decades have expressly repudiated the traditional rule.6
Introducing this modern tendency into a jurisdiction which had
previously followed the orthodox view is the recent Ohio case of
Pashko v. Pashko.7 During the pendency of an action for alimony8 the
wife asked for an injunction to restrain the defendants, her husband
and the "other woman," from visiting, conversing socially, associating,
meeting or being together. She also asked that the woman defendant
be restrained from interfering with the marital relationship. The Court
of Common Pleas, in granting a temporary injunction, seemingly
acted in violation of the rule of the earlier decision of Snedaker v.
King,9 wherein the Ohio Supreme Court, in denying injunctive relief,
declared: "Such extension of the jurisdiction of equity to regulate and
control domestic relations in addition to the legal and statutory remedies already provided, in our opinion is not supported by authority,
warranted by sound reason, or in the interests of good morals or public
policy. The opening of such a wide field for injunctive process, enforceable only by contempt proceedings, the difficulty if not impossibility of such enforcement, and the very doubtful beneficial results
to be obtained thereby, warrant the denial of such decree in this
case...."10
'Knighton v. Knighton, 252 Ala. 520, 41 S. (2d) 172 (1949); Pound, Equitable
Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640
at 674, n. 99; Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 171
at 221.

6Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 S. (2d) 852 (1942); Smith v. Womack, 271
S. W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Witte v. Bauderer, 255 S.W. ioi6 (Tex Civ. App.
1923). Decisions involving different fact situations but supporting the principle that
equity is not restricted to protecting property rights only: Stark v. Hamilton, 149
Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 86, (1919); Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 1o3 S. W. (2d) 663, 665 (1937)
(in which the court stated that "many cases can be found where a court of equity
has assumed jurisdiction to protect purely personal rights from invasion."); Burns
v. Stevens, 236 Mich. 443, 20o N. W. 482 (1926); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J.
Eq. 91o, 67 At. 97, 100, 14 L. R. A. (N. s.) 304, 309 (1907) (where it was said "that an
individual has rights, other than property rights, which he can enforce in a court
of equity and which a court of equity will enforce against invasion.')
x1oi N. E. (2d) 804 (Ohio Com. P1. 1951).
'See Daily v. Daily, 48 Ohio App. 83, 192 N. E. 287 (1933), for a definition of
alimony. Under the Ohio law, an action for alimony is in the nature of a separate
maintenance suit, not necessarily ancillary to a divorce action.
'iii
Ohio St. 225, 145 N. E. 15 (1924), two Justices dissenting.
"Snedaker v. King, iii Ohio St. 225, 145 N. E. 15, 17 (1924).
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The court in the present case admitted that the facts of the two
cases were similar, but made reference to "important distinguishing
features" which justified the variance in results. It was said: "The
Snedaker case was an original action in a court of equity in which
the plaintiff sought a permanent injunction. This case is an alimony
action in a court of domestic relations in which the plaintiff seeks a
temporary restraining order."11 While the opinion contains no elaboration on the significance of these distinguishing factors, it may be
that the court saw therein at least some partial answers to both the
usual arguments against the granting of injunctive relief in marital
relations disputes. In the principal case, equity already had jurisdiction of the case under the alimony statutes, and need not depend on
any property interest of the parties for a basis of jurisdiction. A further
thought underlying the distinction may have been that since the
court's powers in alimony matters had been invoked, the duty of
divorce courts to encourage reconciliation between the parties came
into effect, and any feasible action must be taken to improve chances of
such a reconciliation. The fact that the plaintiff, in the principal
case, requested only a temporary injunction diminished the magnitude of the enforcement difficulty, and the court apparently thought
itself able to watch over conduct of the parties defendant for a limited
time even though it might have refused to do so for an indefinite time.
In addition, the guilty parties might be willing to accept judicial restraint for a short, definite period, on the anticipation of being free
to associate further at the termination of the period, whereas they
might in desperation defy an attempt at permanent restraint.
Even if it be assumed that the court had some such propositions
in mind, the distinctions do not seem to be substantial enough to
obviate the binding character of the Snedaker decision on the principal
case, and it seems probable that the citing of the so-called important
distinctions was done to soften the suggestion of the lower court that
the rule of the Ohio Supreme Court was unwise and should be changed.
This analysis is supported by the manner in which the court refutes
the "difficulty of enforcement" argument, brought out in the Snedaker
case, by declaring: "The answer to that assertion is the fact that this
court issues hundreds of orders in domestic relations matters as a
matter of routine all of which are enforceable through contempt pro"Pashko v. Pashko, 1oi N. E. (2d) 804, 8o6 (Ohio Com. P1. 1951). A portion of
plaintiff's prayer requested that the temporary restraining order be made permanent upon final adjudication, but the court did not rule upon the request.
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ceedings and no insurmountable difficulties have been encountered
1
with respect to their enforcement."'
Though the weight of authority is against the decision, the court
in the principal case has respectable and persuasive support in both
precedents and reason. 13 The modern tendency in the direction of this
case started with several Texas decisions 14 handed down under a
statute construed as giving equity courts unusual powers.'3 Impetus
was added to the tendency by the two long and exhaustive dissenting
opinions in the Snedaker case, 16 which have been cited with approval
by courts in other states. 17 Both of the dissenting Justices expressed
the conviction that equity courts are no longer limited to giving relief
in cases involving a property right, arguing that they have power to
grant injunctive relief for the protection of purely personal rights.
Endorsing and applying that point of view, the Alabama court in
Henley v. Rockett' 8 enjoined a woman from associating or communicating with the complainant's husband, expressly declaring its purpose to be to aid in the moral regeneration of the husband and the
restoration of the broken home.' 9
Other courts, which favor this further protection of the marital
relation but which are not ready to repudiate the traditional view
-Pashko v. Pashko, ioi N. E. (2d) 804, 809 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1951).
"Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 171, 221:
"The last fifty years have seen an increased tendency of equity to intervene in cases
involving the domestic relations." Walsh, Equity (1930) 275; de Funiak, Handbook of
Modem Equity (1950) 157.
"'Smith v. Womack, 271 S. W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Witte v. Bauderer,
o
255 S. W. ioi6 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Ex parte Warfield, 4 Tex. Cr. R. 413, 50 S. W.
933 (1899).
5Tex. Rev. Stat. (1895) Art. 2989, interpreted by Sumner v. Crawford, 91
Tex. 129, 41 S. W. 994, 996 (1897): "... it provides that the writ [injunction] may
issue where it appears (i) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded; and
(2) that, in order to give such relief, the restraint of some act is necessary." The
first part of the article is construed as not requiring a case to be brought within
the rules of equity in order for relief to be granted. The provisions of this statute
are substantially incorporated in Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 4642. Cf. de Funiak,
Handbook of Modern Equity (1950) 159, n. 58 for a different interpretation of the
statute and the holding of the Texas court.
21mi Ohio St. 225, 145 N. E. 15, 17, 22 (1924).
'17Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 S. (2d) 852 (1942); Smith v. Womack, 271
S. W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
1-43 Ala. 172, 8 S. (2d) 852 (1942).
2Cf. Knighton v. Knighton, 252 Ala. 520, 41 S. (2d) 172 (1949). The court refused injunctive relief, distinguishing the Henley case on the facts. Here, the husband
and wife were separated and there seemed to be little chance for reconciliation. The
inference of the court is that they would have followed the Henley case on a similar
set of facts.
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that equity has no jurisdiction to protect mere personal rights, have
found it a simple matter to find a property right entitled to the protection of equity. 20 One such property right is the right of consortium
which arises from the marriage contract.2 1 Although a law court can
award damages for the loss of consortium, this type of compensation
gives little satisfaction to a wife who has lost the support and companionship of her husband. Solution of the problem by divorce, with ensuing alimony, should not be looked upon favorably when divorce might
be prevented and a marriage saved by timely action on the part of
an equity court. Considerable weight was accorded to this factor in
the principal case, where it was observed: "Divorces are at a scandalously high level in the United States today. Courts should use whatever
powers they have to stem the tide. A restraining order against the
third party in this case will be notice to others deliberately intent
upon breaking up a family to take heed and desist from their course.
The court is convinced that it will deter others from similar action
and become a shield in protecting the integrity and the sanctity of
22
family life in our community.1
Though the equity court's only means of enforcing the injunction is
through contempt proceedings, it has been argued 23 that enforcement
would not call for large numbers of people to trace every move of the
parties, since the court could rely on a jealous spouse intent upon
preserving the marriage to report any violations of the court order.
Conceding that the threat of punishment will not completely control
human passions, the court in the principal case denies that this is suf2 4
ficient reason for refusing even to attempt to exert such control. It
was pointed out that the threat of criminal punishment does not entirely eliminate crimes of passion, and yet the criminal law continues
to impose such sanctions as effective deterrents against impulses of most
normal persons.
Although the arguments favoring jurisdiction over marital relations
cases are morally commendable and socially meritorious, most courts
-0Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899); de Funiak, Handbook of Modern Equity (195o) 155; Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation
and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640.
'Valentine v. Pollak, 95 Conn. 556, 111Atd. 869 (1920); Riggs v. Smith, 52
Idaho 43, 11 P. (2d) 358 (1932); Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections
(1934) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 472.
'Pashko v. Pashko, 1o N. E. (2d) 804, 809 (Ohio Com. P1. 1951).
1'Pashko v. Pashko, 1o N. E. (2d) 8o4 (Ohio Com. P1. 1951); Moreland, Injunctive Control
of Family Relations (1930) 18 Ky. L. J. 207.
4
" Also, Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 S. (2d) 852 at 855 (1942).
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continue to ignore them and refuse relief.2 5 It cannot be denied that

the secretive nature of the conduct commonly involved in the violations of marital rights renders their prohibition by judicial order
extremely difficult.20 It is widely assumed that there is no means of
enforcing such orders other than by employing an army of agents by
which violations of the restraining order could be reported to the court
for punishment.27 A further argument points out that even though
the injunction is granted the court will fail in its attempt to effect
reconciliation,2 8 since the restraint may serve only to make the illicit
association more attractive, or the husband may be motivated to seek
29
still another woman to replace the one he has lost by court order.
The Ohio court in the present case has acted with commendable
motives and in accordance with a courageous minority. However,
under the facts of the case, it is doubtful that the problems of enforcement and of effectiveness of the injunctive order have been sufficiently considered.30 Nevertheless, subsequent legal history may prove
n-Bank v. Bank, i8o Md. 254, 23 A. (2d) 700 (1942); White v. Thomson, 324
Mass. 140, 85 N. E. (2d) 246 (1949); Hadley v. Hadley, 323 Mich. 555, 36 N. W. (2d)
144 (1949); Metlis v. Metlis, 104 N. Y. S. (2d) 407 (1951); Spitzer v. Spitzer, 77 N. Y.
S. (2d) 279 (1947); Moreland, Injunctive Control of Family Relations (1930) I8
Ky. L. J.

207.

-O"The wisdom of this tendency seems extremely questionable. Injunctions
against alienation of affections, criminal conversation or seduction can be hardly
enforced 'without attaching a probation officer permanently' to the defendant or
inviting repeated contempt proceedings by spying or imaginative plaintiffs, and in
any event are likely to have quite the reverse of the desired effect.... The problems
of modem marriage and morals in present-day society will not be solved, nor their
solution aided, by the decrees of equity judges." Simpson, Fifty Years of American
Equity (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 171, 221.
-Snedaker v. King, III Ohio St. 225, 145 N. E. 15, 17 (1924), Justice Allen,
concurring: "... these two people stand in a wrongful relationship to each other.
Proof of the violation of this particular order will depend, at least largely, upon the
testimony, not of indifferent third parties but of those particular two people.
Under the circumstances it is difficult to see how the court can enforce the injunction
granted herein without attaching a probation officer permanently to both Miss
Snedaker and King."
Walsh, Equity (1930) 274, 275; Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation
and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640 at 674, n. 99.
25
As was observed in a concurring opinion in Snedaker v. King, 111 Ohio St.
225, 145 N. E. 15, 17 (1924), "an order that forbids a man and a woman to see each
other or to speak to each other under the facts herein set forth, merely adds fuel
to the flame. If the wife is to be assisted in her fight for a rehabilitated home, action
should not be taken which will almost inevitably make wrong-doing even more
alluring to her husband."
nSimpson, Fifty Years of American Equity (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 171, 222:
"First, there is certainly no reason in theory why equity should confine itself to
the protection of property rights. Second, there may nevertheless be substantial
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that the advantage to be gained by attempting to prevent interference
with marital relations is of such social importance that the risk of
occasional and partial failures is worth taking.3 '
ROBERT E. GLENN

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY

IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

OF EVIDENCE OF

TRACKING BY BLOODHOUNDS INDICATING GUILT OF ACCUSED.

[Mon-

tana]
In an age of ultra scientific crime detection, it is somewhat anachronistic that courts still find themselves confronted with the problem
of the admissibility of "bloodhound evidence" in criminal prosecutions.' Most of the cases in which the question has been decided have
arisen in the Southern states, where such evidence has generally been
held to be admissible,2 possibly as an archaic remnant of the days of
slavery when bloodhounds were frequently used to catch fugitive
slaves by following their scents. 3 Whatever its origin may be, the practice is quite prevalent today in the apprehension of those accused of
crime. The recent Montana case of State v. Storm4 well indicates the
divergence of judicial opinion on the question of the admissibility of
bloodhound evidence, as well as the difficulties encountered in applying a general rule of admissibility to the individual cases.
practical grounds for a rule
interests of personality. This
cautiously exercised. It must
who cannot always be relied

that courts of equity have no jurisdiction to protect
is admittedly a jurisdiction which, if it exists, must be
be exercised, in practice, largely by lower court judges
upon to be wise in matters of delicate discretion. May

not the repeated judicial statements that equity protects only rights of property
involve something more than the uncritical acceptance of an old dictum of Lord
Eldon? May not these statements be predicated on a deeper wisdom in the actual
administration of justice through fallible human instruments than are the logically
sound and humanly appealing arguments of modern legal scolarship?"
3Professor Walsh, however, takes a positive view to the contrary: "Since injunctions against immoral conduct open up such a wide field of possible litigation
with so much doubt of effective results, and strong probability that the administration of the law might be made an object of ridicule, we may be quite sure that it
will not be found expedient to extend equitable relief in these cases of injuries to
family relations." Walsh, Equity (1930) 275.

'For a collection of the cases involving bloodhound evidence in general see
Underhill, Criminal- Evidence (4th ed. 1935) § 130; 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed.
1940) § 177; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence § 362; 22 C. J. S.,Criminal Law § 646; Note

(1935)
94 A. L. R. 413.
2
Note (1935) 94 A.L.R.413.
3McWhorter, The Bloodhound as a Witness
'238 P. (2d) 1161 (Mont.1951).

(1920)

54 Am. L. Rev. ig.

1952]

CASE COMMENTS

In the Storm case, defendant had been convicted of murder in the
first degree in the trial court. The evidence established the fact that
the victim, while in his country home, was struck by a bullet fired from
outside the house. Several series of footprints, all of which were different, were found in the vicinity of the decedent's residence, and testimony in regard to them failed to prove that defendant had made any
of the tracks, though all of them led in the general direction of his
home. The sheriff, who arrived at the decedent's home shortly after
the homicide, testified that a vague depression which was thought to
have been made by a knee or a foot had been found in the earth
about fifty feet south of the window through which the shot had been
fired, and that by running a line from the house to the depression it
was determined that the shot which killed the victim could have been
fired from this point. The trial court also admitted evidence that on the
afternoon following the killing, two bloodhounds were laid on a scent
at this depression, and the trainer of the dogs testified that they followed this scent to the defendant's home, a distance of slightly over
a quarter of a mile. The evidence revealed that at one point in the
trailing the trainer had taken the dogs off the scent in order to circumvent a small "Pot Hole," but that the dogs had immediately picked
up a scent on the other side of the marsh which led them to the defendant's home. When the dogs arrived at the defendant's home, where
the sheriff and others were waiting, defendant was sent out to face
them. According to the evidence, the hounds at once began licking his
hands and jumping upon him, as they had been taught to to do when
they located the person sought, whereupon their trainer, "pointing an
accusing finger at the defendant, said 'That's your man'."5 There was
some further evidence that the defendant while under arrest pending
trial, had made a statement to the effect that he had shot the deceased.
The Supreme Court of Montana, with two judges dissenting, reversed the trial court and remanded the case, ruling that it was error
to admit evidence relating to the conduct of the bloodhounds and the
testimony relative to the other tracks which had been discovered in
the vicinity of the decedent's home. The majority opinion ehiphasized the general unreliability of bloodhound evidence, reasoning that
it is of the same nature as the conclusion of a witness, and is hearsay.
Referring to the circumstances of the case at bar, the court further
added that "While some courts have admitted 'bloodhound testimony,'
0_-38 P. (2d) i161, 1169 (Mont. 1951).
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yet none have accepted it where..., the dogs were deliberately dragged
off the scent by their handler,-taken down the state highway to a
spot in the country lane and there given a fresh start and headed
toward the trailer house of the accused wherein the sheriff was
patiently awaiting the arrival of the captive dogs." 6 Then, in order to
leave no doubt as to the breadth of its holding, the court declared
that bloodhound evidence is "incompetent and inadmissible on the
trial of any person accused of crime . . .." The dissent, asserting that
it was following the "overwhelming weight of authority,"' argued
that the bloodhound evidence is admissible, a proper foundation
having been laid by the evidence offered by the prosecution tending
to prove the capabilities of the particular dogs in question and the
care with which they were laid on the trail.
As the dissent contended, a large majority of the jurisdictions in
which the admissibility of bloodhound evidence has been decided support the rule that such evidence is admissible where the dogs have been
shown to possess the ability to follow human scents accurately; 9 but
the evidence is accepted only after testimonial or other circumstantial
evidence has been introduced clearly connecting the accused with the
commission of the crime for which he is being prosecuted. 10 Thus, even
under the majority view, the efficacy of bloodhound evidence is restricted to corroborative purposes only. In Hodge v. State, the first reported case found on this point, the Alabama court observed that,
"It is common knowledge that dogs may be trained to follow the tracks
of a human being with considerable certainty and accuracy. [The
bloodhound evidence] ... was competent to go to the jury for consideration by them in connection with all the other evidence as a cir6238 P. (2d) 1161, 1176 (Mont. 1951).
'238 P. (2d) 1161, 1182 (Mont. 1951).
"238 P. (2d) 1161, 1182 (Mont. 1951).

OAmong the jurisdictions which admit bloodhound evidence are the following:
Alabama, Moore v. State, 26 Ala. App. 607, 164 So. 761 (1935); Arkansas, Rolen v.
State, 191 Ark. 1120, 89 S. W. (2d) 614 (1936); Florida, Davis v. State, 46 Fla. 137, 35
So. 76 (19o3); Georgia, Aiken v. State, 16 Ga. App. 848, 86 S. E. 1076 (1915); Kansas,

State v. Netherton, 133 Kan. 685, 3 P. (2d) 495 (193'); Kentucky, Blair v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 218, 204 S. W. 67 (1918); Louisiana, State v. King, 144 La. 430, 8o So.
615 (igig); Mississippi, Hinton v. State, 175 Miss. 308, 166 So. 762 (1936); Missouri,
State v. Shawley, 334 Mo. 352, 67 S. W. (2d) 74 (1933); North Carolina, State v.
McLeod, 196 N. C. 542, 146 S. E. 409 (1929); Tennessee, Copley v. State, 153 Tenn.

189, 281 S. W. 460 (1929).
"State v. Fixley, 18 Kan. 1, 233 Pac. 796 (1925); State v. King, 114 La. 430, 8o So.
615 (gig); Carter v. State, 106 Miss. 507, 64 So. 215 (1914); State v. Freyer, 330 Mo. 62,
48 S. W. (2d) 894 (1932); Copley v. State, 153 Tenn. 18g, 281 S. W. 46o (1926).
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cumstance tending to connect the defendant with the crime....""
It should be noted that even then, the probative value of such evidence
was regarded with some suspicion so that conviction on the bloodhound testimony alone would apparently not have been sustainable.
There is much confusion and conflict of opinion between the
various courts as to exactly what facts are necessary to constitute a
proper foundation for the admission of the bloodhound evidence. The
12
facts considered necessary usually refer to the qualification of the dog,
3
the circumstances surrounding the trailing,' and to the existence of
other circumstances which tend to incriminate the accused.' 4 In Pedigo
v. Commonwealth the rule is thus crystallized:
"... in order to make such testimony competent, even when it

is shown that the dog is of pure blood and of a stock characterized by acuteness of scent and power of discrimination, it must
also be established that the dog in question is possessed of these
qualities.., and that these facts must appear from the testimony
of some person who has personal knowledge thereof. We think
it must also appear that the dog so trained and tested was laid
on the trail, whether visible or not, concerning which testimony
has been admitted,- at a point where the circumstances clearly
show that the guilty party had been, or upon a track which such
circumstances indicated to have been made by him."' 5
"98 Ala. 1o, 13 So. 385 (1893) [italics supplied]. Judge McWhorter in The Bloodhound as a Witness (1920) 54 Am. L. Rev. io9, strongly doubts the truth of this
"common knowledge." He is admittedly unsympathetic with the sentiments so
charmingly expressed in his article at page 117:
"Oer all, the bloodhound boasts superior skill,
To scent, to view, to turn and boldly killHis fellows' vain alarms rejects with scorn,
True to his master's voice and learned horn:His nostrils oft, if ancient fame rings true,
Traced the sly felon thro' the tainted dew;

Once snuff'd, he follows with unaltered aim,
Nor ordours lure him from his chosen game;
Deep mouthed, he thunders and inflamed he views,
Springs on relentless, and to death pursues."
1It is usually required that the dog be of pure blood from a stock which has
the ability to track human beings, that he have thorough training, and that his
ability has been proven by actual experiences. State v. Harrison, 149 La. 83, 88 So.
696 (1921); Harris v. State, 143 Miss. 102, 108 So. 446 (1926); State v. Steely, 327 Mo.
16, 33 S.W. (2d) 938 (193o); State v. McLeod, 196 N. C. 542, 146 S.E. 409 (1929).
1SIt is required that the initial starting point used be a track made by the person
who committed the crime. Harris v. State, 143 Miss. 102, io8 So. 446 (1926); State v.
Steely, 327 Mo. 16, 33 S. W. (2d) 938 (1930); State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82
N. E. 969 (1907).
2'See cases cited, note 1o, supra.
"103 Ky. 41, 44 S.W. 143, 145 (1898).
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Even with the adoption of this criterion, the individual courts may
still differ in their determination as to what facts will clearly connect
the accused with the tracks, and as to what constitutes satisfactory
proof of the dog's capabilities. An actual test supervised by the court
is perhaps the best determinate of the latter factor, 1 6 but the impracticability of such a test forces most courts to accept the trainer's
testimony on this point.
At least five jurisdictions flatly deny the admissibility of bloodhound evidence under any circumstances. 7 In the case of Ruse v. State,
the Indiana court gives graphic expression to the minority point of
view: "When it is considered that the use of bloodhounds, even under
the most favorable conditions, is attended with some degree of uncertainty, which may readily lead to the conviction or accusation of
innocent persons, and that, at best, evidence as to their conduct in
following a supposed trail is properly not of great probative value, it
follows ...that both reason and instinct condemn such evidence, and
courts should be too jealous of life and liberty of human beings to
permit its reception in a criminal case on proof of guilt."'S There are
several inherent difficulties in the trailing process which make the
dog's conclusions questionable-the scent may be quite old, the trail
may have been frequently crossed by other trails with their accompanying scents, or the scent of the original track at which point the
bloodhounds were started may have been contaminated by the scents
of other persons who have walked near the original track. It has been
further contended that the "superstitious awe in which such animal
is held by the average man ... "19 makes it dangerous to give such
evidence to juries because their unreasoned prejudices may result in
"Harris v. State, 143 Miss. 102, io8 So. 446 (1926) requires an actual test be held.
"Jurisdictions denying admissibility under any circumstances are: Illinois,
People v. Wolf, 334 Ill.
218, 165 N. E. 619 (1929); Indiana, Ruse v. State, 186 Ind.
237, 115 N. E. 778 (1917); Iowa, State v. Grba, 196 Iowa 241, 194 N. W. 250 (1923);
Nebraska, Brott v. State, 7o Neb. 395, 97 N. W. 593 (19o3); British Columbia, Rex v.
White, [1926] 37 B. C. 43, 3 D. L. R. i.The principal case now aligns Montana with
this group.
"186 Ind. 237, 115 N. E. 778, 781 (1917). Compare the language of Rex. v.
White, [1926] 37 B. C. 43, 3 D. L. R. i:"The use of such dogs may be of assistance
to the police to give them the clue to the identity of the offender, which, if obtained, may be followed up by conventional proof of guilt, but evidence of the
action of the dogs-themselves should find no place in a court of law," Also State
v. Grba, 196 Iowa 241, 194 N. W. 250 (1923); People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411, 104
N. E. 804 (1914).
"McWhorter, The Bloodhound as a Witness (1920) 54 Am. L. Rev. 1o9, 112.
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their relying too heavily upon it.20 This popular misconception of the
dog's ability is probably to a large extent traceable to the former practice of using bloodhounds to locate fugitive, but known slaves. 21 Error
or failure of the dogs in tracking a known person would be harmless,
for the mistake would be clearly manifest. Where the dogs are used
to ascertain identity, however, the consequences of an error may be
much more drastic, and in the extreme case may result in the conviction of an innocent man if the evidence of the conduct of the dogs is
allowed to go to the jury.
As in the principal case, courts adopting the minority view some22
times draw an anology between bloodhound evidence and hearsay.
However, the analogy cannot be applied too closely, for no hearsay
is involved in the strict sense. No assertion of the bloodhounds is being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; rather, the tracing
of a particular person by the bloodhounds is a series of acts which constitute a form of circumstantial evidence. It is also argued that the
evidence is objectionable because the accused cannot be accorded the
right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the adverse witness; but
since the trainer is actually the witness and does testify, this objection
would seem to be untenable.2 3 However, though the trainer is available
for cross-examination, it is obvious that he may not be able to answer
21 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 194o) § 177: "... [bloodhound] evidence is apt to
be highly misleading, to the danger of innocent men. Amidst the popular excitement
attendant upon a murder and the chase of the suspect, all the facts upon which
the trustworthiness of the inference rests are apt to be distorted in the testimony.
Moreover, the very limited nature of the inference is apt to be overestimated-a consequence dangerous when the jurors are moved by local prejudice."
-'McWhorter, The Bloodhound as a Witness (1920) 54 Am. L. Rev. iog.
2
State v. Storm, 238 P. (2d) 116l, 1176 (Mont. sg5i). In Rex v. White, [1926] 37
B. C. 43, 8 D. L. R. 1, the Canadian court observed: "The evidence admitted here
is of the same character as hearsay and is, ...more objectionable. ... Let me state
a parallel case; the natives of this Continent were noted for their ingenuity in
tracking.... Let it be supposed that the most skillful of these was employed to
track the murderer and that he had followed courses such as those taken by the dogs,
and that thereafter he communicated his observations and conclusions to another,
but before the trial had died. Under our rules of evidence, that other could not be
called as a witness to tell what the tracker had told him."
23
Note (1923) 33 Yale L. J. 216. Also see State v. Davis, 154 La. 295, 97 So. 449,
454 (1923): "The objection ...that 'bloodhound testimony' is incompetent, irrelevant, and purely hearsay, as it is an attempt to prove the actions of dogs, and deprives the defendant of.his constitutional right of being confronted by witnesses face
to face, with the right to cross-examine them, is not well founded, as such evidence
i not inadmissible on the ground that the dog is the witness and cannot be crossexamined, since it is the human testimony which makes the trailing done by the
animal competent, and the defendant was confronted by the witnesses to such testimony, who were subject to full cross-examination by him."

254

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. IX

many questions which bear upon the reliability of the dog's conclu24
sions.
Upon the facts of the principal case, the decision reached by the
Montana Supreme Court is unimpeachable, for the evidence of the
conduct of the bloodhounds should have been excluded under either
the majority or minority view. Since there was no corroborating evidence to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, it is
doubtful that a conviction on this evidence alone would have been sustained by any court. 25 Furthermore, the fact that the dogs were diverted
from the scent by their trainer would negate any probative value which
the evidence might otherwise have had.2 6 The dissent completely ignores
this factor, dismissing the diversion with the dogmatic, all-assuming
comment that "the dogs were diverted a few feet from the trail as it
entered a small pot hole filled with cattails because it was easier walking, but the trail was picked up on the opposite side of the pot hole
.7 2.
from where the trail entered it .
Since the weaknesses of bloodhound evidence are inherent, a court
can hardly be too cautious in allowing it to be placed before a jury.
Only in cases in which the circumstances clearly implicated the accused,
and only after a careful preliminary investigation of the tracking
capabilities of the dogs which were used and the manner of usage,
should the results of trailing be submitted to the jury as a factor to
be weighed in its determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and then, only with strong precautionary instructions against
allowing bias to sway the minds of the jurors. Anomalously, in this type
situation, the accompanying circumstantial evidence would usually
be so damning as to make a conviction probable without the introduction of the bloodhound evidence.
RICHARD H. LiPSCONIB

!'See Brott v. State, 70 Neb. 395, 97 N. W. 593 (1903) for a lucid discussion of this
point.
5
2 State v. Fixley, 118 Kan. 1, 233 Pac. 796 (1925); Crabtree v. Commonwealth,
26o Ky. 575, 86 S. W. (2d) 3o (1935); Blair v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 218, 204 S.
W. 67 (1918); Meyers v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 523, 240 S. W. 71 (1922); State v.

Freyer, 33o Mo. 62, 48 S. W. (2d) 894 (1932).
""It is very manifest that, if reliance is had upon the instinct of dogs, then
that instinct must be free and untrammeled. ... This control of the animal, that
is supposed to have the instinct, by the man, who has not the instinct, destroys any
value it may have as evidence, and all reference to the conduct of the dogs should

have been stricken from the record." State v. Brown, 1o3 S. C. 437, 88 S. E.
(1916).

"State v. Storm, 238 P. (2d)

1161,

1182

(Mont. 1951) [italics supplied].

21, 23

CASE COMMENTS

1952]

LABOR LAW--DUTY OF EMPLOYER To BARGAIN WITH UNION REPUDIATED
BY

EMPLOYEES

AGREEMENT.

AFTER

CONTROVERSY

RESOLVED

BY

SETTLEMENT

[Federal]

Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act imposes upon an
employer the duty to bargain collectively with the authorized representative of a majority of his employees. 1 Necessarily implied in such
a mandate is the coexistent negative duty to refrain from bargaining

collectively with any but the duly authorized representative. 2 From
this negative duty there arises the right of the employer to refuse to
bargain with an employee organization when he lacks knowledge of its
majority authorization, without thereby rendering himself guilty of
an unfair labor practice. 3 Therefore, before an employee representative
may insist on collective bargaining, it must request recognition as the
sole bargaining agent and furnish proof of its majority status if the
employer requests it.4 Although the most conclusive method of proof
is by an election conducted by the Labor Board, 5 an employer may not
arbitrarily insist upon this or any other specific form of proof, 6 and
when reasonable indication of a majority status is offered it must be
7
accepted.
149 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158(5) (1946), as amended, 61 stat. 141 (1947),
29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(5) (1946 Supp. I).

-N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3Ol U. S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L. ed.
893 (1937); N. L. R. B. v. Union Pacific Stages, Inc., 99 F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
3The nature of this right was explained by Judge Learned Hand in an early
interpretation of the act: "... when there is a real doubt, we may assume arguendo
that the employer need not decide the issue at his peril; faced by two sets of
putative representatives, each claiming to be the properly accredited one, it would
seem fairly plain that he need not choose at his peril, especially if he is not allowed
to take a vote himeslf. The same is equally true, though only one set makes the
claim; he may be in genuine doubt how many it represents." N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862, 868 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). N. L. R. B. v. Chicago Apparatus Co., 116 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940). See N. L. R. B. v. Piqua Munising Wood
Products Co., 109 F. (3d) 552, 556 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o).
'N. L. R. B. v. Clinton E. Hobbs Co., 132 F. (2d) 249 (C. C. A. ist, 1942); North
Electric Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 123 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941); Texarkana Bus
Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F. (3d) 480 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941); N. L. R. B. v. Dahlstrom
Metallic Door Co., 112 F. (3d) 756 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
IN. L. R. B. v. Century Oxford Mfg. Corp., 14o F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
ON. L. R. B. v. Moltrup Steel Products Co., 121 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1941).
See N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (3d) 862, 868 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
Troof that a union is the authorized bargaining agent for the employee unit
may be in the form of application for union membership by a majority of the
employees in the unit. N. L. R. B. v. Somerset Shoe Co., in F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A.
1st, 1940); N. L. R. B. v. Chicago Apparatus Co., 116 F. (3d) 753 (C. C. A. 7th, 194o).
Additional examples of proof of majority status are that a majority of the em-
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While the original existence of majority status is thus a relatively
easy matter for determination, a difficult question is presented when
the representative is alleged to have lost the majority status it once admittedly held. Union membership is constantly changing, and it would
seem that when a union has lost its majority status the employer should
be free to refuse to recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees' own choosing.8 However, Congress has declared the policy
of the Labor Relations Act to be "to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions ... by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purposes of
negotiating terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual
aid or protection." 9 Thus, the policy of protecting the employees' free
choice of a bargaining agent is but the means adopted toward the removal of obstructions to commerce caused by the unequal bargaining
position of employers and individual employees. To allow an employer
to disrupt and delay the power of a collective bargaining unit by
demanding a constant showing of majority status during all stages of
negotiation would render the unions useless as bargaining agents, and
the undesirable obstructions to commerce would remain. 10 Therefore,
the courts and Congress have had to limit the employer's right to refuse to continue to give recognition to a union as sole bargaining
agent for his employees on the ground that the union's majority status
is doubtful.
An employee representative which has been certified by the Board
as sole bargaining agent after an election retains its status for a
"reasonable time." 11 This limitation was embodied into the Act by
the 1947 amendment in the form of a restriction on the number of
Board elections, whether resulting in certification or not, to one elecployees have participated in a strike vote taken by the union, participated in a strike
called by a union, or accepted strike benefits. See Lebanon Steel Foundry v. N. L.

R. B., 13o F. (2d) 404, 407 (C. A. D. C., 1942).
'See N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862, 869 (C. C. A. ad, 1938).
'49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1946), as amended, 61 Stat. 136,

29 U. S.

C. § 151 (1946 Supp. I).
"See N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862, 870 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
U1N. L. R. B. v. Worchester Woolen Mills Corp., 17o F. (2d) 13 (C. A. ist, 1948);

N. L. R. B. v. Century Oxford Mfg. Corp., 140 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); N. L.
R. B. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 14o F. (2d)
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tion in any twelve month period. 12 Further limiting the employer's
right to refuse recognition to a non-majority group are cases holding
that the employer cannot refuse to bargain with a union on the ground
that it no longer represents a majority where the loss of majority
status is coupled with an unfair labor practice on the part of the
employer.13 The presumption that a majority status once established
continues to exist1 4 can be overcome only by a manifestation of the
free will of the majority of the employees to the effect that the union
no longer represents them.'5 Since an employer's unfair labor practice
indicates that the will of the employees has not been allowed to operate
freely, the presumption can never be overcome by a loss of majority
coupled with an unfair labor practice.' 6 Therefore, where the Board
has found the employer guilty of an unfair practice, it may order the
employer to bargain with a union whose majority status is no longer
certain.1 However, the "majority status" is not fixed for all time,
but only for so long as the Board considers it necessary to expunge
the ill effects of the unfair practice and restore the ability of the employees to make an untramelled selection.' s
In Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board,19 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recently been
261 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 159 (1946 Supp. I). The original Act had
limited elections only when they resulted in actual certification by the Board. 49
Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159 (1946). However, the policy of the limitation
even as approved by Congress, seems to have been ignored by a decision which allowed the employees to repudiate their elected representative within a few days of
an election, thus leaving the employees without the means of designating their representative by election for one year. N. L. R. B. v. Vulcan Forging Co., iSS F. (2d)
927 (C. A. 5th, 1951).
"West Texas Utilities Co. v. N. L. R. B., 184 F. (2d) 233 (C. A. D. C., 1950); Great
Southern Trucking Co. v. N. L. R. B., 139 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1944); N. L. R.
B. v. Win. Tehel Bottling Co., 129 F. (2d) 250 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942); N. L. R. B. v.
Somerset Shoe Co., 1ii F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. ist, 1940); Oughton v. N. L. R. B., i18 F.
(2d) 486 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940); N. L. R. B. v. Chicago Apparatus Co., 116 F. (2d) 753
(C. C. A. 7 th, 194o); Continental Oil Co. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 473 (C. C. A. ioth,
1940).

uAOughton v. N. L. R. B., 118 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. d, 194o); N. L. R. B. v. Piqua
Munising Wood Products Co., 109 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940). See N. L. R. B.
v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862, 866 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
5
0Oughton v. N. L. R. B., uS F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 3d, 194o); N. L. R. B. v.
Piqua Munising Wood Products Co., 1o9 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o).
20Oughton v. N. L. R. B., i18 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 3d, 194o).
"1See note 13, supra.
'sFranks Bros. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321 U. S. 702, 64 S. Ct. 817, 88 L. ed. 1020
(1944); Great Southern Trucking Co. v. N. L. R. B., 139 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 4 th,
1944).
9192 F. (2d) 740 (C. A.

4 th,

1951).
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presented with a question of first impression regarding the scope of the
employer's right to refuse to recognize the majority status of a union in
a situation in which none of these established rules could be made controlling.20 In 1946 a consent election was held, resulting in the certification of a union as sole bargaining agent. The employer and the union
entered into two successive one-year bargaining contracts, and while the
bargaining for a third contract was in process, the union, on May 9,
1949, filed a charge of unfair labor practice against the employer. The
Regional Director of the Board investigated these charges, but no
formal complaint was ever filed by the Board against the employer.
In December, 1949, the union withdrew the charges after an agreement
of settlement had been entered into, whereby the employer agreed to
recognize the union as the sole bargaining agent of the unit and
promised not to interfere with the employees' exercise of their rights.
Collective bargaining negotiations were resumed, but on March 9,
195o, ninety-seven per cent of the employees petitioned the Board to
decertify the union. Thereupon, the employer notified the union that,
pending the outcome of the decertification petition, he would not
bargain with it unless it could prove its majority status. The Board
then denied the employees' petition on the ground that the union
was entitled to a reasonable time in which to effectuate the terms
of the settlement agreement. The employer continued to refuse to
bargain without proof of the union's majority status, and the union
filed charges resulting in a Board complaint. The Board issued an
order, dated July 9, 1951, ordering the employer to bargain with the
union, on the ground that "the bargaining provision of the settlement
agreement, like a similar provision in a Board order remedying unfair
labor practices, must be given a reasonable time to operate, irrespective
of any possible or proved loss of Union majority during such reason21
able period."
In a 2 to i decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the order of
the Board requiring the employer to bargain with the union, even
though it no longer represented the majority of the employees. The
majority of the court distinguished the case from those in which
10Over three years had elapsed between the original certification of the union by
election and the refusal of the employer to bargain. There had never been a Board
finding that the employer was guilty of an unfair labor practice prior to the loss
of majority. Thus, none of the established limitations were applicable to the facts
of the case.
"Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. (2d) 740, 742 (C. A. 4 th,
1951).
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the original charge of unfair labor practice had resulted in a determination of guilt, and those in which no unfair practice charge was involved, and concluded that the propriety of the Board's order depended
upon the effect to be given to the bargaining provision of the settlement agreement.
The court reasoned that "the settlement agreement clearly manifests an administrative determination by the Board that some remedial
action is necessary," 22 and further pointed out that a contrary ruling
"would permit an employer to commit an unfair labor practice by
refusing to bargain collectively with the union, sign a settlement
agreement undertaking to bargain with the union, then attempt to
have a new union certified when dissatisfaction with the old union
arose among employees because of the unfair practice." 23 It therefore
seems that the majority judges thought the Board's ruling proper
either because the employer in this case had in fact committed the
originally charged unfair practice, or, because, in general, a rule prohibiting an employer from denying a union's majority status soon after
a settlement agreement is reached is necessary to prevent employers
from abusing the settlement agreement privilege. Suggesting that the
latter reason was the real basis for the decision is the fact that
the majority, after emphasizing the importance of settlement agreements as an expeditious means of settling disputes, 24 concluded that

a union would be apprehensive about entering into such an agreement
if an employer were allowed to repudiate his bargaining promise before
a reasonable time had elapsed, when the employees themselves re21Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. (2d) 740, 743 (C. A. 4 th,
1951.)

2Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. (2d) 740, 743 (C. A. 4 th,
1951).

21 "The manifest importance of these settlement agreements in the field before
us can be gleaned from the fact that between 1936 and 1947 over 16,ooo unfair labor
practice charges (over one-third of the total number filed during the period) were
settled before formal action (N. L.R. B., Twelfth Annual Report (1947), pp. 86-87).
As stated by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941),
p. 13: 'Probably over go per cent of the matters coming before administrative
agencies are disposed of informally with the acquiescence of the private interest
affected and no formal trial proceedings. This must be so or government could not
function.... In the first four years of its existence the National Labor Relations
Board closed 12,227 cases, in only 8 per cent of which was it necessary to go to
formal proceedings.... The committee recommends that agencies which bring proceedings for the discontinuance of practices prohibited by law employ the informal
methods used by the National Labor Relations Board, ... to obtain in appropriate
cases discontinuance by agreement without issuing complaints .......
Poole Foundry
& Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. (2d) 740, 742 (C. A. 4 th, 1951).
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pudiated the union.25 However, the dissent, recognizing the one-sided
nature of this argument, proffered the equally compelling argument
that to uphold the Board will discourage employers from entering into
settlement agreements which will have the same effect as a Board de26
termination of guilt.
Further, the dissent rejects the intimation of the majority opinion
that the employer in the case at bar actually committed the orginally
charged unfair practice. 27 Emphasis is placed on the fact that not only
was there no Board determination of guilt, but also that no formal
complaint was filed by the Board after an extensive investigation of
the original charges. The settlement agreement "merely evidenced the
consent of the company to assume an obligation to do that which it
had always done, namely, to abstain from interference with the freedom
of the men and to bargain with the union as their representative." 28
Finally, in rebuttal of the majority contention that its decision was
necessary to prevent the formulation of a rule which might allow other
employers to avoid the effects of their unfair labor practices, the dissent
asserts that "However reprehensible such conduct may be, it has
nothing to do with the case at bar. ' 29 If in any specific instance, an
employer has in fact engaged in practices which should place him
under especial restraint after a settlement agreement has been
21"There is manifest force in the Board's assertion that the contention of Poole
would seriously undermine the effectiveness of settlement agreements as a satisfactory means of closing cases involving charges of unfair labor practices prohibited
by the Act. There would indeed be few of these agreements if Poole, after a solemn
promise to bargain with the Union, could immediately escape this obligation by
questioning whether the Union actually represents a majority of the employees in
the bargaining unit." Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. (2d) 740,
743 (C. A. 4 th, 1951).
26,,...
such employer could never safely settle any doubtful complaint, and, in

order to protect himself, will be forced generally to litigate the complaint; the
employer will prefer to have the merit of the charges decided in a hearing where he
may cross-examine the union's witnesses and make his normal defenses thereto."
Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. (2d) 740, 745 (C. A. 4 th, 195).
2The dissent believed this to be the true basis for the majority's decision and
the Board's contention. "Actually, the theory of the Board's contention that an
imputation of guilt is to be conclusively drawn from the settlement agreement
lies in its contention that, since the Board -will only approve a settlement agreement after it has determined that the complaint filed has merit, accordingly the
courts must conclude that the settlement agreement arising out of such disputes
carries a final determination that there was guilt." Poole Foundry & Machine Co.
v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. (2d) 740, 745 (C. A. 4th, 1951).

28Poole Foundry &cMachine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. (2d) 740, 745 (C. A.

4

th,

1950-

2Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. (2d) 740, 744 (C. A.
1950.

4 th,
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reached, it is the duty of the Board to make an express determination
of the employer's guilt and impose appropriate restrictions on him.
Though this procedure would add to the work of the Board, "The obligation to do justice in the individual case is not minimized by the
30
volume of business which the Board is obliged to handle."
Inasmuch as the decisions imposing restrictions on employers
guilty of unfair labor practices are the only precedents remotely in
point on the ultimate issue of the principal case, a determination must
be made as to whether the defendant was guilty of the unfair practice
originally charged if the decision is to be turned on established rules
of law. There being no express finding of his guilt by either the Board
or the court, the only inference of guilt lies in the charges made by
the union which cannot be taken as proof of guilt, and in the settlement agreement approved by the Board. There appears to be no
authority for reading an admission of guilt into a settlement agreement. In fact, the established judicial policy is against the making of
31
such an inference from peaceful attempts to settle existing disputes.
With this sole basis for a determination on legal rules eliminated
the only reasonable basis for a decision in this instance would seem
to be the practical consideration of which result would serve to improve labor relations. As has been noted, the effect of a decision either
way upon the use of settlement agreements was argued by both the
majority and the dissent, with a neutralizing effect: Employers will
be discouraged from entering into settlement agreements by the majority decision, whereas unions would be discouraged by the decision
advocated by the dissent. A second factor argued is whether a reversal
of the Board's order would make it possible for employers to avoid
the effects of the unfair practices by entering settlement agreements.
If assurance against such a practice can be provided, there would seem
to be no valid reason for allowing this new restriction on the employer's
right to refuse to recognize a non-majority group. Although the dissent
limits itself to the facts of the case and does not present such an assurance, a brief investigation of the law surrounding settlement agreements demonstrates that in the future employers would not be able to
flout the policy of the Act in the manner feared by the majority.
The Board would have full power to prevent any such practice,
'*Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. (2d) 740, 745 (C. A. 4 th,
1951).
31Hawthorne v. Eckerson Co., 77 F. (2d) 844 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). For a general discussion of the policy against construing settlements as admissions of guilt see 4
Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 194o) § io6i.
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since settlement agreements are not binding on it.32 The Board "has
consistently gone behind such agreements ... where subsequent events
have demonstrated that efforts at adjustment have failed to accomplish
their purpose ... "33 If the Board felt in a situation similar to that of
the principal case, the employer had actually been guilty of the originally charged unfair practice, its right to act in the public interest
34
would not be affected by the settlement agreement.
It thus appears that there is no necessity of imposing restrictions
upon the apparently innocent employer in the principal case, in
order to set up a rule to deal with guilty employers in future controversies. Not only does the majority's view have the effect of penalizing
an employer against whom no wrong is proven, but it has the further
undesirable result denying to the majority of his employees the
right to revoke the bargaining authority of a union which they have
almost unanimously repudiated by their own free will. 35 Such a decision
does not seem consistent with the advancement of harmonious labor
relations.
WILLIAm H. HOGELAND

LABOR LAw-RIGHT OF EMPLOYER To ENJOIN UNION FROM REMOVING

UNION SHOP CARD. [Ohio]
The growth of labor unions in strength and influence both with
workers and the consuming public has put unions in a position to
visit ruin on employers who refuse to cooperate with union aims.
This power can be exerted by forbidding labor to work for the recalcitrant employer and persuading the public not to patronize his
business. So long as the power is exercised to prevent unfair labor
practices or to achieve other legitimate ends of labor, its dangerous
potentialities are not so striking. But unions can also use their in3N. L. R. B. v. Prettyman, 117 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941); N. L. R. B. v.
General Motors Corp., 116 F. (2d) 3o6 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
-'Wallace Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 323 U. S. 248, 254, 65 S. Ct. 238, 241, 89 L.
ed. 216, 226 (1944).
"See N. L. R. B. v. Prettyman, 117 F. (2d) 786, 792 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941); N. L.
R. B. v. General Motors Corp., i16 F. (2d) 3o6, 312 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1940).
""... the record contains no suggestion that the union's loss of the confidence
of the men was caused by any improper conduct or interference on the part of the
company or that the decertification petition of the men was suggested or stimulated
in any way by company action." Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F.
(2d) 740, 744 (C. A. 4 th, 1951).
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fluence to coerce employers into submitting to seemingly arbitrary
decisions which may appear to have little bearing on traditional
functions of organized labor. In such cases the courts are faced with
problems which are more social than legal and to which the established
principles of law provide no clear answer.
Such a situation was presented in the recent case of Foutts v.
Journeymen Barbers Union of America,1 in which the complainant,
a barber shop proprietor, sought to enjoin the barbers' union from
removing from his shop the shop card indicating union approval of
the operation of the business. A provision recently added to the
constitution of the union required that any proprietor who worked
as a barber should join the union with a "proprietor membership."
Such a membership would require him to pay dues and assessments
but would not entitle him to hold office or to vote in the union. The
penalty for the shop owner's failure to join the union would be the
removal of the union card from his establishment. Since union members were not allowed to work in shops not exhibiting the card, the
effect of the removal of the sign would be to call out the union employees. Prior to the adoption of the provision requiring membership of proprietors, the union had forbidden membership to shop
owners because they were classified as management, but the union
sign had been permitted in shops in which the owner worked as a
barber but employed only union labor and did not otherwise violate
union rules. The signs, however, were originally placed in shops
under the agreement that the employer would "peaceably give up
said shop card ... for any cause when called upon to do so." In the
principal case, the barber shop proprietor refused to join the union
and brought an action to enjoin the removal of the sign. Both the
trial court2 and the appellate court granted a permanent injunction
against the removal of the sign, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded the order. Five Justices joined in the majority
opinion which treated the removal as a discontinuance of the union's
recommendation to the public. Rather than viewing it as an ordinary
coercive method of a labor union, the lawfulness of which was to be
determined by its purpose, 3 the majority thought that the union's
'99 N. E. (2d) 782 (Ohio 195).
2
The case before the Court of Common Pleas is reported at 88 N. E. (2d) 317
(Ohio Com. Pl. 1949).
3"Where picketing, a strike or a boycott against an employer by a union is
involved, it may be appropriate to determine whether the object sought to be
achieved by such union activity is legal and proper." 99 N. E. (2d) 782, 785 (Ohio
1951).
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proposed action was a measure that could be employed for any reason.
Holding that the card was a representation to the public, the court was
unwilling to permit an order that would "enable the plaintiff to deceive the public,"' 4 by exhibiting the union card when the union did
not in fact lend its approval to the shop.
The dissenting opinion of two Justices found the proprietor membership to be an unlawful labor objective because it is tantamount to
forcing the proprietor to pay for belonging to an organization from
which he derived no benefits. Consequently, reasoned the minority,
the removal, as a self-help measure, should be limited by the rule demanding a lawful purpose for permissible labor activity. The removal
was a means toward what the dissent termed "extortion" on the part
of the union-forcing Foutts to pay dues for a nominal membership. 5
The agreement that Foutts made when he accepted the card was regarded by the two dissenting Justices as not controlling, because he
should not be held to have agreed to abide by future union rules so
unreasonable that they could not have been anticipated by him when
he accepted the card.
The decision in the Foutts case finds support in the 195o decision
of Rainwater v. Trimble,6 in which the Georgia court also declined to
examine the removal of the card in the light of the illegality of the
purpose of the union's requirement of proprietor membership. Rather,
the court turned the case on the original agreement that supposedly
bound the proprietor to relinquish the card for any cause. Finding
that the agreement was not in contravention of any statutory rule of
the state, 7 the court denied an injunction against the removal of the
shop card. It should be noted that although the Georgia and the Ohio
courts concurred in refusing to examine the lawfulness of the purpose
of the removal, they were not motivated by the same reason. In the
Foutts case, the court believed the particular conduct to be outside
the rule that would bring the unlawful purpose doctrine8 into play
199 N. E.(2d) 782, 786 (Ohio 1951).
599 N. E.(2d) 782, 787 at 79o (Ohio 1951).

6207 Ga. 3o6, 61 S. E. (2d) 420 (195o).
72o7 Ga. 3o6, 61 S. E. (2d) 42o at 422 (1950). The opinion explained the result
in Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers Union of America, 199 P. (2d) 400 (Cal. App.

1948), by saying that it turned on the particular public policy of the State of
California. The court did not discuss the applicability of the unlawful purpose
doctrine and did not observe that the particular public policy of the State of
California was directed to the lawfulness of the object of the union's action and
not to the agreement that the proprietor made when the shop card was given him.
8
The unlawful purpose doctrine requires the examination of the legality of
the object sought by union conduct in order to determine liability for the conduct.
Restatement, Torts (1939) § 755: "Workers are privileged intentionally to cause harm
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because, absent some contractual agreement, a person cannot be forced
to give affirmative recommendation to another, regardless of the person's objective in refusing such recommendation. In the Rainwater
case, however, the court did not go beyond the agreement, and because
this agreement was validated by the court's finding, a consideration of
the purpose of the removal was not deemed necessary.
The rule supported by the minority in the Foutts case has been
announced in two decisions of recent years which would apply the
unlawful purpose doctrine to the removal of the sign. In Riviello v.
Journeymen Barbers Union of America,9 the proprietor sought an injunction against the removal of the sign, the threatened order to his
employees to quit work, and the threatened picketing by the union.10
The California Court of Appeals granted a preliminary injunction,
basing its decision on a consideration of the union's conduct. It was
held that to coerce an employer to accept "sterile" and inactive membership in an employee union would be to discriminate against a class,
and that such an action would be beyond the scope of a lawful labor
objective." Therefore, except insofar as the injunction was aimed
to another by concerted action if the object and the means of their concerted action
are proper; they are subject to liability to the other for harm so caused if either
the object or the means of their concerted action is improper." For a discussion
of the doctrine with relation to strikes, see 1 Teller, Collective Bargaining and
Labor Disputes (1940) § 84.
In contrast, a court might find that the union was acting unlawfully in pursuing a certain course of conduct which, of itself, would be illegal. Thus, an examination of the objective of such activity would be unnecessary. See i Teller,
Collective Bargaining and Labor Disputes (194o) § 112 for examples of those decisions
holding that picketing is per se illegal without regard to its object or purpose.
9iggP. (2d) 4oo (Cal. App. 1948).
2It is to be noted that the threatened order to the employees to quit work
and the threatened picketing were not directly in issue in the Foutts case. However,
the union in the Foutts case did assert its right to call a walk-out and to picket
the shop.
1199 P. (2d) 40o at 405 (Cal. App. 1948). The court made it clear that if the
employers were offered full and equal membership in the barbers' union, the purpose of the union's conduct would be lawful. 199 P. (2d) 4oo at 404 (Cal. App. 1948).
Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. (2d) 746, 155 P. (2d) 343 (1944) decided that union activity
to coerce a self-employed milk dealer to hire union labor was for an unlawful
purpose when the dealer had no employees and when the union would not admit him to membership. In the Riviello case, the Bautista case was distinguished
on its facts when the court said that the objective of the activity in the Riviello case
would be proper if Riviello were allowed full membership in the barbers' union.
For another California case concerning the application of the unlawful purpose
doctrine to protect a person's right to non-discriminatory membership in a labor
union, see James v. Marinship Corporation, 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1944),
and the discussion in Hewett, The Right to Membership in A Labor Union (1951)
99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. gig, 929.
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at peaceful picketing, 12 the court was concerned only with the result
of the union conduct and not with the means employed to attain that
result. This approach was also adopted in Wisconsin Employment RelationsBoard v. JourneymenBarbers Union of America.13 The Wisconsin board had found the union conduct to be an unfair labor practice
and had issued a cease-and-desist order against it.14 The court upheld
the order, finding that the effect of the union's requirement of proprietor membership would be to force an employer to contribute
financial support to a labor union, 5 an act declared by Wisconsin
statute to be an unfair labor practice.
The restraints upon the use, as a coercive measure, of a labor union's
recommendation of an employer to the public have more often been
defined in terms of the union label, 16 or peaceful picketing.' 7 The
union card in the present problem is analogous to the union label
affixed to manufactured goods, in that the latter is a means by which
a union can notify the public that union labor produced the goods.
The union's use of its label has been restricted by the rule that it
cannot be withheld from an employer to attain an unlawful labor objective. The Connecticut court made this proposition clear in Connors
v. Connollyi 8 where damages were awarded to an employee whose
'The court held that peaceful picketing was subject to the unlawful purpose
doctrine in California, despite the "free speech" concept of peaceful picketing. 199
P. (2d) 400 at 406 (Cal. App. 1948). The James case, note is, supra, was relied upon
for this proposition. The effects of both the James case and the Bautista case, note
1, supra, on the law of picketing are dealt with in Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct (1950) 49 Mich. L. Rev.
191, 206.
6
"25 Wis. 77, 39 N. W. (2d) 725 (1949).

' 4The scope of the order was not clear as to the removal of the shop card. The
court said: "By the order of the board, the ... [union was] directed to cease and
desist from ... " compelling or inducing "the complainant to become a member of
and contribute financial support to the respondent union." Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Journeymen Barbers Union of America, 256 Wis. 77,
39 N. W. (2d) 725, 728 (1949). The majority of the court in the Foutts case thought
that the Wisconsin Employment Board case was not concerned with the removal
of the card. However, the minority of the Court in the Foutts Case considered the
Wisconsin decision in point.

'5The decision as to the illegality of coercing an employer to contribute financial support to a union would seem to have been wholly unnecessary by the court's
own admission that the board's order would be affirmed regardless of the construction given to the statute making it an unfair labor practice to contribute to a
union. 256 Wis. 77, 39 N. W. (2d) 725 at 728 (1949).
"6See Dangel and Shreiber, Labor Unions (1941) §§ 254-256.
"7See x Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) § 109.
"886 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 6oo (1913). Apparently, no more recent case has considered the problem.
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discharge was effected by the defendant-union's withholding its label
from his employer. Granting that the union had a property interest
in the label, the court held that it could not withhold it label to make
effective an industry-wide closed shop agreement. 19 But if the Connors
decision sustains the minority of the court in the Foutts case, the
majority finds support in the label analogy in Saulsberry v. Coopers'
International Union.20 Here, the Kentucky court refused injunctive
relief against a union that withheld its label in the course of bargaining for a renewal of a contract. The unlawful purpose concept was
rejected, and even though the complainant declared that the union
had conspired with his business competitors to ruin his business, the
court thought that the right to use non-violent coercive measures was
absolute. Thus, the objective of such measures was immaterial to the
21

court.

The withdrawal of the card in the present problem might also be
examined with regard to the rules governing peaceful picketing. The
barbers' union card was a recommendation to the public; when its
display was prohibited in a barber's shop, it meant that the shop was
no longer approved by the union. As picketing is the affirmative notification to the public that a union disapproves of an employer, it
would seem that the removal of the barbers' union shop card is the
same type of notification in its negative aspect.2 2 Peaceful picketing

has generally been conditioned upon its having a lawful objective as
its purpose, 23 and the latest pronouncement emanating from the
United States Supreme Court has upheld the powers of a state to enjoin
peaceful picketing when the state court finds the purpose of such
3D86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 6oo, 6o6 (1913): "The United Hatters has a property right
in its label. It may withhold it from those who do not comply with the conditions it
attaches to its use. It may grant its use to those who do so comply. It may enjoy
its advantages in all lawful ways. But it can no more employ it for an unlawful
purpose, or as an unlawful means, than it or any other person can any other thing
which it or they own, or any other agency at its or their command. The use of
all property or privileges is confined to the lawful, and cannot be extended to the
unlawful." The court had held the industry-wide closed shop to be against
public policy as a matter of law and not a question for the jury.
20147 Ky. 170, 143 S. W. io8 (1912).
"147 Ky. 170, 143 S. W. ioi8 at 1021 (1912).
21
The majority in the Foutts case seems to recognize this difference between the
affirmative and negative aspects of recommendation when, in 99 N. E. (2d) 782, 785
(Ohio 1951), it is said: "There may be limitations on the right of ... one to criticize the services which he no longer wishes to recommend and approve but there is
certainly no limitation on his right merely to discontinue his recommendation
or approval
of those services."
21 See i Teller, Collective Bargaining and Labor Disputes (1940) § lo 9 .
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picketing to be one considered unlawful by the courts of that state, and
when the Supreme Court concurs in such finding of unlawful purpose.24 But there are elements of peaceful picketing that would seem
not only to distinguish it from the removal of the shop card in the
Foutts case, but which would also serve to buttress the argument that
peaceful picketing should be governed by the unlawful purpose doctrine and to refute the contention that the removal should be so
governed. The potentialities for violence that lie-not too dormantly
-near the surface of even a peaceful picket are not present in the
coercion effected by the removal of the shop card. And, even though
the barber shop proprietors definitely lost business because of the
absence of the card, it is doubted that the psychological effects on the
consumer are the same in the barbers' union cases as in the picketing
situation. One who gets his hair cut in a shop that does not display
the union sign can hardly be said to undergo the same pressure that
he would encounter in that singular experience of crossing a picket line
to purchase non-union produced goods or services, of which the
picketers so vehemently disapprove with scowling countenance and
vituperative placard. Because one authority has emphasized this phychological effect of the picket line on the consumer in arguing that
peaceful picketing is more than simply a means by which the union's
side of a controversy is communicated to the public,

2

5

this feature

would seem to be an especially cogent reason for distinguishing picketing from the removal of the sign as two phases of union representation.
Also, there is no opportunity for fraud or defamation in the removal
of the sign, but the possibilities for misstatements often are involved
in the picketing situation.
The decision in the Foutts case probably has handled the barbers'
union's action more satisfactorily than any other court to date. Since
the case was remanded to the trial court, the opportunity was left open
to Foutts to seek an injunction against any future union conduct for
an unlawful purpose after the removal of the card. 26 Thus, union conOlInternational Brotherhood of Teamsters Union, Local 309 v. Hanks, 339 U. S.
470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. ed. 995 (195o). Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, pointed
out that the Court could not conclude that the highest court in the state of
Washington, "in holding the picketing ... to be for an unlawful object, has struck a
balance [balance between the constitutional protection of the element of communication in picketing and the power of a state to set the limits of permissible contest
open to industrial combatants) so inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people
that it must be found an unconstitutional choice." 339 U. S. 470, 478, 70 S. Ct. 773,
778, 94 L. ed. 995, 1003 (1950).
2Gregory, Labor and the Law (2d ed. 1949) 347.
2699 N. E. (2d) 782 at 787 (Ohio 1951).
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duct would be limited by the unlawful purpose doctrine, but the union
would not be forced to recommend an employer to which it did not
give its approval. Because of the distinct property interest which the
union had in the shop card, because this interest was acknowledged
by the proprietor when he accepted the card, and because the removal
as a phase of recommendation by a union can readily be distinguished
from those aspects of picketing which bring picketing under the unlawful purpose doctrine, the removal should be an unrestrained right.
The union's right to give or withhold the shop card seems difficult
27
to oppose on any legal basis.
JOHN C. CALHOUN

MORTGAGES-ENFORCEMENT

IN

EQUITY

OF ORAL

PROMISE

To

GIVE

SECURITY IN REALTY FOR LOAN. [New Jersey]

It is generally recognized that a mortgage creates such an interest in
land as to come within the land contract clause of the Statute of
-'Perhaps the line of demarcation between the views of the majority and the
minority opinions in the Foutts case was not whether a union has an absolute right
to recommend or not recommend an employer as it sees fit, but rather was a disagreement as to what the union was essentially doing when it removed the shop
card. If the minority refuses to follow the basic proposition of the majority, that
the law will not force a person affirmatively to recommend another against his
will, the point of departure by the two Justices dissenting is nowhere made clear.
The dissent does make it clear, however, that it considered the removal of the card
something more than simply the non-approval of an employer. The minority
thought that the removal was designed to touch off the sort of picketing and striking involved in the Riviello and Wisconsin Employment Relations Board cases. "...
it sets in motion a chain of events-withdrawing all union employees, branding
the plaintiff's shop as non-union and destroying his business and picketing-if
the union elects to exercise its asserted right to do so." 99 N. E. (2d) 782, 790 (Ohio
1951). Viewed in this light, the removal might be equated to what some have termed
"signal" picketing. This sort of picketing, as opposed to "publicity" picketing,
does not primarily inform or persuade the consuming public but rather notifies
other workers and unionists of a dispute, thus bringing into operation a prearranged-if tacit-agreement among unionists to refuse to deal with an employer
in event of such dispute. For a review of the suggested legal consequences of the
distinction between "signal" and "publicity" picketing, and for an argument against
such consequences, see Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of
Union and Employer Conduct (1950) 49 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 205.
In the Foutts case, it can be said that the scope of the majority's remanding
order could safely prevent the effectuation of any such pre-arranged agreement
among unionists even if it be granted that the removal of the shop card was the
"signal" for the effectuation.
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Frauds,1 and that an oral executory contract to borrow money and
give a mortgage as security is therefore unenforceable both at law and
in equity. 2 Even though money is actually loaned in reliance upon an
oral promise to give a mortgage on specific property as security, the
law courts will not give damages for the breach of the promise to execute the mortgage, though the lender may sue the recipient at law
for the return of the money advanced. The courts of equity, however,
can grant an equitable mortgage on one of two grounds, with the aim
of protecting the lender against the irreparable injury which may result from his being deprived of his expected security.
The equitable mortgage may be granted on the basis of equity's
broad "good conscience" powers. 3 This basis for relief is expressed in
' 4
the maxims "equity treats that as done which ought to be done
and "equity will not permit the Statute of Frauds to be used as an
instrument of fraud." 5 Relief may also be granted in the form of a
specific performance decree, where it is deemed that there has been
sufficient part performance to lift the bar of the Statute of Frauds. 6
Though ample and long-standing authority supports the jurisdiction of
equity to grant relief on either theory, some modern courts seem to
have taken the position that the specific performance theory is the
sole ground upon which relief can be based.7
:Feldman v. Warshawsky,

125

N. J. Eq. 19 , 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938); Sleeth v. Sampson,

237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923); Newman v. Newman, 103 Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E.
70 (1921); Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925); 49 Am. Jur., Statute

of Frauds
§ 197.
2
Bennett v. Harrison, i 5 Minn. 342, 132 N. W. 3og (191r); Mathews v.
Damainville, ioo App. Div. 311, 91 N. Y. Supp. 524 (1905); i Jones, Mortgages (8th
ed. 1928) § 227; Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 8.
'Craven v. Hartley, 1o2 Fla. 282, 135 So. 899 (1931); Farmers' State Bank of
Cunningham v. St. Aubyn, 12o Kan. 66, 242 Pac. 466 (1926); Foster Lumber Co. v.
Harlan County Bank, 71 Kan. j58, 80 Pac. 49 (19o5); Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y.
104, 38 N. E. ooo (1894); Poole v. Tannis, 137 Wis. 363, 118 N. W. 188 (19o8).
'Applying the maxim: Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corporation of America, 296 U. S. 459, 46 S. Ct. 166, 7o L. ed. 357 (1926); 19 Am. Jur.,
Equity § 456.
5Applying the maxim: Whitney v. Hay, 181 U. S. 77, 21 S. Ct. 537, 45 L. ed.
758 (goi); Washington Brewery Co. v. Carry, 24 Atl. 151 (Md. 1892); Glass v.
Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 3 Am. Rep. 418 (1869); Wagonblast v. Whitney, 12 Ore.
83, 6 Pac. 399 (1885).
ODean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (181o); Baker v. Baker, a S. D. 261, 49 N.
W. 1o64 (1891); Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925).
'Newman v. Newman, io3 Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E. 70 (1921); Rutherford Na-

tional Bank v. H. R. Bogle & Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 Atl. i8o (1933); Sleeth v.
Sampson, 237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923); Baker v. Baker, 2 S. D. 261, 49 N. W.
1o64 (1891); Spencer v. Williams, 113 W. Va., 687, 170 S. E. 179 (1933); Smedley,

The Enforcement of Oral Promises to Give Real Estate Security (1941) 2 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 2io.
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The equity courts of New Jersey early granted the lender an equitable lien to secure advances made on the inducement of an oral promise
to give a mortgage. In the earliest recorded New Jersey case on the
subject, Dean v. Anderson,s the court held that when the plaintiff
shows a performance on his part by which he would suffer injury
amounting to fraud if the defendant refused to perform, the court will
grant him his security. The relief in this case seems to be based on both
the broad powers of equity and the specific performance doctrine. 9 In
subsequent cases the court emphasized the specific performance theory,
and recognized the lending of the money as constituting sufficient part
performance to justify enforcement of the borrower's oral promise to
give security. 10 In 1937, the Court of Chancery in deciding the case
of Feldman v. Warshawsky" expressly approved the earlier decisions
based on sufficient part performance and decreed specific performance
of the promise to provide security for the loan. The Court of Errors
and Appeals, however, reversed the lower court on the express ground
that the lending of money, without more, did not constitute sufficient
part performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds.12 This
decision, following the trend set by New York Court of Appeals in
834 N. J. Eq. 496 (1810) (not reported until 1881).
'While the court gave relief in the form of a specific performance decree,
the opinion contained the following language: "It was on the faith of this property as a security for the sum of 7oo pounds that Dean was induced to convey his
estate to Jackson, and to give up his agreement for a mortgage on the estate he
sold, and in conscience and equity the agreement of the parties is equivalent to
a mortgage. It is the object of this court to give every agreement that effect which it
was intended to have, and to consider that as done which, for a valuable consideration, is agreed to be done...." Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496, 499 (1810).
'"Clark v. Van Cleef, 75 N. J. Eq. 152, 71 At. 26o (19o8); Rutherford National
Bank v. H. R. Bogle & Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 At. 18o (1933).
U1122 N. J. Eq. 596, 196 AtI. 2o5 (1937).
"Feldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938). In reversing the
decision, the appellate court indicated that it did not believe that it was deviating
from the earlier New Jersey decisions. The court found that the Rutherford Bank
case was based on the decisions of the Dean and Clark cases (see notes 8 and io,
supra), and concluded that these latter cases are not in point here on the facts.
However, it is difficult to see any controlling difference in the factual situations of
these cases.
The court observed that, since in the Clark case specific performance was
denied because the statute of limitations had run, what the Chancellor said on
the matter of specific performance was mere dicta. Then, without the citation
of any supporting authority relating to mortgages, the conclusion was reached
that the settled rule was that the payment of the money without more did not
constitute such partial performance as to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds
where real estate is involved.
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Sleeth v. Sampson,'3 represents the prevailing view in those courts employing the specific performance approach.
The recent New Jersey case of Cauco v. Galante14 suggests the difficulties confronting courts, limited to giving relief under the specific
performance doctrine, in finding sufficient acts of performance by the
promisee to justify enforcement of the promise. In this case the plaintiff
entered into an oral agreement with her brother, now deceased, and his
wife, the defendant, whereby the plaintiff was to sell certain premises
owned by her and to lend the proceeds therefrom to the brother and his
wife. The loan was to be secured by a mortgage on property owned by
the defendant. The plaintiff performed her part of the undertaking
by conveying her property to a buyer who was obtained by the brother,
and by turning over the proceeds of the sale to the brother. Thereafter, the plaintiff made numerous requests for the execution of the
promised mortgage and was repeatedly assured that the mortgage would
be given, but none was ever forthcoming. The brother died and his
wife became his administratrix, upon whom further unavailing demands were made. The plaintiff then brought an action asking that a
lien for the amount advanced by her be impressed on the estate of the
deceased brother and the property of the defendant.
The difficulty of obtaining relief on this theory is evidenced by the
tortuous course this case has run through the New Jersey courts. The
trial court, concluding that the plaintiff had not borne the burden of
establishing the purported agreement, dismissed the complaint; the
plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey overruled
the defendant's argument that the Statute of Frauds barred relief, held
that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, and ordered a new
trial. On retrial the Superior Court, Chancery Division, found for the
plaintiff; on appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. In sustaining the granting of relief, the latter court indicated that it still
considered the Feldman decision controlling, 15 but was of the opinion
that in the instant case the plaintiff, by selling her land at the solicitation of the defendant and her husband, had so irretrievably changed
her position as to remove the bar of the statute. Having reached this
"237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923). This decision seems to overrule two earlier

New York decisions often cited for the proposition that the lender should be given
the security promised. Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104, 38 N. E. ooo (1894);
Smith v. Smith, 125 N. Y. 224, 26 N. E. 259 (189i). In Sleeth v. Sampson the court
said that only dicta in the above cases indicated disagreement.
"16 N. J. 128, 77 A. (2d) 793 (1951), and 8 N. J. 233, 84 A. (2d) 712 (1951).
156 N. J. 128, 77 A. (2d) 793 at 797 (1951).
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admirable conclusion, the court thought it necessary to embellish the
decision with some reasoning of rather questionable content. The court
acknowledges that the statute requires an agreement to give a mortgage
to be in writing but then says that in this case "the terms and subject
matter were sufficiently dearly proved in the light of legal precedent to
resist the defense of the Statute of Frauds."'16 However, the fact that
the oral agreement is proved to a certainty does not have the effect
of satisfying the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, since that statute
operates to make an oral agreement voidable at the option of the defendant.' 7 By the weight of authority the defendant can admit the existence of the oral agreement and still set up and insist upon the defense
of the statute.' 8 But the New Jersey court declared that "The fundamental ground for affording relief in such a case is equitable fraud
which inheres in the consequence of setting up the Statute as a defense."' 9 Inasmuch as the statute was originally enacted to provide
a defense against the enforcement of a fraudulent claim, and was styled
"An act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries," 20 the court's reference to it as an instrument of fraud is equivocal and confusing, though
such phraseology frequently appears in the case opinions. In the face of
such dual and contrary use of the term it appears that "fraud" has no
specific meaning to the court and is of dubious value as the basis for
decision.
Since Sleeth v. Sampson2 ' established the rule that lending the
money is not sufficient part performance to remove the bar of the
statute, the courts following this doctrine have been able to grant
relief in but few cases. Initially, they make the mistake of drawing
too strict an analogy between an oral contract to give a mortgage and
an oral contract to sell land.2 2 In the contract-to-sell cases it is genu6 N. J.128, 77 A. (2d) 793, 798 (1951).

17
Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank and Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1 A. (2d) 146
(1938); J. A. Laporte Corp. v. Pennsylvania-Dixie Cement Corp., 164 Md. 642, 165
AtI. 195 (1933); Campbell v. Fair, 82 S. W. (2d) 1O38 (Tex. Civ App. 1935); 49 Am.
Jur., Statute of Frauds § 537.
2Thomas J. Baird Inv. Co. v. Harris, 2o9 Fed. 291 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913); Mendel v.
Miller, 134 Ga. 6io, 68 S. E. 430 (1910); Davis v. Stambaugh, 163 Ill. 557, 45 N. E.
170 (1896); Cornett v. Clere, 193 Ky. 590, 236 S. W. 1o36 (1922); Browning v. Berry,
107 N. C. 231, 12 S. E. 195 (1890); 49 Am. Jur., Statute of Frauds § 605.
"Cauco v. Galante, 6 N. J.128, 77 A. (2d) 793, 798 (1951).
21Stat. 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677); Lasier v. Wright, 304 Ii1. 130, 136 N. E. 545 (1922);
Dearing v. McKinnon, Dash and Hardware Co., Ltd., 165 N. Y. 78, 58 N. E. 773
(10oo); 49 Am. Jur., Statute of Frauds § i.
21237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923).
2For a more complete analysis see Smedley, The Enforcement of Oral Promises
to Give Real Estate Security (1941) 2 Wash. 8, Lee L. Rev. 210.
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erally recognized that mere payment of purchase money is not sufficient
part performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds, 23 and
such actions as the taking of possession and/or the making of improvements are also required. 24 But it is apparent that the lender under an
oral agreement to give security is not in a position either to take possession or to make improvements on the land involved; due to the
nature of the transaction, there will be nothing except the advancement of the loan which can stand as part performance. As long as
these courts insist that specific performance is the only form of relief
which equity can give and that more is required in the way of part
performance than the lending of money, only in exceptional cases will
they be able to grant the relief so obviously needed by the lender.
In the following specific performance-part performance approach,
the courts fail to give recognition to the real basis upon which the
lender requires relief. In every instance in which the lender has
actually advanced the money he has changed his position to his detriment in reliance on the borrower's promise to give security, regardless
of how the lender obtained the money for the loan. Unless equity comes
to his assistance, he stands to suffer irreparable injury. 25 His remedy at

law is not adequate because under it he is merely an unsecured creditor.
Only by the processes of equity can he become the secured creditor
which the borrower contracted to make him. He is not asking for the
land, but merely for a security interest therein to assure the repayment
of the loan, made in reliance on the security promised. In this light it
seems erroneous to base his relief on the same standards required in
the contract-to-sell cases.
As generally employed in part performance cases, the finding of
"Purcell v. Miner (Purcell v. Coleman), 4 Wall. 513, 18 L. ed. 435 (1867); Cooley
v. Miller & Lux, 156 Cal. 510, 1o5 Pac. 981 (109o); Santoro v. Mack, to8 Conn. 683,
145 At. 273 (1929); Russell v. Briggs, 165 N. Y. 5oo, 59 N. E. 3o3 (190); Halsell v.
Renfrow, 14 Okla. 674, 78 Pac. iS8(1904); McClintock, Equity (1948) § 58.

-4Some courts regard these acts of part performance as supplying circumstantial
evidence that the alleged contract was in fact entered into. Harlan v. Harlan, 273
Ill. 155, 112 N. E. 452 (1916); Wooley v. Stewart, 222 N. Y. 347, 118 N. E. 847 (1918);
East v. Atkinson, 117 Va. 490, 85 S. E. 468 (s915); McClintock, Equity (1948) § 58.
Other courts look upon such acts as significant in the sense of putting the plaintiff
in position to be defrauded if specific performance is denied. Clinchfield Coal Corp.
v. Steinman, 217 Fed. 875

(C. C. A.

4 th,

1914); Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 3

Am. Rep. 418 (1869); Andrews v. Charon, 289 Mass. i, 193 N. E. 737 (1935); Brown
v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 29 N. W. 135 (1886); McClintock, Equity (1948) § 58.
"'Hicks v. Turck, 72 Mich. 311, 40 N. W. 339 (1888); Irvine v. Armstrong, 31
Minn. 216, 17 N. W. 343 (1883); Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925);
Walsh, Mortgages (1934) 42: "... money damages would be an entirely inadequate

substitute, since in the action at law for damages he would be reduced to the position
of the ordinary unsecured creditor suing to recover the amount due him."
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"fraud" seems to be a result-getting device in most instances, and the
content of the word as there used is fundamentally that the court
believes relief should be granted to the plaintiff. In the principal case,
the court declared that "Where the Statute works the intolerable
mischief of operating as a fraud the Statute should be no bar to the
granting of relief to one who has, in good faith, so performed the parol
agreement as to irretrievably change the situation of the parties to the
disadvantage of the plaintiff." 20 However, if a finding of fraud is necessary to support relief, it appears there is sufficient "fraud" on the lender
anytime he advances money and fails to get the security which he was
promised. The borrower has, by promises to give security, enticed the
lender into such a vunerable position that he may lose the entire sum
of the loan unless the security is obtained.
Once the existence of an agreement to give security has been proved
to the court's satisfaction, 27 and it is shown that the loan was actually
made, equity should grant relief on the equitable maxim that "equity
regards that as done which ought to have been done." Such an approach to the problem would avoid the part performance obstacle.28
The principal case indicates that some courts still fail to appreciate
the full scope of their power to afford relief in such situations, and
still consider themselves limited to the narrow remedy of specific
performance of the agreement to give a mortgage. The New Jersey
court was able to obtain the right result under the circumstances involved, but few cases present the courts with such an opportunity to
circumvent the rigid standard they have set for themselves. As long as
the courts adhere to the part performance theory, they will usually
be driven to depriving the unfortunate lender of his expected security.
ROBERT LEE BANSE

"'Cauco v. Galante, 6. N. J. 128, 77 A. (2d) 793, 798 (1951).

"In every instance where an equitable mortgage is sought, before any relief is
given the court must be thoroughly satisfied that the alleged oral agreement was
in fact made. The burden of proving such an agreement is on the claimant and it
is generally held that this burden is only met by the introduction of clear and
convincing evidence. Steggall v. Steggall, 274 Mich. 402, 264 N. W. 842 (1936); Feldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, 196 At. 205 (1937); Dean v. Anderson, 34 N.
J. Eq. 496 (191o); Nelson v. King, 92 Okla. 5, 217 Pac. 36o (1923). In the principal

case the court applied the usual formula in declaring that the plaintiff's proof was
"required to be clear, cogent and convincing." 8 N. J. 233, 84 A. (2d) 712, 713 (1951).
nProfessor Walsh argues that the doctrine of part performance under the
Statute of Frauds has nothing to do with these cases. He maintains that the right to
security by specific performance of the contract arises when the loan is made and
is based on the creditor's right to the security in reliance upon which he made the
loan, not on the existence of a legally enforceable contract to execute a formal
mortgage. Walsh, Equity (193o) § 85; Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 8.
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FOR DAMAGES FOR TRESPASS TO

REALTY IN STATE OTHER THAN SITUS OF LAND.

[Arkansas]

It has long been a firmly established, yet severely criticized, principle
that an action for damages for trespass to real property constitutes a
local rather than a transitory action, and can only be brought in the
jurisdiction where the land is located.1 1n the face of overwhelming
authority, however, the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Reasor-Hill
Corporation v. Harrison2 has recently ruled that an action can be
maintained in Arkansas for damages caused by negligent trespass to
land in Missouri. A writ of prohibition was asked by petitioner, an
Arkansas corporation, to prevent the lower Arkansas court from assuming jurisdiction of a cross-complaint filed by the owner of the
Missouri realty, for damages to his cotton caused by adulterated insecticide negligently manufactured by petitioner and sprayed on the
cotton from a crop-dusting airplane. Conceding that legal theory
strongly supports the prohibition, the court nevertheless denied the
writ on the basis of practical considerations. It was observed that if
petitioner could not be sued in Arkansas, he could avoid liability
3
by staying out of Missouri, until the statute of limitations runs,
and the issuance of the writ would, in effect, "provide a sanctuary in
Arkansas" 4 for a wrongdoer. The court found justification for its
radical departure from precedent by concluding that "the majority
rule has no basis in logic or equity and rests solely upon English cases
that were decided before America was discovered and in circumstances
that are not even comparable to those existing in our Union." 5
The development of local and transitory causes of action in English
common law was intimately related to the development of trial by
jury.6 As long as jurors decided cases on the basis of their own knowl'See Marshall's decision in Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203, 15 Fed. Cas.
660, 663, No. 8411 (C. C. D. Va. 1811).
294 Ark. L. Rep. 572 (1952).

3'he Missouri Statute of Limitations continues to run even if the defendant is
absent from the state if he is a non-resident of Missouri. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §
516.200; Carter v. Burns, 332 Mo. 1128, 61 S. W. (2d) 933 (1933); Kissane v. Brewer,
2o8 Mo. App. 244, 232 S. W. 11o6 (1921). See Note (1950) 7 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 237.

'Reasor-Hill Corporation v. Harrison, 94 Ark. L. Rep. 572, 576 (1952).
5Reasor-Hill Corporation v. Harrison, 94 Ark. L. Rep. 572, 576 (1952).
'The British South Africa Co. v. Companhia De Mocambique, [1893] A. C.
6o2 at 617-63o; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, s Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 at 1029-1032
(1774); 40 Cyc. 17, 28, 30; Storke, The Venue of Actions of Trespass to Land (1921) 27
W. Va. L. Q. 3o1; Note (1940) 28 Ky. L. J. 462; Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 196; Note
(1910) 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 928 at 933.
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edge of the facts, it was expedient that trials be held in the locality
where the cause of action arose. When jurors became merely the triers
of facts adduced at the trial, the necessity of having the trial proceed at
the place of origin of the cause of action disappeared. Thus, defendants
could no longer flee the jurisdiction to avoid liability, for they could be
sued in any jurisdiction where they were found. In the in personam
actions liability followed the defendant, and the cause of action on that
liability became known as a "transitory action." 7 However, as to any
actions relating to land, the idea persisted that the trial could be held
only.where the land was located, and these actions were designated as
"local actions." s When a local cause of action occurred in a county in
England, the defendant could not totally avoid liability by staying out
of the county where the land was located, for the plaintiff could bring
the suit of one of the courts at Westminster and a writ from those courts
could be served anywhere in England, and judgment could be enforced
against any of defendant's property anywhere in England.9 The situation inside England, therefore, was closely analogous to that inside
Arkansas today where, by statute, actions for injury to real estate have
to be brought in the county where the land is located,10 but defendant
can be served anywhere in the state. 1
In the United States the lack of a remedy for damages for trespass
to land when the defendant is in a state other than that in which the
land is located is primarily due to the lack of any system of courts
which can issue service or enforce judgment in every state of the
7
Genin v. Grier, io Ohio 210, 211 (1840): "In England originally, all actions were
tried in the proper counties in which the cause of action arose. Hence, originally,
in that country all actions were local. 7 Co. us. 'This created no inconveniency,
for all men, being anciently in decenna, they were easily come at, the decenna
being responsible for their appearance; but when the customs of the decennary
begun to wear off, men used to fly from their creditors; and this begot the distinction
between local and transitory actions, the first relating to land, which must be tried
where the land lies; the other, a debt or duty adhering to the person wherever he
fled.' i Bac. Ab. 56." For further discussion see 40 Cyc. 17.
"Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law (1922) 5: "This the following actions, as well as proceedings in rem and actions to recover damages for
trespass upon or injury to land, have been held to be local: replevin at common
law; actions upon covenants running with the land when based upon privity of
estate; an action of debt for arrears of a rent-charge when based upon privity of
estate; an action against an innkeeper based upon the custom of the realm. These
actions are all in some manner connected with land."
'Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law (1922) 22; Wicker, The
Development of the Distinction Between Local and Transitory Actions (1926) 4 Tenn.
L. Rev. 55 at 67.
"3 Ark. Stats. Ann. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1947) § 27-6oi.
213 Ark. Stats. Ann. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1947) § 27-618.
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Union. Inasmuch as the American states are viewed as independent
sovereignties in this regard, the situation existing between the states
today is comparable to the English situation involving international
local and transitory actions. When the common law courts of England
desired to extend their jurisdiction into the international commercial field, they developed the fiction of the videlicet.12 By this means
transitory actions arising outside of England could be tried in England
simply by naming (untruthfully) in the videlicet a county in England
as the place in which the cause of action arose; the trial would then be
held in that county. The fiction also served to bring the cause of action
within the jurisdiction of the English courts.' 3 The same procedure

could logically have been applied to actions in relation to land except where possession of land was sought or where title to land was directly in issue, 14 but the common law judges would not allow the videlicet to be used in an action in any way connected with land. They refused "to swallow the fiction that land was situated somewhere other
25 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1927) 140-148; 3 Stephen, New Com-

mentaries on the Laws of England (4 th ed. 1858) 452: "In order to justify indeed
the institution even of a transitory suit in the English courts when the cause
of action arises abroad, it was once necessary to have recourse to a legal fiction, and
to allege on the face of the proceedings, that the cause of action arose (contrary
to the truth of the fact) in an English county." Wicker, The Development of the
Distinction Between Local and Transitory Actions (1926) 4 Tenn. L. Rev. 55, 59: "-where the matter in issue arose without the realm, it was of course impracticable
if not impossible, to secure a jury presumably acquainted with the facts. Littleton
writing in the fifteenth century takes it for granted that a case which involves the
consideration of facts happening without the realm, can not be tried within the
realm...."
"In the usual transitory action the place where the cause of action was alleged
to have occurred was held not to be traversable, and would be the place where the
trial would be held. In some transitory actions, however, as on a bond or specialty,
the true place of the occurrence of the cause of action had to be alleged or there
would be a fatal variance between the allegation and the proof. Here the videlicet
was especially significant, for the true place where the cause of action arose,
even if outside England, could be alleged, and by naming a county in England in
the videlicet the cause of action would be brought under English jurisdiction, and
would be tried in the county of England cited in the videlicet. For example: Paris,
to wit Middlesex. 40 Cyc. 22.

"Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law (1922) 2: "It is obvious
that an action to recover possession of specific land, or to affect the title thereto
or some interest therein, is maintainable only in the jurisdiction in which the
property involved is situated. Unless it has jurisdiction of the property, a state has
no power to afford the remedy sought, and cannot confer jurisdiction upon its
courts. Such proceedings, which are called proceedings in rem, are properly held to
be local, in that they can be brought only in the particular jurisdiction where the
property sought to be affected thereby is situated."
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than where it was in fact,"'15 and no distinction was recognized between
actions where damages only were sought for injuries to realty, and
actions for possession of, or directly trying title to, foreign land which
would entangle the courts in questions concerning unfamiliar foreign
laws relating to land.
As a consequence of this partial adoption and partial rejection of
a pleading fiction, the English law was brought to such a state that in
a suit tried in England, damages could be allowed the plaintiff for
assault to his person and for injuries to his ships and goods suffered
in the East Indies, but no relief could be allowed for the dispossession
of a house and island, because the latter claim was considered to involve
a local action. 16 In 1774, Lord Mansfield, in Mostyn v. Fabrigas,'7 declared that in two previous cases decided in nisi prius he had allowed
damages in suits brought in England, for injuries to real property
located in Nova Scotia and Labrador.' 8 However, in 1792, Mansfield's
dictum was overruled in a case in which the English courts refused
to entertain jurisdiction over a suit for damages for trespass to a house
in Canada.19 Thus, it became the law of England (but first definitely

uWicker, The Development of the Distinction Between Local and Transitory
Actions (1926) 4 Tenn. L. Rev. 55, 62.
'Skinner v. East India Company, 6 State Trials 71o (666). Holdsworth states
that the case was referred by the King to the House of Lords, which allowed
Skinner damages. At that time the controversy was taking place between the House
of Lords and the House of Commons as to whether the House of Lords could
exercise any original jurisdiction. The East India Company appealed to the Commons
who voted the action of the House of Lords illegal. The Commons finally won, and
Skinner received nothing. i Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1931) 367.
1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1774).
"InMostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 at 1032 (1774), Lord
Mansfield said that notes were produced of a case before Lord Chief Justice Eyre
that substantiated his position. But see the British South Africa Co. v. Companhia
De Mocambique, [1893] A. C. 602, 633: "His Lordship undoubtedly seems to have
misunderstood the case of Shelling v. Farmer, [1 Str. 646, 93 Eng. Rep. 756 (1725)]
since he attributes to Eyre C. J.'s decision the very reverse of what that learned
judge decided."
Lord Mansfield also said, "There is a formal and a substantial distinction
as to the locality of trials. I state them as different things: the substantial distinction is, where the proceeding is in rem, and where the effect of the judgment cannot
be had, if it is laid in the wrong place." Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1021, 1029 (1774). Further he states: "So if an action were brought relative
to an estate in a foreign country, where the question was a matter of title only,
and not of damages, there might be a solid distinction of locality." Mostyn v.
Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1030 (1774). Wheaton, Nature of ActionsLocal and Transitory (1922) 16 Ill. L. Rev. 456, 458: "Itseems that the differentiation
made by Lord Mansfield is the very best possible."
1
Doulson v. Matthews, 4 T. R. 503, 1oo Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (1792): "It is
now too late for us to inquire whether it were wise or politic to make a distinction be-
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settled after the American Revolution) that an in personam action
20
for damages for injury to land by trespass was a local action.
This view was incorporated into the American jurisprudence by
Chief Justice Marshall in Livingston v. Jefferson,21 where under a
videlicet a suit for damages for injury to land in Louisiana was brought
in Virginia. Even while Marshall adopted the English rule, he criticized
it, declaring:
"....

that if the action be disallowed, the injured party may have

a clear right without a remedy in a case where the person who
has done the wrong, and who ought to make the compensation,
is within the power of the court. That this consideration should
lose its influence, where the action pursues a thing not within
reach of the court, is of inevitable necessity; but for the loss of its
influence where the remedy is against the person and can be
afforded by the court, I have not yet discerned a reason, other
than a technical one, which can satisfy my judgment. If, however,
this technical distinction be firmly established, if all other judges
respect it, I cannot venture to disregard it."22
While Mansfield's dictum was in the books at the time of the Revolution, and thus could be considered a part of the American common
law, Marshall chose to be bound by the later case which overruled
Mansfield, but which was never a part of American common law. It
has been suggested that the political animosity existing between
Marshall and Jefferson played a large role in the result that Marshall
reached. The Chief Justice was already being criticized for some of
his then recent decisions, and an unorthodox decision in the Livingston case would have been very inopportune, especially since it would
have meant the financial ruin of Jefferson. 23 This, however is mere
speculation, and the fact remains that the decision has become commanding authority. Even though it has received severe criticism, courts
tween transitory and local actions: it is sufficient for the Courts that the law has
settled the distinction, and that an action quare clausum fregit is local. We may
try actions here which are in their nature transitory, though arising out of a
transaction abroad, but not such as are in their nature local."
2Little v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846 at 847
(1896).
-1iBrock. 203, 15 Fed. Gas. 66o, No. 8411 (C. C. D. Va. 1811).
nLivingston v. Jefferson, i Brock. 203, 15 Fed. Cas. 660, 664, No. 8411 (C. C. D.
Va. 1811).
!24 Beveridge, The Life. of John Marshall (1919) ioo-i 16; Wicker, The Development of the Distinction Between Local and Transitory Actions (1926) 4 Tenn. L.
Rev. 55 at 66; Storke, The Venue of Actions of Trespass to Land (1921) 27 AV. Va.
L. Q. 3o, 304: "It seems probable that if the great judge had been free to act without
regard to ulterior considerations, a different result might have obtained."

19521]

CASE COMMENTS

have generally followed it because of precedent.2 4 However, there has
been a persistent tendency to circumvent the rule, as is indicated by the
fact that it has been overruled in Minnesota, 25 changed by statute in
New York,26 and narrowly restricted in other jurisdictions by allowing
the plaintiff in a trespass and conversion case to waive the trespass and
sue in tort, 27 or by allowing the plaintiff to bring his action in either

28
state when an act done in one state causes injury to land in another.
It is also significant that Ohio early repudiated the rule as to inter29
county actions.
The Arkansas court in the principal case rebutted the usual justification given by courts for following the majority rule-that they are
unable to pass on title to land situated in another state-by declaring:
2
'Potomac Milling & Ice Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 217 Fed. 665, 668 (D.C.
Md. 1914): "... if the application of the old rule be confined strictly to cases in
which the title or right of possession of the land is at issue, it will be given all
the force which either the later authorities or common sense justify. I would be glad
to accept this view. If in this case plaintiffs were remediless, I might feel it my
duty to give a higher court an opportunity fully to consider the question anew."
Dobie, Venue in Civil Cases in the United States District Court (1925) 35 Yale L.
J. 129, 14o: "This distinction between local and tranistory actions goes back to
very far off days, yet the line of demarcation between the two has been, and still
remains, obscure and uncertain. Most of the judges have followed ancient saws and
sayings with little or no attempt to analyze the nature and validity of the underlying reasons." Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 196, 2o1: "Later cases recognize that the rule
not only works injustice, but that it is an outgrowth of technical distinctions which
no longer have any basis in law or reason, yet rigid adherence to precedent, so
characteristic of our system of law, has prevented them from breaking away from
the rule, which may be said to be almost universally condemned."
In spite of the dissatisfaction voiced against the rule, the American Law
Institute felt it necessary to incorporate it into the Restatement of the Law because
it represents the firmly entrenched majority rule: " Except as stated in § 615, no
action can be maintained in one state to recover compensation for a trespass upon
or harm done to land in another state." Restatement, Conflicts (1934) § 614.
2zLittle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0 Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846 (1896).
21
9 N. Y. Cons. Laws (Baker, Voorhis, 1951) Real Property Law § 536.
'Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178, 17 S. Ct. 778, 42 L. ed. 127 (1897); Mco
Gonigle v. Atchison, 33 Kan, 726, 7 Pac. 55 (1885); Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 196 at 217.
2Rundle v. Delaware & R. Canal, 21 Fed. Cas. 6, No. 12,139 ( C. C. E. D. Pa.
1849; Smith v. Southern Ry. Co., 136 Ky. 162, 123 S. W. 678 (19o9); Ducktown
Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., Limited v. Barnes, 6o S. W. 593 (Tenn. 19oo);
Armendiaz v. Stillman, 54 Tex. 623 (1881); Restatement, Conflicts (1934) § 615:
"If an act is done in one state causing injury to land in another state, an action can
be maintained in the former state as well as in the latter." It seems that the principal
case might have been decided on this particular exception to the general rule,
because the act of manufacturing adulterated insecticide was done in one state,
and it caused injury in another.
2OGenin v. Grier, lo Ohio 2io (184o). But Ohio adheres to the majority rule
as regards an inter-state action. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 83
Ohio St. 13, 93 N. E. 26o (191o).
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"As between nations this reasoning may be sound. The members of
this court have neither the training nor the facilities to investigate
questions involving the ownership of land in France, in Russia, or in
China. But the same difficulties do not exist with respect to land in
another State." 30 If by this statement the court meant to say that it
would make all actions in relation to realty transitory, even though
the only issue involved was one of title, it is extending its unorthodoxy
to a situation in which the courts of the state where the land is located
should handle the action. 31 As title was not involved in the instant
case, the statement would be dictum in any event. And since the
opinion goes on to show that courts do actually pass on title to land
situated in another state in transitory actions for conversion, and on
contracts to purchase land, the Arkansas court may merely have been
demonstrating that the statement that title to land can only be litigated
in the state where the land is located is entirely arbitrary when used
by courts in refusing to assume jurisdiction of a case where damages
are sought for trespass. It will require another case on that direct point
to make it clear just how far actions in relation to realty have been
made transitory by the instant decision.
The modern means of transportation involved in the principal
case clearly reveals the invalidity of the time-honored argument that
a plaintiff can, by the exercise of proper diligence, sue the defendant
32
before he leaves the jurisdiction where the trespass is committed.
"This argument, too, has merit when nations are concerned. A sovereign, by its control of passports and ports of entry, may detain those
who wish to cross its borders. But the citizens of the various States have
33
a constitutional right to pass freely from one jurisdiction to another."
Here the injury done to the cotton was not immediately visible, and it
was only a matter of minutes until the plane from which the injurious
dust was released was out of the State.
Another reason advanced to justify adherence to the majority rule
is the desire of courts not to overcrowd their dockets and subject local
IOReasor-Hill Corporation v. Harrison, 94 Ark. L. Rep. 572, 574 (1952).
2
Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law (1922) 9: "Its decision
would not render the question as to the title res judicata; for the jurisdiction
finally to determine a controversy as to the title to land rests only with the courts
of the state where the land is situated."
"Montesano Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Portland Iron Works, 78 Ore. 53, 152 Pac.
244, 248 (1915): "Instances may occur where a person having no property in a
state may commit an injury to real property therein and leave the state, thereby
defeating a recovery, but it is rarely the case that serious injury may be perpetrated
with such expedition and secrecy as to prevent an action being begun and service
of summons upon him."
"Reasor-Hill Corporation v. Harrison, 94 Ark. L. Rep. 572, 575 (1952)-
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taxpayers to added burdens by taking jurisdiction of foreign causes of
action, 34 "especially if the other jurisdiction would provide no redress
if the situation were reversed." 35 It would appear that this "convenience" argument was properly disregarded, in the principal decision,
inasmuch as courts have always entertained out-of-state causes of action
of a transitory nature, and there is no difference between local and
transitory actions in regard to the burden on courts or taxpayers.3 6
In view of modern conditions aptly illustrated in the Harrison
case, the Arkansas court has reached a well-reasoned and correct decision, though there is very little judicial precedent to support it. As
was previously shown, when all actions inside England were local,
transitory actions were developed to bring about more complete
justice, so that a defendant could be sued where he was found even
31 See Little v. Chicago, St. P., M & 0. Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846, 848
(1896).
* Reasor-Hill Corporation v. Harrison, 94 Ark. L. Rep. 572, 575 (1952). It is
possible that Missouri might allow such an action. In Ingram v. Great Lakes Pipe
Line Co., 153 S. W. (2d) 547 (Mo. App. 1941) damages were allowed in a suit brought
in Missouri for injuries to realty in Kansas. This result was reached by use of a Missouri venue statute. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) § 508.030: "Suits for the possession of real
estate, or whereby the title thereto may be affected ... shall be brought in the
county where such real estate, or some part thereof is situated." As an action for
damages for trespass was not specifically made local, the statute has been construed to mean that it is transitory. Note (1941) io U. Kan. City L. Rev. 62, 63:
"An action for trespass to real property within the State of Missouri has been
declared to be transitory by this construction. The principal case has extended this
rule across state lines and declares such an action to be truly transitory in that it may
be brought in any court having jurisdiction of the parties." In Gulf, M. & 0. R. Co.
v. Smith-Brennan Pile Co., 223 S. W. (2d) ioo (Mo. App. 1949), damages were
allowed for an injury to a bridge in Illinois without any consideration of the point
whether it was a local or transitory cause of action. Further cases involving Missouri
law on this point are: Henderson v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 173 F. (2d) 840 (C. A. 8th,
1949); Coleman v. Lucksinger, 224 Mo. 1, 123 S. W. 441 (19o9); Gregg v. The Union
Pacific Company, 48 Mo. App. 494 (1892); Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Co.
v. Mahoney, 42 Mo. 467 (1868).
The Missouri cases show a strained use of their venue statutes, because whether
or not a court will try a case for damages for trespass to land situated in another
state is generally regarded as a matter of jurisdiction rather than one of venue,
unless the action is called transitory, and then no statute is needed to give the court
jurisdiction. Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law (1922) 25: "By
the weight of authority it is held that if an action is brought in one state to recover
damages for trespass to land situated in another state, the objection is not merely
a personal privilege of the defendant, but the court has no jurisdiction over the
cause of action." The British South Africa Company v. Companhia De Mocambique,
[1893] A. C. 602.
mReasor-Hill Corporation v. Harrison, 94 Ark. L. Rep. 572, 576 (1952): "One
may have some sympathy for this position in international disputes, but it has no
persuasive effect when the States are involved." See Taylor v. Sommers Bros. Match
Co., 35 Idaho 30, 204 Pac. 472, 476 (1922).
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though the cause of action arose in another county. Then the arbitrary
limitation was placed on the fiction of the videlicet that, when the
action was in relation to land, it must be a local action. It would appear that justice in a modern era requires even a more severe limitation on what is to be regarded as a local cause of action, and that
"on principle ... proceedings in personam, including actions to re37
cover damages for trespass to land, should be held to be transitory.1
However, to make all actions in trespass absolutely transitory might
tend to bring about many injustices through the harrassment of defendants in inconvenient localities and situations, where it would be
difficult and expensive to secure witnesses and proof. It is necessary,
therefore, that the facts of each case should be analyzed according to
a forum conveniens principle so that unjust impositions may be
38
avoided.
CLYDE H. BLOEMKER

PROCEDURE-VALIDITY or STATUTE CONFERRING JURISDICTION OVER FOR-

EIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN CONTINUOUS BUSINESS IN STATE.

[Vermont]
Commensurate with the growth of the American corporation in an
expanding industrial economy has been a marked trend on the part of
3'Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law (1922) 14.

Courts often cite their internal statutes making certain actions in relation to
realty local inside the state, and then declare that they therefore have no jurisdiction to try a case for damages for trespass to land situated outside the state. Ophir
Silver Min. Co. v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 147 Cal.
467, 82 Pac. 70 (19o5); Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co., 98 Ore. 183, 193 Pac. 909
(1920); Montesano Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Portland Iron Works, 78 Ore. 53, 152 Pac.
244 (1915). When courts speak of a lack of jurisdiction to try a case for damages for
trespass to land lying in another state, they are starting their consideration after
they asume the cause of action is local. Thus, they are by-passing the crux of the
issue, which is to determine whether an action for damages for trespass to realty
lying outside the state is local or transitory. If it is called transitory, there is no
further questiton as to jurisdiction. The Minnesota court in Little v. Chicago, St. P.,
M. & 0. Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846 (1896), see note 25, supra, and the

Arkansas court in the principal case held the internal statutes of the respective states
not applicable to an out-of-state action, and correctly so, because these courts called
the action a transitory action. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S.657, 669, 13 S. Ct. 224,
228, 36 L. ed 1123, 1128 (1892): "Whether actions to recover pecuniary damages

for trespass to real estate ...are purely local, or may be brought abroad, depends
upon the question whether they are viewed as relating to the real estate, or only
as affording a personal remedy.... and whether an action for trespass to land in
one State can be brought in another State depends on the view which the latter State
takes of the nature of the action."
38Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217.
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many states to extend the jurisdiction of their courts over corporations
which are chartered in other states but the activities of which find
contact points within the state of the forum. Since the earlier cases
which held that a corporation could be sued only in the state of incorporation,1 the authority of a state's courts over a foreign corporation
has been greatly expanded.2 The change has been developed concurrently with the expanding foreign activity of corporations and with
the increasing ease with which they can defend against suits brought in
foreign jurisdictions. The departure from the earlier view necessarily
has been conditioned, however, by the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 3
The traditional bases of jurisdiction over non-residents are presence, consent, and statutory authorization. 4 Since a corporation can
act only through its agents, the question of corporate "presence" understandably became the source of much litigation. To provide a foundation for jurisdiction in these cases, the courts resorted to certain
fictional concepts which quickly became imbedded in this branch of
the law. It was said that a foreign corporation "impliedly consented"
to the jurisdiction of a state when, through its agents, it entered the
business channels of that state in a more or less continuous course of
"Northern Indiana R. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 5 McLean 444, 18 Fed. Cas.
358, No. 10,321 (C. C. D. Ind. 1853); National Liberty Insurance Co. v. Trattner,
173 Ark. 480, 292 S. W. 677 (1927). See Dodgem Corporation v. D. D. Murphy
Shows, Inc., 96 Ind. App. 324, 183 N. E. 699, 702 (1932); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
( 3 d ed. 1949) 209.
-This is well brought out by the language of the Supreme Court of the United
States in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 31o at 316, 66 S. Ct. 154,
at 158, 90 L. ed. 95 at 1O (1945). And see Note (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 523.
-Selby v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 189 S. W. (2d) 135 (Mo. App. 1945); State ex
rel. Mills Automatic Merchandising Corp. v. Hogan, 232 Mo. App. 291, 103 S. W.
(2d) 495 (1937); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. ig5i) 85. And a corporation is a
person in that it receives the benefits of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444, 80 L.
ed. 66o (1936); Pacific Movement of the Eastern World v. Wright, 117 S. W. (2d)
647 (Mo. App. 1938).
'To secure jurisdiction over foreign corporations, some states have statutes requiring the corporation to appoint an agent, upon whom process can be served
for actions arising within the state, before the corporation is allowed to carry on
business within the state. Others provide that designated persons shall be deemed
such agents if the corporation enters the state to do business, implying the consent of the foreign corporation to be sued in the state for actions arising within
the state. In the absence of express or implied consent, jurisdiction has been
exercised over foreign corporations "present" within the state and upon whom
process could be served. Thus, all three bases of jurisdiction have been involved
in the matter of jurisdiction over foreign corporations. See Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws (3d ed. 1949) § 76.
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dealing.' The corporation was then "present" within the state and
therefore amenable to suit.6 This doctrine found expression in the
familiar phrase "doing business." Whether a corporation was "doing
business" within a state depended, of course, upon the nature and extent of its activities within that state, and could only be resolved
through case-by-case determination.7 It has not been thought, however,
that single or isolated acts of a corporation could render it "present"
for purposes of suit.8
The legislature of Vermont, apparently determined to expand the
concept of "doing business" into this heretofore forbidden area, passed
a statute in 1947 which declared that a foreign corporation which
makes a contract to be performed in whole or in part in Vermont or
committs a tort in whole or in part in Vermont, would "be deemed to
be doing business" in that state.9 Against the contention that such an
imposition of jurisdiction deprived a foreign corporation of due process
of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutionality
of this enactment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Vermont in the
recent case of Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corporation.10
5Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 81 F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); State
v. Tazewell, 125 Ore. 528, 266 Pac. 238 (1928). "When a corporation voluntarily
does business within a state, it has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of that state
just as a man has when he comes into a state." Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Griffin, 226 Ky. 159, so S. W. (2d) 633, 636 (1928).
'McWhorter v. Anchor Serum Co., 72 F. Supp. 437 (W. D. Ark. 1947); Reed
v. Real Detective Publ. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. (2d) 133 (1945); Porcelli v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 128 N. J. L. 603, 27 A. (2d) 641 (1942).

'Roark v. American Distilling Co., 97 F. (2d) 297 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); McWhorter v. Anchor Serum Co., 72 F. Supp. 437 (W. D. Ark. 1947); Dorsey v. Anderson, 222 Iowa 917, 270 N. W. 463 (1936).
sJohns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. C. Md. 1950);
Edgewater Realty Co. v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., 49 F. Supp. 807 (D. C.
Md. 1943); Schultz v. Long Island Machinery & Equipment Co., 173 So. 569 (La. App.
1937); 20 C. J. S. 155.

'Vt. Stat. (1947) § 1562: "Doing business, definition, service of process. If a
foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Vermont to be performed
in whole or in part by either party in Vermont, or if such foreign corporation
commits a tort in whole or in part in Vermont against a resident of Vermont,
such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Vermont by such foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by such foreign corporation
of the secretary of the state of Vermont and his successors to be its true and lawful
attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions or proceedings
against such foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such contract or
tort. The making of such contract or the committing of such tort shall be deemed to
be the agreement of such foreign corporation that any process against it which is
so served upon the secretary of state shall be of the same legal force and effect as
if served on the foreign corporation at its principal place of business in the state
or county where it is incorporated and according to the law of the state or county."
10116 Vt. 569, 8o A. (2d) 664 (1951).
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In that case defendant was a Massachusetts corporation, and plaintiff was a citizen and resident of Vermont. Defendant, in repairing
plaintiff's roof, was alleged to have negligently damaged it. Plaintiff
brought a tort action for damages in a Vermont court and, under the
statute, service was made on the defendant "by delivering a copy of
the writ to the Secretary of State as process agent"" for the foreign
corporation. Defendant, making a special appearance, moved for a
dismissal, relying principally on the contention that the statute
"'abrogates the general rule' which is said to be that single or isolated
acts will not ordinarily be regarded as such a doing or carrying on of
business as to subject a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of a
state court via the medium of substituted service."' 12
Though the statute bases the jurisdiction of the Vermont courts on
the premise that a foreign corporation committing a tort in Vermont is
"doing business" in that state, the court did not concern itself with
whether such activity could properly be held to constitute "doing
business." Instead, it stated the "precise problem" as being whether
a state has the power to extend the jurisdiction of its courts over a
foreign corporation which has committed a tort within the state against
a resident of the state. 13 In answer, the court decided that the Due
Process Clause does not prevent the exercise of such jurisdiction, "provided always that adequate notice of the litigation be given to the par14
ticular defendant against whom liability is sought to be enforced."'
It was observed that "in defining due process of law, a trend from
emphasis on the territorial limitations of courts to emphasis on providing notice and opportunity to be heard" has marked the modem
decisions.15
"ii6 Vt. 569, 80 A. (2d) 664, 665 (1951).
22116 Vt. 569, 8o A. (2d) 664, 665 (1951).
""In our examination we shall limit ourselves to the precise problems presented: Has the State of Vermont the power to subject by statute to the jurisdiction
of its courts a foreign corporation which commits a single tort in whole within
the territorial limits of Vermont and against a resident of Vermont to actions and
proceedings against it arising from or growing out of such tort? Does such a statute
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States of America?" Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt.
569, 8o A. (2d) 664, 666 (1951).
14hi6 Vt. 569, So A. (2d) 664, 667 (1951). It is generally thought that "notice" is
the element of due process which is to be primarily considered in jurisdiction
cases. In re Hampton's Estate, 55 Cal. App. (2d) 543, 131 P. (2d) 565 (1942); McIntyre v. State, i9o Ga. 872, 11 S.E. (2d) 5 (1940); Elliott v. Clement, 175 Ore. 44,
151 P- (2°d) 739 (1944).
"116 Vt. 569, 8o A. (2d) 664, 668 (1951). See Note (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 523,
536.
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Much of the opinion of the principal case consists of quoted excerpts from International Shoe Co. v. Washington,16 a 1945 decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, which held that a Delaware
corporation doing business principally in Missouri but which had for
four years employed about a dozen salesmen who regularly collected
orders in substantial volume in Washington had established "sufficient
contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and
just, according to our traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations which
appellant has incurred there."' 7 Since it is obvious that the Smyth and
the International Shoe Co. cases are readily distinguishable on the
basis of the business activity of the defendant corporation in the state
where suit was brought, if the earlier case supports the principal decision at all, it is not in the holding of that case but in the approach
to the problem. There the Supreme Court avoided applying the
familiar "doing business" test and substituted instead a "fairness" test
to determine whether due process had been satisfied.' 8 Under this
standard, the foreign corporation is required to "have certain minimum
contacts with it [the state of the forum] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'."' 9 The Supreme Court concluded that the extensive
and continuous commercial operations of the Delaware corporation in
Washington made it a fair subject for suit there. The Vermont court,
however, seems to find that it is generally fair to extend jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation regardless of the slight business connection
it has with the state, if the alleged wrongful act for which suit is
brought was done in the state, and if the defendant is given sufficient
notice and opportunity to be heard.2 0 The court of the state where
the cause of action arises "is normally the forum of convenience for the
21
settlement of the dispute."
18326 U. S. 3io, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. ed. 95 (1945).
'-326 U. S. 31o, 320, 66 S. Ct. 154, 16o, go L. ed. 95, 104 (1945).
'Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1949) 216; Notes (1951) 26 St. John's L. Rev.
166; (1951) 1oo U. of Pa. L. Rev. 598, 6o0.
"International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158,
90 L. ed. 95, 102 (1945).
"No sound reason appears to exist why foreign corporations may not be held
responsible in Vermont for wrongful acts done in Vermont. If a foreign corporation
voluntarily elects to act here, it should be answerable and under our laws. The
consequences imputed to it lie within its own control, since it need not act within
this state at all, unless it so desires." Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116
Vt. 569, 8o A. (2d) 664, 668 (ig5i).
2-Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., i6 Vt. 569, 8o A. (2d) 664, 668 (1951).
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3
In McWhorter v. Anchor Serum Co., 22 an Arkansas Statute 2

similar to the Vermont statute in the Smyth case was struck down as
unconstitutional by a Federal District Court in Arkansas. It was there
declared that "before any state can subject a foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of that state, the corporation must have expressly consented to such jurisdiction or must have done sufficient acts to constitute a submission to such jurisdiction. ... In the case of foreign
corporations these acts normally take the form of 'doing business'. 2 4
The district court adopted Justice Brandeis' standard that a "foreign
corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in
the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the state
in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is
present there,"25 and concluded that a state statute which attempts to
extend the jurisdiction of the local courts over a corporation not in
such relation to the state violates the Due Process Clause. The defendant was represented in the state of Arkansas by a sole agent who
merely took orders, and the court ruled that it could not find the
presence of the corporation in the state of Arkansas from that limited
activity.2 If the "fairness" test of the InternationalShoe Co. case had
been used, the result could easily have been the same, in that the
statute could be said to "offend traditional notions of fair play and
27
substantial justice."
-n72 F. Supp. 437 (W. D. Ark. 1947).
nActs of Arkansas (1947) Act 347. "'Any non-resident person, firm, partnership,
general or limited, or any corporation not qualified under the Constitution and
Laws of this State as to doing business herein, who shall do any business or perform
any character of work or service in this State shall, by the doing of such business or
the performing of such work, or services, be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of the State, or his successor or successors in office, to be the true and lawful
attorney or agent of such non-resident, upon whom process may be served in any action accrued or accruing from the doing of such business, or the performing of such
work, or service, or as an incident thereto by any such non-resident, or his, its, or
their agent, servant or employee.' The act also stipulates that notice of such service (upon the Secretary of State) and a copy of the process shall be sent by registered
mail by the plaintiff to the defendant at his last known address." McWhorter v.
Anchor Serum Co., 72 F. Supp. 437, 438 (W. D. Ark. 1947).
2'72 F. Supp. 437, 439 (W. D. Ark. 1947). Accord, Davis v. Jones, 236 Ala. 684,
184 So. 896 (1939); Schmidt v. Bellevue-Montclair Apartments, 44 N. Y. S. (2d)
298 (1943)'Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company v. Mc Kibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 265,
37 S. Ct. 280, 61 L. ed. 710, 711 (1917), quoted in McWhorter v. Anchor Serum
Co., 72 F. Supp. 437, 439 (W. D. Ark. 1947).
^
F. Supp. 437 at 439 (W. D. Ark. 1947) and cases there cited.
272
it is submitted that the "fairness" test of the International Shoe Co. case and
the "doing business" test of Justice Brandeis are not essentially different standards,
and that past decisions could have been reached under either test. However, the
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In the McWhorter case, plaintiff relied on the non-resident motorist
statutes, 28 which confer jurisdiction on the basis of a single act by the
defendant-the use of the public ways of the state. The cases in this
field are inapplicable to the problem in the principal case, however,
for the Supreme Court has expressly ruled that such assumption of
jurisdiction by a state is valid under the state's police power, in that
an automobile is inherently a dangerous instrument.29 In the McWhorter and Smyth cases the reserve police power could not be called
upon to take the cases out of the general rule that isolated acts are not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
The defendant in the instant case is not subject to the jurisdiction
of Vermont by express consent, and this consent can never be implied
if such implication violates defendant's right to due process of law.
Consent, however, was implied off the basis of defendant's "doing
business" under statutory definition. Yet the Vermont court, in determining the constitutionality of the statute, avoided the traditional tests
for ascertaining whether a corporation is "doing business," and these
tests obviously could not have been satisfied; instead it substituted the
"fairness" test of the InternationalShoe Co. case.
In passing on the fairness issue, the court seems to have engaged
in some unwarranted assumptions and overlooked some highly relevant
"fairness" test lacks the concrete and mechanical qualities of the "doing business"
standard and can be readily adapted to confer jurisdiction in more cases, if the
trend expressed in Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 16 Vt. 569, 8o A.
(2d) 664 at 668 (1951) and Note (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 523 at 536, is to be
extended further.
'A typical statute is that of Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws (1923) c. 431, § 2:
"The acceptance of a nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred by section
three or four, as evidenced by his operating a motor vehicle thereunder, or the
operation by a nonresident of a motor vehicle on a public way in the Commonwealth other than under said sections, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the registrar or his successor in office, to be his true
and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes in any action
or proceeding against him, growing out of any accident or collision in which said
nonresident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on such a way, and
said acceptance or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that any such
process against him which is so served shall be of the same legal force and validity
as if served on him personally. Service of such process shall be made by leaving
a copy of the process with a fee of two dollars in the hands of the registrar, or in
his office, and such service shall be sufficient service upon the said nonresident:
Provided, that notice of such service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent
by registered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant's return
receipt and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith are appended to the
writ and entered with the declaration. The court in which the action is pending
may order such continuances as may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the action."
9Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. ed. lO91 (1927).
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considerations. Thus, jurisdiction in the instant case was conferred
on the basis of defendant's having committed a tort in Vermont, yet
whether a tort was in fact committed could only be determined by a
decision of the case on its merits. If the decision is that no tort has
been committed, the courts of Vermont obviously are without jurisdiction, yet the case has been decided on its merits. If such a decision
is without effect because the Vermont court lacked jurisdiction,3 0 defendant would be subject to another suit, on the same cause of action,
by the same plaintiff in the courts of the state of its incorporation. This
result would seem to give plaintiff two chances to have his case decided
on its merits. Further, the Vermont court, in discussing jurisdiction,
seems to be saying that either plaintiff or defendant must bear the
burden of going away from home for the suit, and it should be the
defendant because it is a wrongdoer and the plaintiff an innocent
victim.

1

Apparently defendant's wrongdoing is presumed merely

because it is charged with tortious conduct. If the defendant proves
itself free of wrongdoing, it has been victimized by the necessity of
defending an unwarranted suit in a foreign jurisdiction.
The Vermont court is apparently correct in assuming that the
Supreme Court of the United States has never specifically ruled against
the validity of such a statutory grant of jurisdiction as was made by
the Vermont legislature.32 But the implications of the decisions have
been that the satisfaction of either the "doing business" or the "fairness" test rests on the existence of substantial and continuous commercial activity within the state by the foreign corporation. 33 The
Vermont statute's branding of an isolated tort as "doing business" was
certainly unprecedented, and the Vermont court's decision that "fair
play" and "substantial justice" are served by requiring the foreign
corporation to stand suit where the alleged tort was committed is questionable.
EDWARD L. OAST, JR.

3°Generally, a decision of a court which lacks jurisdiction over the case is without effect. Rowe v. Nolan Finances Co., 71o App. D. C. 35, 142 F. (2d) 93 (1944);
Collins v. Powell, 224 Iowa 1015, 277 N. W. 477 (1938); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws
(1935) 326.
-"Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 1i6 Vt. 569, 8o A. (2d), 664 at 668
(1951).
'Note (195o) 94 L. ed. ui81; Restatement, Judgments (1942) § 23 (caveat not
answered by 1948 amendment).
'International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 31o, 66 S. Ct. 154, go L. ed.
95 (1945); McWhorter v. Anchor Serum Co., 72 F. Supp. 437 (W. D. Ark. 1947);
McBaine, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations: Actions Arising out of Acts
Done Within the Forum (1946) 34 Calif. L. Rev. 331.
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PROPERTY-PRIOR TAKER'S POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AS SUBSTITUTE FOR
RECORDING OF INTEREST AS AGAINST SUBSEQUENT TAKER WITHOUT

NOTICE. [Pennsylvania]
Though the purpose of the recording acts is conceded to be to
provide a record by which holders of interests in land can give notice
of their rights and by which persons proposing to acquire interests in
land can determine the condition of the title,1 the record has not been
made the sole controlling factor in contests in which a subsequent
taker claims priority over a previous non-recording taker.2 The subsequent taker may find himself deprived of the protection of the recording acts because knowledge of the previous interest is imputed to him
on the basis of circumstances which are held to have put him on a duty
of inquiry that would have revealed the existence of the competing
claim.3 One of the factors most frequently urged as imputing such
4
knowledge is possession of the property by the previous claimant.
In the recent Pennsylvania decision of Malamed v. Sedelsky,5 the
defendants took title to realty in the name of one Pastner, a veteran
soldier, in "order that a mortgage might be secured from the Veterans
Administration." The defendants made all payments of the purchase
price, and at all times held exclusive possession of the premises. More
than two years later Pastner executed a deed to the defendants, but
before it was recorded Pastner executed a judgment note to the plaintiff
and a judgment was entered on the note. Two months later defendants' deed was recorded. Thereafter, the property was sold under an
execution issued on the judgment, the plaintiff purchasing at the
sale and receiving the sheriff's deed. The plaintiff then brought suit
'Bailey v. Kuida, 69 Ariz. 357, 213 P. (2d) 895 (ig5o); Blue Ridge Apartment
Co. Inc. v. Telfair Stockton and Co., 2o5 Ga. 552, 54 S. E. (2d) 6o8 (1949); Knox
v. Kaelber, 14o N. J. Eq. 598, 55 A. (2d) 53 (1947); 5 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed.
1939) §1262.

2Smith v. Miller, 289 Pa. 184, 137 Atl. 254 (1927); Howard v. Leonard, 185 S. W.
(2d) 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Walker, 149 S. W. (2d)
195 (Tex. Civ. App. 194o).
'Sterling v. Title Ins. and Trust Co., 53 Cal. App. (2d) 736, 128 P. (2d) 31 (1942);
Stoke v. Wheeler, 391 Ill. 429, 63 N. E. (2d) 492 (1945); McLain v. Shenandoah
Life Ins. Co., 224 N. C. 837, 32 S. E. (2d) 592 (1945); Cambridge Production Credit
Ass'n v. Patrick, 140 Ohio St. 521, 45 N. E. (2d) 751, 144 A. L. R. 323 (1942); 5 Tiffany,
Real Property (3d ed. 1939) § 1285.
4
Doll v. Walter, 305 Ill. App. 188, 27 N. E. (ad) 231 (1940); Rapine v. Harvey,
128 N. J. Eq. 437, 16 A. (2d) 822 (1940); Klar v. Hoopingarner, 62 Ohio App. io2,
23 N. E. (ad) 326 (1939); 5 Tiffany, Real Property (3 d ed. 1939) § 1287.
5367 Pa. 353, 8o A. (2d) 853 (1951).
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for possession and to quiet title, and prevailed in the trial court. 6
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court held that since defendants
were in exclusive possession of the premises, plaintiff was under a duty
to inquire as to their rights in the property, and since he failed to inquire, constructive notice is imputed to him of the fact that defendants were the true owners of the property and that the judgment
debtor had no interest which could be seized under the execution issued
on the judgment. The reasoning employed in this decision was based
on an 1838 case in which it was said that "it certainly evinces as much
carelessness to purchase without having viewed the premises, as it does
to purchase without having searched the register." 7
In so ruling, the Pennsylvania court was following the majority
view, that the "open, notorious, and exclusive possession" of the
premises by the holder of the unrecorded deed is sufficient to charge
the person with the subsequent claim8 with notice of the rights of the
'The trial court held for the plaintiff on the ground that "that act of June 4,
1901, P. L. 425, 21 P. S. § 6oi, makes void a resulting trust as against judgment

creditors ...unless ...a written declaration of trust by the holder of the legal
title has been recorded ... " The Supreme Court, in reversing the decision, ruled
"that the resulting trust was extinguished by the delivery of the unrecorded deed
... and the Act of igoi could thereafter afford no protection to creditors who
acquired their rights after the trust ended." 367 Pa. 353, 8o A. (2d) 853, 854 (1951).
The trust issue will not be discussed in this comment.
WVoods v. Farmere, 7 Watts 382, 387 (Pa. 1838).
"The Pennsylvania court made no distinction between subsequent purchasers
and subsequent judgment creditors, but the recording statutes are generally divided
into three categories as to their treatment of the rights of a judgment creditor over
the holder of a prior unrecorded deed. (i) As a general rule, judgment creditors are
held not to be "subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers" and are thus not entitled to the protection of the recording laws which mention only such parties.
An unrecorded conveyance, therefore, will prevail over any subsequent judgment
lien in these jurisdictions. United States v. Certain Lands in Borough of Brooklyn,
44 F. Supp. 830 (E. D. N. Y. 1942); Carroll v. Evans, i9o Ark. 511, 79 S. W. (2d)
425 (1935); Davis v. Perry, 120 Cal. App. 670, 8 P. (2d) 514 (1932); Bank of Cottonwood v. Henriques, 91 Cal. App. 88, 266 Pac. 836 (1928). (2) Some statutes expressly include judgment creditors, but require them to be without notice of the
prior interest at the time the lien is obtained, thereby placing them in the same
class with purchasers or encumbrancers, who must be without notice when their
interest is taken. Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co., 135 U. S.326, 1O S.Ct. 825, 34
L. ed. 162 (189o); Van Gundy v. Tandy, 272 Ill. 319, 111 N. E. 1020 (1916); Brainhall v. Hutchinson, 42 N. J. Eq. 372, 7 Atl. 873 (1886); Agricultural Credit Corp.
v. State, 74 N. D. 71, 20 N. W. (2d) 78 (1945). The Pennsylvania statute governing
the principal case, falls within this category, by providing that, "Every such deed,
conveyance, contract, or other instrument of writing which shall not be ...recorded
...shall be adjudged fraudulent and void as to any subsequent bona fide purchaser
or mortgagee or holder of any judgment ... without actual or constructive
notice...." Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1950) §21-351. (3) The third group of
statutes concerning judgment creditors includes them within the protection the act
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possessor to the extent that the subsequent taker could, by reasonable
inquiry, have ascertained the nature of such rights.9 This is said to be
true because the actual possession of realty raises a rebuttable presumption of ownership of the property, 10 and the subsequent taker
should have seen that a third party was in possession, and in the exercise of common prudence and honesty, should have determined the
nature of the possessor's claim."'
It is, of course, impossible to determine how far the courts would
go in invoking the general rule. To defeat the subsequent claim, it is
not necessary to show that the subsequent taker actually knew of the
possession of the other, but only that the posession is of the character
required by law, in which case constructive notice follows from the
element of possession. 12 Although it is generally agreed that the
possession required by law must be "actual, open, visible, and exclusive," since these are ambiguous terms, the courts must interpret
3
their meaning in the light of specific factual situations. Inclosure,'
cultivation, 14 improvements on the land,' 5 any use and occupation
gives against unrecorded prior interests, and does not require them to be without
notice, even though the purchasers or encumbrancers must be. Price v. Wall, 97
Va. 334, 33 S. E. 599, 75 Am. St. Rep. 788 (1899); Edison v. Huff, 29 Gratt. 338
(Va. 1877); Guerrant v. Anderson, 4 Rand. 2o8 (Va. 1826). This appears to be a
rarely accepted system, and is typified by 8 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 195o) §55-96: "...
every deed ...conveying real estate ...shall be void as to all purchasers for
valuable consideration without notice ...and lien creditors, until and except from
the time it is duly admitted to record ..."
ODoll v. Walter, 305 Ill. App. 188, 27 N. E. (2d) 231 (1940); Rapine v. Harvey,
128 N. J. Eq. 437, 16 A. (2d) 822 (1940); Klar v. Hoppingarner, 62 Ohio App.
102, 23 N. E. (2d) 326 (1939); James v. Union Graded Dist. No. 2 of Muskogee
County, 201 Okla. 573, 207 P. (2d) 241 0949); 5 Tiffany, Real Property (3 d ed. 1939)
§ 1287.

"In re Sentinel Oil Co., 27 F. Supp. 304 (S. D. Cal. 1939); Michelson v. Leskowicz,
55 N. Y. S. (2d) 831 (1945); Smith v. Briggs, 168 S. W. (2d) 528 (Tex. Civ App.
1943).
1Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Walker, 149 S. W. (2d) 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
2'Majewski v. Greenberg, iol N. J. Eq. 134, 136 At. 749 (1927)13
'oms v. Knighton, 199 Ga. 858, 36 S. E. (2d) 315 (1945) (Where petitioner went
into possession and plowed the land, cut a ditch across the land, and inclosed part
of it with wire fence, there was sufficient possession to constitute constructive notice
to a subsequent claimant.)
"Toms v. Knighton, 1g9 Ga. 858, 36 S. E. (2d) 315 (1945). Cf. DeGuerin v.
Jackson, 50 S. W. (2d) 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (Where the only evidence of occupation was a growing cotton crop, constructive notice of ownership should not be
imputed to the subsequent taker.)
"5Blackburn v. Venice Inlet Co., 38 S.(2d) 43 (Fla. 1948) (Holder of subsequent
claim who lived within two or three miles of property and had opportunity to see
and observe improvements on the land by previous taker was held to have constructive notice of previous taker's interest.)
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of the land which is so notorious as to attract the attention of adverse
claimants,1 6 and any possession which is so exclusive as to prevent
actual occupation by another17 are held to be sufficient to give constructive notice of the interest of the possessor. When the land is being
used in a manner which clearly indicates an intention to appropriate
it for the benefit of the possessor, there is sufficient indicia of ownership to put all persons upon inquiry as to the rights of the one in
possession.' 8 The possession must be a continuous one and not merely
for a temporary or special purpose. 19 The courts have been very strict
in determining what actually constitutes the necessary possession, and
unless the weight of evidence unequivocally shows that it is of the
character required by law, it will not act as constructive notice.
In these jurisdictions which follow the general rule it is held
that possession of land sufficient to put a party upon inquiry is equivalent to the recording of the deed.20 If this is true, it is impossible to
have absolute protection in titles to land situated at some distance
from the recording office, for while the purchaser is completing his
purchase at the office where conveyances are registered, he cannot be on
the land to insure that someone claiming title has not taken possession
since he inspected it. This factor has prompted the Indiana courts to
abrogate the rule that open and notorious possession of itself is notice
to third persons of the possessor's rights in the land. 21 Further if the
general view is applied, an unjust result arises when the subsequent
taker lives a great distance from the premises and never has a chance to
see the property.
Recognizing that such injustices can result from the operation of
'"See Toms v. Knigthon, 199 Ga. 858, 36 S. E. (2d) 315, 319 (1945).

"'See Toms v. Knighton, 199 Ga. 858, 36 S. E. (2d) 315, 319 (1945).
"See Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Roper, 68 Fla. 299, 67 So. 115, i16
(1914). It was held that surveying of land and digging holes to test its quality and
taking prospective purchasers to examine it was not sufficient indicia of ownership to put the world upon inquiry as to the rights of the holder of the deed. Such
acts could have been performed by an agent of the former owner or a casual
trespasser.
"Hosier v. Great Notch Corporation, 23 N. J. Misc. 1, 4o A. (2) 196 (194);
Rapine v. Harvey, 128 N. J. Eq. 437, 16 A. (2d) 822 (1940); Wood v. Price, 79 N.
J. Eq. 620, 81 AtI. 983, 985, 38 L. R. A.

(N. s.) 772 (1911): "...

the general rule

is that possession of real estate which is ...not ...for a temporary purpose, is
constructive notice to all the world of rights of the party in possession."
2ODoll v. Walter, 3o5 Ill. App. 188, 27 N. E. (2d) 231 (194o); Niles v. Cooper.

98 Minn. 39, 107 N. W. 744, 13 L. R. A. (N. s.) 49 (19o6); Kelly-Springfield Tire
Co. v. Walker, 149 S. W. (2d) 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 194o).
"Mishawaka, St. Joseph Loan & Trust Co. v. Neu, 2o9 Ind. 433, 196 N. E. 85
(1935), noted ix Ind. L. J. 174.
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the general rule, some jurisdictions have modified or repudiated it by
statute. 22 In Virginia, for example, while the recording statute states
that an unrecorded deed shall be void as to a subsequent purchaser
only if he is without notice, 23 it specifically excludes possession alone as
being a means by which constructive notice is given. 24 However, possession is still a relevant factor in determining whether or not the
subsequent taker is affected with notice. While possession is not sufficient of itself to constitute notice of the possessor's interest, there
may be other facts which, when combined with the element of possession, would justify imputing constructive notice to the subsequent
2
taker. 5
In North Carolina and Louisiana, the legislatures have gone even
further than in Virginia in removing possession as a factor of notice
in a subsequent purchase by declaring that the registration of a conveyance of realty cannot be replaced by any kind of notice, either actual
or constructive.260 Except as between the contracting parties, an un27
recorded deed is utterly null and void, and conveys no title.
The minority view puts fuller emphasis on recording in the determination of land titles, thus enabling purchasers and creditors to
121 Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1951) § 56-119; 2 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) § 422.400; 4
S. C. Code (Jacobs, 1942) § 8882; 8 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 55-96.
218Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 55-96.
248 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950)) § 55-56: "... the mere possession of real estate

shall not of itself be notice to purchasers thereof for value of any interest or estate
therein of the person in possession...." Payne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., 124 Va.
296, 98 S. E. 34 (1919); Norfolk and Portsmouth Traction Co. v. C. B. White and
Bros., Inc., 113 Va. 102, 73 S. E. 467, Ann. Cas. 1913 E. 655 (1912). "... it was

never intended that, where the purchaser thereof had actual notice of the existence
of a prior contract or conveyance, though unrecorded, he would be protected in
the purchase of land. The object of the statute was to prevent actual notice of
possession from being construed as constructive notice of title." White v. Lee, 144 Va.
523, 530, 132 S. E. 307, 309 (1926).
'Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cofer, 129 Va. 640, io6 S. E. 695 (1921); see
Norfolk and Portsmouth Traction Co. v. C. B. White and Bros., Inc., 113 Va. 102, 106,
73 S. E. 467, 468 (1912): "... that the possession of such estate ... without notice of
other evidence of title in such occupant, should not be notice to such subsequent
purchaser for valuable consideration." [italics supplied].
201La. Rev. Stat. (195o) § 5141; 2A N. C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1950) § 47-18.
Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N. C. 4o6, 196 S. E. 352, 355 (1938): "There is nothing in the
statute nor any decision of this court that would require an examiner of titles to go
out to the premises and ascertain who was in possession of the premises and under
what claim. The cardinal purpose of the registration ...laws is to provide records
that shall of themselves be sufficient, under careful and proper inquiry, to disclose
the true state of the title to real estate."
-2A N. C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 195o) § 47-18. The rule is in force as to mortgages
in Arkansas and Ohio. 5 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) § 51-1oo2; Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1940) § 8542.
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rely with greater safety upon the examination of the records. 28 Under
this view, the subsequent good faith taker is insured against the danger
that a jury will later impute legal knowledge from possession when in
fact he did not have actual knowledge. On the other hand, the prior
party must prove on a subjective basis that the subsequent purchaser
had actual notice, making the burden of proof too heavy to bear in
a great many instances. In this way, then, it is possible for a subsequent
purchaser who is actually not in good faith to prevail over the previous
taker. The majority view, as set out in the principal case, makes it
possible for the claim of a good faith subsequent purchaser to be defeated by knowledge which is imputed by the fact of possession. If
the prior purchaser may prove notice to the subsequent taker on an
objective basis-by proving possession in himself-no subsequent purchaser can buy with safety, for a jury may later find that he had notice
when in fact he did not. The problem facing the courts is the necessity
of balancing these two dangers, and the choosing of which view to
adopt is essentially a matter of determining the extent of the burden
the prior taker should bear in proving the subsequent taker not to
have acted in good faith.
CHARLEs F. TUCKER

TORTS-BASIS FOR DETERMINATION OF PASSENGER STATUS OF PLAINTIFF
IN ACTION AGAINST STREET CARRIER FOR PERSONAL INJURIES.

[Iowa]

Because the duty of a common carrier to protect a passenger from
injury is based on stricter standards of care than apply to one not a
passenger,' a plaintiff suffering personal injuries allegedly caused by
the wrongful act of a carrier may materially strengthen his chances of
recovering damages by establishing himself in the category of "passenger." Attempts to gain this advantage have placed before the courts
many perplexing problems concerning the commencement and termination of the passenger-carrier relationship, such as that involved in
2
the recent Iowa case of Murray v. CedarRapids City Lines, Inc.
ISPayne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., 124 Va. 296, 98 S. E. '4
Moore, 86 Va. 26, 9 S. E. 419 (1899).

(1919); Slater v.

V"A carrier, such as a railroad company, owes to a passenger a different and a
higher degree of care than to mere trespassers or strangers, or to travelers at highway
crossings, or using the streets or highways as crossings, or to one of it servants...
13 C. J. S. 1257. See also io Am. Jur. 157.

248 N. W. (2d) 256 (Iowa 1951).
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In the Murray case, defendant carrier's driver stopped his bus, in
which plaintiff was a passenger, at a point not a regular stop, opened
the front door, and left the bus in search of the police to take charge
of two intoxicated and disorderly youths who were passengers thereon.
The driver requested the other passengers to close the door and keep
the boys aboard until he returned with the police. In attempting to
follow the driver's instructions, a passenger inadvertently opened the
rear door, through which plaintiff left the bus because he did not want
to be "locked in with two drunks." As plaintiff stood outside the front
of the bus, he was injured in a scuffle which ensued when other passengers and the two youths got off, the scuffle apparently being caused
by the efforts of certain passengers to restrain the boys until the police
arrived. Although plaintiff took no part in the struggle, a wild blow
buckled his glasses into his eye, the sight of which he lost completely.
Alleging that the proximate cause of his injuries was the failure of
the carrier to exercise the high degree of care required for his safety,
plaintiff sued the transit line to recover damages for personal injuries
inflicted by a fellow passenger. 3 The carrier contended that plaintiff
was not a passenger when injured, that defendant had exercised the
degree of care it was required to use to protect plaintiff, and that
plaintiff's injuries were not the proximate result of defendant's negligence. The trial judge sent the case, including the question of the
plaintiff's legal status at the time of his injury, to the jury, which found
for the plaintiff. On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence
tending to establish the plaintiff's continued status as a passenger
when injured was insufficient to go to the jury.
The judgment of the trial court, however, was affirmed by the
'Cases in which such liability was recognized: Arkansas Power & Light Co. v.
o

Steinheil, 19 Ark. 470, 80 S. W. (2d) 921 (1935); Blackwell v. Fernandez, 324 Ill. App.
597, 59 N. E. (2d) 342 (1945); Rine v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co., 317 Mass. 520, 58

N. E. (2d) 750 (1945); Green Bus Lines v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp., 287 N. Y.
3o9, 39 N. E. (2d) 251, 162 A. L. R. 241 (1942); Southeastern Greyhound Lines v.

Smith, 23 Tenn. App. 627, 136 S. W. (2d) 727 (1940); Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v.
Hubbard, 12o Va. 664, 91 S. E. 618 (1917); Clark v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 84 W. Va.
526, 1oo S. E. 480, 7 A. L. R. 117 (1919).

But the mere presence of an intoxicated passenger on the carrier's car does
not make an assault reasonably foreseeable and failure of the carrier to eject such
passenger after acquiring knowledge of his intoxication does not make the carrier
liable for an assault by him on a fellow passenger. Holton v. Boston Elevated Ry.
Co., 303 Mass. 242, 21 N. E. (2d) 251 (1939); Mills v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
172 N. C. 266, 90 S. E. 221 (1916); Brehony v. Pottsville Union Traction Co., 218 Pa.
123, 66 Atl. oo6 (1907). Cf. Kinsey v. Hudson & Manhattan R. Co., 13o N. J. L.
285, 32 A. (2d) 497 (1943)-
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Supreme Court of Iowa, which termed the evidence sufficient to justify
a jury finding that a passenger status still existed at the time of plaintiff's injury. In doing so, the court declared the criterion to be the
intention of the plaintiff when he left the bus. "The jury here could
properly find that plaintiff left the bus temporarily only and with no
intention of not continuing to his destination, just as did many others
of the passengers.... The fact that he elected to seek safety, temporarily, outside should not be said, as matter of law to have suspended
the relationship." 4 The Iowa Supreme Court's disposition of the
Murray case poses two fundamental questions: (i) Is the court or the
jury the proper agency to decide the issue of passenger status, and (2)
What is the proper test to be used in determining whether or not
the passenger relationship has been terminated?
The issue of passenger status involves both questions of law and
fact,5 and ordinarily the court will submit the questions of fact to the
jury, under proper instructions setting out the law as to what factors
are necessary to establish or maintain a passenger-carrier relationship. 6
It is then for the jury to determine whether or not such facts exist in a
particular case. 7 However, the court alone is the proper agency to pass
on this issue when the facts are undisputed or when only one conclusion can reasonably be reached from the evidence. 8 The frequency of
jury determinations of the passenger issue is apparently due to the high
incidence of conflicting evidence and the courts' hesitancy to rule that
but one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from a given set of facts.
'48 N. W. (2d) 256, 258 and 259 (Iowa 1951).
1
Ball v. Mobile Light & P. Co., 146 Ala. 309, 39 So. 584, 119 Am. St. Rep. 9 (19o5);
Todd v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 274 Ill.
2o, 113 N. E. 95 (1916); Cottrell v. Michigan
United Traction Co., 184 Mich. 221, 15o N. W. 857 (1915); St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v.
Sanderson, 99 Miss. 148, 54 So. 885, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.)
352 (1911).
"Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Jennings, igo Ill. 478, 6o N. E. 818, 54 L. R. A. 827
(0o); Hennessey v. Intermountain Transp. Co., iio Mont. 398, 102 P. (2d) 489 (1940);
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hoover, 142 Md. 251, 12o At. 526 (1923); Clark v. Bland,
181 N. C. 110, 1o6 S. E. 491 (1921); Kidwell v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 71 W. Va.
664, 77 S. E. 285, 43 L. R. A. (N. s.) 999 (t913).
?Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Ringstaff, 67 F. (2d) 482 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933); Hart
v. Fresno Traction Co., 175 Cal. 489, 167 Pac. 885 (1917); Foote v. Chicago, N. W., M.
& R. Co., 256 Il1. App. 581 (1930); Gegere v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 175 Minn. 96
220 N. W. 429 (1928); Brennan v. Public Service Ry. Co., 1o6 N. J. L. 464, 148 At.
775 (1930); San Antonio Public Service Co. v. Turbin, 153 S. W. (2d) 343 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941).

"Willingham v. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co., 2o3 Ala. 351, 83- So. 95
(1919); Painter v. Chicago, B. & Q R. Co., 93 Neb. 419, 14o N. W.

787 (1913);

Richardson v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 70 Ore. 330, 141 Pac. 749 (1944);
Schuyler v. Southern Pac. Co., 37 Utah 581, 1o9 Pac. 458 (19o9); Virginia Ry. &
Power Co. v. Dressier, 132 Va. 342, 111 S. E. 243, 22 A. L. R. 3o (1922).
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This tendency is regrettable if carried to extremes, for while the court
must take care not to usurp the function of the jury, the well known
predilection of juries to favor the injured human plaintiff appearing
before them over the non-visible corporation defendant frequently
leads to verdicts for the plaintiff in doubtful situations. 9 Although a
verdict unwarranted by the evidence may be set aside by either the
trial or appellate court, verdicts often may not be such flagrant departures from the evidence as to justify the judge in setting them aside.
And even if an appeal succeeds, it is not uncommon for the defendant's
cost of appeal to exceed the amount of damages awarded by a dubious
verdict in a lower court.
In view of the inclination of the jury to favor the plaintiff, it is
important that the trial court make every effort to give instructions
that will explain clearly the proper basis for determining whether the
passenger relationship has been established or has ceased. Since it is the
duty of a carrier to exercise toward passengers the highest degree of
care, such duty stopping just short of making it an insurer of passengers'
safety,1 0 it logically follows that for a carrier to perform this high duty
the passenger must be in a place over which the carrier has the legal
control. Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Dressier" thus states this view
of the law:
"The reason for the high degree of care required of carriers
of persons is the tender regard the law has for human life and
limbs, and the fact that the carrier has the selection, control,
management, and operation of the whole instrumentalities of
carriage, and a limited control over and direction of the conduct
of the passenger. It may make and enforce reasonable rules for
the protection of passengers, but if the passenger may place himself outside the pale of influence of the carrier, beyond its control and direction, and still retain his character as passenger,
such rules would be wholly inoperative and useless, and the
carrier would be without means to protect the passenger from
injury or itself from liability. "12
OA "horrible example" of this sort of jury finding may be seen in Robertson v.
West Jersey &S. R. Co., 79 N. J. L. 186, 74 Atl. 30o (19o9).
"°13 C.J. S., Carriers §§ 677-678; lo Am. Jur., Carriers §§ 1245-1247. But "highest
degree of care" means only that which can be exercised consistently with practical
operation of the transit line. Atchison, T. & S.. F. Ry. Co. v. France, 54 Ariz. 140,
94 P. (2d) 434 (1939); Bowes v. New England Transp. Co., 126 Conn. 2oo, 1o A.
(2d) 589 (1940); Gould v. Maine Central Transp. Co., 136 Me. 336, 9 A. (2d) 263
(1939); Wiggins v. North Coast Transp. Co., 2 Wash. (2d) 446, 98 P. (2d) 675 (1940);
Adkins v. Raleigh Transit Co., 127 W. Va. 131, 31 S. E. (2d) 775 (1944).
"13 2 Va. 342, 111 S. E. 243, 22 A. L. R. 3o (1922).
"Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Dressler, 132 Va. 342, 362, in1 S. E. 243, 249
22 A. L. R. 301, 312 (1922).
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A review of railroad carrier cases involving common fact situations reveals that neither a temporary nor permanent departure from
the carrier's vehicle severs the passenger-carrier relationship where the
control factor is present. One who, at his final destination, alights from
a train retains his status as passenger until he has had a reasonable
opportunity to leave the premises. 13 Thus, one's legimate activities,
such as waiting for friends who are to meet him, 14 seeing about personal luggage,' 5 or taking shelter from inclement weather 8 must be
considered in the determination of what constitutes a reasonable time.
17
But waiting to transact private business with a railway employee,
remaining for an unlawful purpose,' 8 or voluntarily loitering in search
of pleasure) will not serve to extend the time during which the passenger status is retained if an otherwise reasonable time for departure
has elapsed. 2° The rule is also well established that a railroad passenger
may alight at intermediate stations for any reasonable and useful
purpose, if no objection is made by the carrier, and still retain the
22
rights of a passenger. 21 Such purposes include procuring refreshment,
sending telegrams, 2 exercising on the station platform, 24 talking with
"Young v. Baldwin, 84 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); Mac Gregor v. Pacific
Electric Ry. Co., 6 Cal. (2d) 596, 59 P. (2d) 123 (1936); Sink v. Grand Trunk Western
Ry. Co., 227 Mich. 21, 198 N. W. 238 (1924); Wessman v. Boston & M. R. R., 84
N. H. 475, 152 Ad. 476 (1930); Galehouse v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 22
N. D. 615, 135 N. W. 189, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.)965 (1912); Baker v. Hines, 88 Okla.
266, 213 Pac. 313 (1923); 13 C. J. S. 1073; 1o Am. Jur. 53.
"Powell v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 220 Pa. 638, 7o At. 268, 2o L. R. A. (N. s.)
5019 (1908).
"See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 312, 74 S.W.
581 (1903).
"'Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Keller, 104 Ky. 768, 47 S. W. 1072 (1898).
"¢Hendrick v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 136 Mo. 548, 38 S. W. 297 (1896).
"Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Barrett, 16 Ill. App. 17 (1884).
"Glenn v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 165 Ind.659, 75 N. E. 282, 2 L. R. A. (N. s.) 872
(1905).
"But a passenger's formed intention to remain an unreasonable time will not
relieve the railroad of the high duty of care owed if a reasonable time had not
passed in fact when the injury was sustained. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Wood,
104 Fed. 663 (C. C. A. 8th, igoo).
"Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 153 Ark. 77, 239 S. W. 376 (1922); Sellars v.
Southern Pac. Co., 33 Cal. App. 701, 166 Pac. 599 (1917); Moffit v. Grand Rapids
Ry. Co., 228 Mich. 349, 200 N. W. 274 (1924); Goodman v. Queen City Lines, 208
N. C. 323, 18o S. E. 661 (1935); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Reinhart, 61 Okla.
72, i6o Pac. 51 (1916); Texas, N. 0. R. Co. v. Rooks, 283 S. W. 622 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926).
"Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McCue, 216 Ala. 616, 114 So. 218, 61 A. L. R. 2oo
(1927).
nAlabama G. S. Ry. Co. v. Coggins, 88 Fed. 455 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1898).
-'Sellers v. Southern Pac. Co., 33 Cal. App. 701, 166 Pac. 599 (1917).
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acquaintances, 25 alighting because of curiosity2 6 or to aid the carrier's
servants 27 or even to engage in an altercation with them. 28 A more
difficult problem is presented when the temporary departure is made at
a point not intended to be used for the boarding and discharge of
passengers, and decisions are conflicting as to whether a passenger
retains his rights as such after alighting at such a point. 29 It may be
noted that in one case allowing recovery it was found that the passenger
might reasonably have thought the place of departure to be a regular
station because of its proximity to such a point. 30
From this examination of railroad cases involving the strict duty
owed by carrier to passenger, the conclusion is suggested that the
intention of a person not to terminate the passenger relationship
should not govern his status. These decisions have clearly established
the rule that if a person leaves the carrier's vehicle with the definite intention to end travel thereon at that point, the carrier for a reasonable
period of time thereafter still owes him a strict duty of care while he
remains in an area controlled by the carrier. On the other hand, if a
person goes beyond the area of control, even with the specific intent
to remain a passenger, the carrier should not be held responsible for
31
his safety, because it has no practicable means of protecting him.
Therefore, the court in the principal case has set up an unreliable
test for determining when passenger status is terminated. To instruct a
jury that the subjective intent of a person now on the public street is
determinative of his status undercuts the legal theory supporting carrier liability and is scarcely less than an invitation to the jury to make
2'Arkansas C. R. Co. v. Bennett, 82 Ark. 393, 102 S. W. 198 (1907).
2Chicago, M. &St. R. Ry. Co. v. Harrelson, 14 F. (2d) 893 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
2Moffit v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 228 Mich. 349, 2oo N. W. 274 (1924).
2SLayne v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 66 W. Va. 607, 67 S. E. 11o3 (1909).
"That he does: St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Glossup, 88 Ark. 225, 114 S. W.
247 (igo8); Arkansas C. R. Co. v. Bennett, 82 Ark. 393, 102 S. W. 198 (1907); Austin
v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 149 Mo. App. 397, 13o S. W. 385 (igo); Wandell v. Corbin,
49 Hun. 6o8, i N. Y. Supp. 795 (1888); Missouri, K & T R. Co. v. Prince, 48 Tex.
Civ App. 210, 1o6 S. W. 700 (1907); Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Cooper, 2 Tex.
Civ. App. 42, 20 S. W. 990 (1893).
That he does not: State v. Grand Trunk Railway, 58 Me. 176, 4 Am. Rep. 258
(1870); DeKay v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 41 Minn. 178, 43 N. W. 182, 4 L. R. A.
632 (1889); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sattler, 64 Neb. 636, 90 N. W. 649, 57 L. R.
A. 890 (1902).
"Wandell v. Corbin, 49 Hun. 6o8, i N. Y. Supp. 795 (1888).
81Where plaintiff, as customary, had temporarily alighted from defendant's
train to await its return from another station, the railroad was not liable when he
was assaulted by one of its servants at a bakery, plaintiff not being entitled to the
protection due a passenger as he was off the railroad's right of way and not under
its control when he was injured. Blackburn v. Williamson & P. C. Ry. Co., s8o
Ky. 254, 202 S. W. 500 (1918).
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the transportation company an insurer of the safety of persons over
whom it no longer has authority and who are in areas which it cannot
regulate.
The reasoning of the case is also open to question in that the Iowa
court heavily relied on railroad cases as stating the law applicable to
bus passengers. Since the street carrier differs from the railroad carrier in that the former controls a more limited area, if any, outside the
vehicle than does the latter, decisions involving railroads and their
station platforms often may not be sound precedents to follow in cases
32
involving street carriers unloading on a public way.
Many jurisdictions hold in street carriersituations that as a matter
of law the passenger-carrier relationship ends when a passenger at
the end of his journey voluntarily alights upon a safe place on the
public street and clears the car from which he alights.33 This rule, of
course, does not cover the principal case, as the plaintiff had not
reached his original destination and apparently intended to reboard the
bus after police took off the drunken youths. Nevertheless, it may be
argued for the carrier that plaintiff forfeited his passenger status because he left the bus by his own volition and at a place over which
the carrier had no such control as would make protection of a passenger
reasonably possible. And the railroad cases in which carrier status
is retained in spite of temporary departures at intermediate stations
do not refute this contention, because in those cases the passenger remained in areas under the control of the carrier. However, this argument ignores the important consideration of the reasonable and proper
motive for plaintiff's departure to safeguard himself from possible
physical injury which was threatened because of defendant's failure
to furnish adequate protection for the passengers in the bus.
In view of this latter feature of the principal case, it seems that
the result therein can best be supported by bringing the case within
the rule of Hines v. Garrett.3 4 There it was held that where the negligence of the carrier forced a passenger to make an immediate choice
between remaining on the carrier and being taken far past her desti',Will v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 168 Wis. 38, 171 N. W. 658 (i919).
-McAlpine v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 67 Cal. App. (2d) 468, 154 P. (2d) 911 (1945):
Ferguson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 159 Kan. 52o, 156 P. (ad) 869 (1945);
Trout's Adm'r v. Ohio Valley Electric Ry. Co., 241 Ky. 144, 43 S. W. (2d) 507 (1g3);
Kieger v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 216 Minn. 38, 11 N. W. (2d) 757 (1943); Smuzynski
v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 20o Mo. App. 1095, 93 S. W. (2d) 1058 (1936); White v.
Chappell, 219 N. C. 652, 14 S. E. (2d) 843 (1941); Hudak v. Penn-Ohio Coach Lines
Co., 73 Ohio App. 409, 57 N. E. (2d) 93 (1943); San Antonio Public Service Co. v.
Turbin, 153 S. W. (2d) 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
'Ui3i Va. 125, io8 S. E. 690 (1921).
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nation or alighting at a place not intended as an unloading point,
the carrier was liable for an assault committed by third persons on a
passenger who got off nearly a mile from her intended destination, such
an assault having been held reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances. Leaving the carrier's vehicle was held not to divest the
plaintiff of her status of passenger where the negligence of the carrier's agents amounted to coercion or undue inducement to leave the
car. As did the carrier in Hines v. Garrett, so did the carrier in the
Murray case by its own negligence place a passenger in such a position
that his election to leave the vehicle could not be said to be a voluntary act but rather one forced upon him by the carrier's tortious act,
the act in the principal case being the failure to provide protection
for him while he was inside the bus. Since there was a specific jury
finding that plaintiff's eye injury was the proximate result of this
tortious act, it appears that the result of the Murray case is justified
despite the superficial conflict with existing authority on the importance of plaintiff's intention. 5
Although the control factor should generally be the dominant
consideration in determining whether the injured person is a passenger
to whom the carrier owes a strict duty of care, a definite exception to
this principle arises in the situation graphically illustrated by the
Murray case. If a carrier would be otherwise liable for injuries sustained by a plaintiff on the carrier's premises, the carrier should not be
relieved of liability because the injury was sustained off the premises
when the plaintiff was forced off the premises by the carrier's wrongful
conduct. By so holding, the Murray case upholds the salutary doctrine
that a tortfeasor will not be allowed to profit from his own wrong-

doing.

6

THOMAS C. DAMEWOOD

"In Furby v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 286 Pa. 85, 132 Ad. 796 (1926) recovery was
denied to a nurse who left a partially derailed train and was hurt on a bridge
when she fell into a hole therein created by the train wreck. The fact that she
was off the train to care for injured persons at the express request of the carrier
did not outweigh, in the mind of the court, the fact that she had voluntarily left the
carrier's property and area of control.
3It may be questioned as to whether the status of passenger is vital to plaintiff's recovery. If the struggle to subdue the drunks had resulted in injury to a
pedestrian, liability might fairly have been imposed, as a carrier owes the duty of
ordinary care to persons on the public streets. Under this approach it would have
been proper to instruct the jury that if it found plaintiff still to be a passenger,
plaintiff could recover if there had been a breach of the duty of great care owed him
by the carrier, and if it found him to be no longer a passenger, plaintiff could still
recover if there had been a breach of the duty of ordinary care owed by the carrier
to members of the general public. Had such an instruction been given, it appears
that the jury could reasonably have found for plaintiff under either theory.
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TORTs-LIABILITY OF OWNER FOR INJURIES INFLICTED ON INTRUDER BY
"SPRING GUN" SET ON UNINHABITED PREMISES.

[Ohio]

The rather anomalous claims of a self-confessed thief that a prop-

erty owner should compensate him for injuries sustained at the hands
of the owner while the thief was attempting to break into the property
has placed upon the courts a task of balancing the rights of an owner
in protecting his property and the rights of an intruder not to be killed
or severely injured for merely invading another's property. Though this
issue has been frequently litigated in the so-called "spring gun" cases,
the answer still has not been defined with sufficient clarity to eliminate
confused thinking and questionable results from the later decisions.
The recent Ohio case of Allison v. Fiscus' is an example of the unsettled condition of the law in this field and introduces a variation of
the most widely accepted rule for determining a property owner's
liability in such cases. The plaintiff was seriously injured by the blast
of a dynamite bomb rigged by the defendant to explode when the
door of his tool shed was opened. The door was padlocked, but on
several previous occasions similar locks had been broken and the
shed entered. The plaintiff admitted that it was his intention to steal
2
property of defendant inside the shed, a felony by statute in Ohio.
The breaking took place in the daytime and the only potential weapon
which plaintiff carried was a ten-inch metal pipe which he used to
break the lock. The building was used entirely as a place of storage
for mine equipment and was not in dose proximity to any place of
habitation. The defendant contended that his motive in setting the
bomb, which was placed at a depth of some three feet under the shed's

doorstep, was merely to frighten and not to injure anyone breaking
into the shed, and that he believed the amount of dynamite used to
be no more than sufficient for that purpose. On the basis of these
facts, the trial court found the defendant liable for compensatory
damages as a matter of law, and left to the jury only the question of the
amount of damages to be awarded. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
subject to plaintiff's acceptance of a remittitur of excessive damages,
but the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower courts' decision for
error in the trial court's instructions to the jury that the defendant
was liable for compensatory damages as a matter of law. It held instead that two questions should be submitted to the jury: (1)Did
defendant in good faith believe that the dynamite he planted would
1156 Ohio St. i2o, ioo N. E. (2d) 237 (1951).
2
Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1940) § 12442.
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only scare and was not sufficient to injure an intruder? (2) Was the
force used in fact reasonable and necessary to prevent the felony? One
judge in a clear and forceful dissent approved the view of the lower
courts that there were no reasonable grounds for doubt that the force
which defendant employed was more than was privileged under the
prevailing rules of law, and that he was, therefore, liable for plaintiff's
3
injuries as a matter of law.
Decisions classifiable under the generai designation of "spring-gun
cases" are of common occurrence and date back to the period of the
English game laws, passed by sports-minded members of Parliament to
keep poachers out of the game preserves of their country estates.

4

Though the courts indicated their disposition against trespassers by
denying recovery against land owners who, through the use of spring
guns, inflicted injuries on intruders, 5 Parliament in 18276 repudiated
this privilege of property ownership by making it a misdemeanor to
set spring guns with intent to inflict death or serious bodily injury
upon a trespasser or other persons coming in contact with them.
American courts are unanimous in holding that a property owner
is liable for the death or serious bodily injury of a mere trespasser
inflicted directly7 or indirectly8 even though the trespasser might cause
some damage to the premises. 9 Vhen the intruder is not a mere tres"'While the question of whether excessive force has been used is ordinarily a
question of fact for the jury, there certainly may be cases where the facts and circumstances are such that, if the applicable law is applied, reasonable minds can
come only to the conclusion that excessive force was used." Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio
St. 12o, 1oo N. E. (2d) 237, 248 (1951).
'Hammond, The Village Laborer ( 3d ed. 1920) 171; Slater, The Growth of
Modern England

(1932) 224.

5Illot v. Wilkes, 3 Barn. & Ald. 304, io6 Eng. Rep. 674 (182o).
'7 & 8 George IV (1827) c. 18.
'Johnson v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 753, 132 S. W. (2d) 72 (1939); Stacey v.
Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 402, 225 S. W. 37 (192o); Newcome v. Russell, 133 Ky. 29,
117 S. W. 305 (19o9); People v. Doud, 223 Mich. 120, 193 N. W. 884 (1923); Ulmer
v. Seelman, 159 Mich. 253, 123 N. W. 1124 (1909); State v. Shippey, lo Minn. 223,
88 Am. Dec. 70 (1865); Everton v. Esgate, 24 Neb. 235, 38 N. W. 794 (1888); Dyer

v. State, 58 Okla. Cr. 345, 53 P. (2d) 700 (1936); Palmer v. Smith, 147 Wis. 70, 132
N. W. 614 (s911); 40 C. J. S., Homicide § i1o.
'Warren v. Hawaii, 35 Hawaii 232, 119 F. (2d) 936 (1941); State v. Plumlee, 177
La. 687, 149 So. 425 (1933); Missouri v. Beckham, 3o6 Mo. 566, 267 S.W. 817 (1924);
Grant v. Haas, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 688, 75 S.W. 342 (19o3); Pierce v. Commonwealth,
135 Va. 635, 115 S. E. 686 (1923).

'Some courts have extended this liability to include persons engaged in petty
thievery. Bloom v. State, 155 Ind. 292, 58 N. E. 81 (19oo); State v. Edgerton, 1oo Iowa
63, 69 N. W. 28o (1896); Howard v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 453, 248 S. V. 1059
(1923); State v. Plumlee, 177 La. 687, 149 So. 425 (1933); State v. Childers, 133 Ohio
St. 5o8, 14 N. E. (2d) 767 (1938).
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passer but is engaged in the commission of a felony, the rule as generally stated is that the owner of property is not priiileged to use any
more force indirectly than he would be privileged to use if present. 10
This principle obviously sets up no definite standard in itself but must
depend on other criteria from which may be determined the amount of
force a property owner can employ directly in protection of his property. It is generally agreed that he is not privileged to use such force as
might reasonably be expected to cause death or serious bodily injury
in the protection of his property, except where he or other persons
inhabiting his dwelling appear to be threatened with similar force.",
The owner need not retreat if he reasonably believes that the intruder
will inflict serious bodily harm on him or other inhabitants if he is
12
not prevented from so doing by the use of similarly forceful measures.
The time at which the intrusion took place, whether day or night, and
the amount of advance warning 3 given to the intruder to desist are
important factors to be considered in determining whether the defender's belief that drastic measures were necessary was a reasonable
one.
Where successful commisson of the crime would result only in loss
of or damage to property, the majority of cases holds that a property
owner may seek to restrain the offender but in doing so is not privileged
to use force sufficient to cause him serious bodily harm. 14 To hold
otherwise would in effect place a higher premium on property than
uScheuermann v. Scharfenberg, 163 Ala. 337, 50 So. 335 (19o9); State v. Moore,
31 Conn. 479, 83 Am. Dec. 159 (1863); State v. Plumlee, 177 La. 687, 149 So. 425
(1933); State v. Green, 118 S. C. 279, 11o S. E. 145 (1921); State v. Barr, ii Wash.
481, 39 Pac. io8o (1895); Prosser, Torts (1941) § 21; Restatement, Torts (1934) § 85;
Miller, Criminal Law (1934) 222.
uCoats v. Arkansas, ioi Ark. 51, 141 S. W. 197 (1911); People v. Flanagan, 60
Cal. 2, 44 Am. Rep. 52 (1881); State v. Countryman, 57 Kan. 815, 48 Pac. 137 (1897);
Kinder v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 145, 92 S. W. (2d) 8 (1936); Flynn v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 572, 264 S. W. i111 (1924); People v. Dann, 53 Mich. 490, 19 N. W.
159 (1884); Restatement, Torts (1934) § 65.
2Beard v. U. S., 158 U. S. 550, 15 S. Ct. 962 (1895); State v. O'Brien, 18 Mont. 1,
43 Pac. xo91 (1896); State v. Francis, 152 S. C. 17, 149 S. E. 348 (1929); Wilkes v.
State, io3 Tex. Cr. R. 148, 28o S. W. 786 (1926); Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo. 40, 59 Pac.
793 (1900); Prosser, Torts (1941) § 19.
EState v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 83 Am. Dec. 159 (1863); Prosser, Torts (1941)
133.
"U. S. v. Gilliam, 25 Fed. Cas. 1319, No. 15,205 (1882); Simpson v. State, 59 Ala.
1, 31 Am. Rep. 1 (1877); Darling v. State, 148 Ark. 653, 225 S. W. 328 (1920); People
v. Capello, 282 Ill. 542, 118 N. E. 927 (1918); State v. Metcalfe. 203 Iowa 155, 212
N. W. 382 (1927); State v. Plumlee, 177 La. 687, 149 So. 425 (1933); State v. Tripp,

34 Minn. 25, 24 N. W. 290 (1885); and cases cited note 21, infra. See Miller,
Criminal Law (1934) § 69.
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on human life. Although warehouses and stores have been put in the
same class as dwelling-houses by statute in some states, 15 they are generally considered to be ordinary property and may not be protected
by "deadly" force. 16
Under these principles, since in the instant case the building feloniously entered by plaintiff was an unoccupied storehouse isolated from
any dwelling, the defendant, had he been on the scene, would not have
been privileged to use a highly injurious means of repelling plaintiff's
entry and, therefore, was not privileged to employ such a means in
his absence. 17 In its opinion, the majority of the Ohio court never
clearly explains how it avoids reaching this conclusion. Much emphasis is placed on the facts that the padlock gave plaintiff notice not to
enter the building and that plaintiff was engaged in a felony when he
sustained the injury, but these factors do not alter the effect of the
general rules, of which the courts seems to approve. 18 Perhaps the
decision gives some credence to an assertion made by noted authority 9
a quarter of a century ago that while considerable dictum declares that
the use of spring guns is not justifiable to protect non-dwellings, the
majority of actual decisions commonly hold that the owner is not liable
to one injured by such a device while he is feloniously breaking into
unoccupied buildings.2 0 However, the current weight of authority
21
appears to disprove this earlier analysis of the decisions.
"Scheuermann v. Scharfenberg, 163 Ala. 337, 50 So. 335 (19o9); Bryant v. State, 6o
Ga. 358 (1878); Marshall v. Wheeler, 124 Me. 324, 128 Atl. 692 (1925); People v.
Dupree, 98 Mich. 26, 56 N. W. 1046 (1893); Corey v. Schuster, 44 Neb. 269, 62 N. W.
470 (1895); 40 C. J. S., Homocide § 1o9.
"6Prosser, Torts (1941) 133; Miller, Criminal Law (1934) 218, 220; 40 C. J. S.,
Homicide § 1o9.
"The state of Ohio has no statute which gives such a building any special
exemption from the general rules as to protection of property. Allison v. Fiscus,
156 Ohio St. 12o, 1oo N. E. (2d) 237 at 239 (1951).
'156 Ohio St. 120, 1oo N. E. (2d) 237, 240 (1951).

"See Burns and Bohlen, The Privilege To Protect Property By Dangerous and
Mechanical Devices (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 525, 541.
"1The only cases cited to sustain this sweeping analysis of the actual decisions
are Scheuermann v. Scharfenberg, 163 Ala. 337, 50 So. 335 (19o9) and Gray v. Combs,
7 Marsh 478 (Ky. 1832); State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 83 Am. Dec. 159 (1863) is
in accord.
"Among the decisions imposing liability for the use of "spring gun" devices
to protect non-dwelling buildings are Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 35 Am.
Dec. 96 (1840); State v. Beckham, 306 Mo. 566, 267 S. W. 817 (1924); State v. Childers,
133 Ohio St. 5o8, 14 N. E. (2d) 767 (1938); State v. Green, 118 S. C. 279, 11o S. E.
145 (1921); Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S. E. 686 (1923); State v. Barr,
11 Wash. 481, 39 Pac. 1o8o (1895); Schmidt v. State, 159 Wis. 15, 149 N. W. 388 (1914).

Also, see cases cited note 14, supra.
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The basis for the significance given by the court to the fact that
a felony was being committed may be traced to the period in English
criminal law when most felonies were punishable by death.2 2 But since
this extreme penalty has long since been abandoned for most crimes,
the view that a property owner is not liable for death or serious injury
inflicted on one seeking to commit a felony which does not involve
"deadly" force seems outmoded, and the more modern decisions take
23
that position.
The reason for the court's emphasis on the warning effect of the
padlock on the shed door is uncertain. The court may have been inferring that the defendant would have been privileged to use the force
which was employed against plaintiff had he been present, after warning plaintiff not to enter the building. However, it seems clear that
an affirmative warning not to enter an unoccupied building does not
carry with it an implied threat that defiance of such warning will result in having a dynamite charge exploded under the trespasser's feet.
It has been said that "lack of warning is important as showing defendant's intention to inflict harm on intruders rather than to deter
them," 24 but the giving of the warning can hardly afford the property
owner any added privilege to use force sufficient to cause serious bodily
injury to the intruder, where the harm threatened is to his property
and not to any person.
In reversing the lower courts' decision the Ohio Supreme Court
further confused the issue by introducing a new test, or perhaps a
qualification of the old test, for determining liability in this type case.
The jury is to decide first, whether defendant believed in good faith
that the amount of dynamite he used would not cause bodily harm,
and second, whether the force defendant used was in fact reasonable
and necessary in the circumstances. The use of this test inevitably
would involve problems which the court either did not foresee or did
not choose to discuss. If the jury should return an affirmative answer
to both questions, obviously the defendant would not be liable. Conversely, if the answer to both is in the negative, he undoubtedly would
34 Blackstone, Commentaries (1825) 188.
-'Bray v. State, 16 Ala. App. 433, 78 So. 463 (1918); Hayner v. People, 213 Ill.
142, 72 N. E. 792 (1904); Kinder v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 145, 92 S. W. (2d) 8
(1936); People v. Doud, 223 Mich. 120, 193 N. W. 884 (1923); Bowen v. State, 164
Miss. 225, 144 So. 230 (1932); State v. Mills, 6 Pa. 497, 69 At. 841 (i9o8); State v.
Selengut, 38 R. L 3o02, 95 Ad. 503 (1915); McKinney v. State, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 342, 257
S. W. 258 (1924); Garcia v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 9, 237 S. W. 279 (1922); Miller,
Criminal Law (1934) 218, 219.
"Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1828).
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be liable. But if the jury should find that the defendant did in good
faith believe the force he used was not sufficient to cause bodily harm
and did not intend that it should cause such harm, but that it was in
fact unreasonable and unnecessary in the circumstances, the court does
not indicate which finding should control. It can only be a matter of
conjecture whether the honest subjective opinion of the defendant as to
the destructiveness of the force he used would be allowed to overrule
the considered opinion of the jury as to whether the force was in fact
reasonable, or whether the opposite would be true.
If the honest but mistaken belief of the defendant is to be taken as
the controlling test, too much reliance is placed on an individual
opinion which the fact of the plaintiff's injury has proved to be wrong.
If, on the other hand, the "reasonable force" test is considered to be
the controlling one, the measure of liability is placed on firmer and
more reliable grounds. Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts
apparently employed that approach to the case and found that the
evidence allowed only the conclusion that the defendant had used unreasonable force, it seems that the Ohio Supreme Court's reversal serves
no purpose but to prolong the litigation and to confuse the issues on
retrial.
J.

HUNTER LANE, JR.

TRusTs-PuRPOSES FOR WHICH CHARITABLE TRUSTS MAY BE VALIDLY
CREATED.

[Virginia]

To qualify as a charitable trust and thus attain the law's special
favor,' an instrument of gift must be dedicated to a purpose recognized as charitable by the courts.2 All other trusts are private trusts,
including those which evidence traits of benevolence or liberality on
the part of the creator but yet fall short of being charitable within the
technical meaning of the word.3 Charitable trusts were enforced in
"'The law treats the charitable trust with very considerable favor. It gives
that trust advantages not possessed by the private trust. In the first place it applies
liberal rules of construction in an effort to support such a trust. It permits the
trust to be perpetual in duration and to escape some of the rules regarding remoteness of vesting, suspension of the power of alienation, and accumulations.
Many statutes exempt from taxation the property held under a charitable trust. The
liberal cy pres rule is applied to charitable trusts only." 2 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees (1935) 1o89.
24 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5 th ed. 1941) § 1020.
3
Zollman, Charities (1924) § 398.
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England long before passage of the Statute of Charitable Uses in 16o, 4
but this historic enactment still is looked to for the exemplary though
not exclusive enumeration of charitable purposes contained in its preamble. 5
While charitable purposes may be thus enumerated, an all-inclusive
definition of charitable trusts is perhaps impossible to frame.6 Lord
Macnaghten in a noted English case declared that " 'Charity' in its
legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of
poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the
dIn Trustees of the Baptist Association v. Harts Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. 1,4 L. ed.
499 (U. S. 18ig), the United States Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall decided that equity courts had no inherent power to enforce charitable
trusts and that such trusts depended for their validity upon the Statute of Charitable
Uses. The Court was under the erroneous impression that charitable trusts had
not been enforced before passage of the Statute. Subsequent research disproved
this conclusion, however, and the Supreme Court in Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How.
127, x L. ed. 205 (U. S. 1844), reversed its earlier holding in an opinion by Justice
Story, who had concurred with Marshall in the Hart case. See 3 Scott, Trusts (1939)
§ 348.-2; Note (1938) 25 Va. L. Rev. log.
u43 Eliz. (16oi) c. 4. The preamble reads: "Whereas lands, tenements, rents, annuities, profits, hereditaments, goods, chattels, money, and stocks of money, have been
heretofore given, limited, appointed and assigned, as well by the Queen's most
excellent Majesty, and her most noble progenitors, as by sundry other well-disposed
persons: some for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for maintenance
of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and
scholars in universities, some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches,
sea-banks and highways, some for education and preferment of orphans, some for
or toward relief, stock or maintenence for houses of correction, some for marriages
of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and others for relief or redemption of prisoners or
captives, and for aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of
fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes; which lands, tenements, rents,
annuities, profits, hereditaments, goods, chattels, money and stocks of money, nevertheless have not been employed according to the charitable intent of the givers and
founders thereof, by reason of frauds, breaches of trusts, and negligence in those
that should pay, deliver and employ the same: for redress and remedy whereof...."
The provisions of the statute which follow the preamble were repealed by the
Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 51 & 52 Vict. (1888) c. 42.
63 Scott, Trusts (1939) 1974. One of the most widely quoted attempts to define
a charitable trust was provided by Justice Gray of the Massachusetts court: "A
charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either
by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by
relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or. constraint, by assisting them to
establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or
works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government." Jackson v. Phillips, 14
Allen 539, 556 (Mass. 1867).
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community, not falling under any of the preceding heads." 7 To these
four categories the Restatement of Trusts adds two others: trusts for
the promotion of health and trusts for governmental or municipal
purposess The Restatement concludes, however, that "A purpose is
charitable if its accomplishment is of such social interest to the community as to justify permitting the property to be devoted to the purpose in perpetuity."9 It is axiomatic that any conception of "purposes
beneficial to the community" or "of ... social interest to the com-

munity" will vary as to time and place, thus precluding adherence to
any fixed and unchanging standard. Understandably, then, courts have
encountered considerable difficulty at times in attempting to draw a
dividing line between purposes that are charitable and those merely
benevolent.
This problem confronted the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
in the recent case of Shenandoah Valley National Bank v. Taylor,'0
a decision that attracted widespread public interest because of the unusual provisions of the trust sought to be created. The testator, having
no surviving children of his own, by will left virtually his entire estate
for the establishment of a trust fund named for himself and his wife.
The trustee was directed to collect the income from the trust estate and
pay it out in equal parts on the last school days before Easter and
Christmas vacations to each of the children in the first, second, and
third grades of a named public school in the city of testator's residence,
"to be used by such child in the furtherance of his or her obtainment
of an education.""
One of the testator's next of kin brought suit against the executor
and trustee, alleging that the trust was not a charitable trust, and
hence was void in that it violated the rule against the creation of
perpetuities. A demurrer filed by the trustee was overruled by the trial
court and a decree entered in favor of the contestants of the will. On
appeal, the trustee contended that the gift was charitable and could
be sustained either as a trust for the advancement of education or a
trust for "other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial
to the community."' 12 The Supreme Court of Appeals, however, af-

7Commissioners

for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891 ] A. C. 531,

583.
"Restatement, Trusts (1935) § 368.
"Restatement, Trusts (1935) § 368, comment b.
1%92 Va. 135, 63 S. E. (2d) 786 (1951).

"Shenandoah Valley National Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 138, 63 S. E. (2d)
786, 788 (1951).

"Shenandoah Valley National Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 141, 63 S. E. (2d)
786, 790 (1951), quoting Restatement, Trusts (1935) § 368.
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firmed the decree of the trial court. In disposing of the trustee's latter
argument, the court pointed out that in very explicit language the
trustee had been directed to pay the income from the trust in equal
parts to all of the children in the first three grades of the school without regard to need. This purpose, is was declared, was lacking in social
benefit to the community and therefore must be classed as mere benevolence. Though each child would receive financial benefits as an individual, yet "the social interest of the community as such"'1 is not
furthered because the payments are not made to relieve poverty.
Decisions of other jurisdictions support the court's holding on this
point. Thus, a trust to provide Christmas presents for students of a
particular school, with no limitation as to need or merit,14 and a trust
to buy sweets at a certain time each year for every boy and girl under
the age of fourteen in a particular parish, 15 were found not to be
charitable. The distinguishing factors of two other cases which were
contrasted with the principal case serve to emphasize the nature of the
"social interest" element of charitable trusts. 16 In each case the court
concluded that the named trustees were empowered to select beneficiaries from the designated class who were in need and worthy of
help, thus preserving the charitable nature of the trust. In the principal
case, however, the unequivocal words of the testator specifically directing how and to whom the trust income was to be paid, precluded
the indulgence of any presumption that the trustee was to be permitted
to pay the trust income only to those school children who were in
need.
If, on the other hand, the testator had intended to create an educational trust, as the trustee also maintained, then the question of relative need would not arise. The court's conclusion that the testator's
dominant intent in this regard, as gathered from the words of the will,
was benevolent and not charitable, is at least open to question. Indeed,
"Shenandoah Valley National Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 141, 63 S. E. (2d)
792 (1951), quoting Restatement, Trusts (1935) § 374, comment f.
"Goodell v. Union Association of Children, 29 N. J. Eq. 32 (1878).
"'Pleasants v. Attorney General, [1923] 39 T. L. R. 675.
"In In re Nilson's Estate, 81 Neb. 8o9, u16 N. W. 971, 972 (19o8), interest from
a trust fund was to be distributed each Christmas to "worthy and needy servant
girls and the widows and orphans of deceased sailors and fishermen who are not
a public charge" living in the testator's native village in Norway. In Appeal of
Eliot, 74 Conn. 586, 51 At. 558 (1902), the court held that the testator, in setting
up a trust fund to provide a home for a designated class of persons, was to be
presumed to have intended that only those members of the class who had no home
786,

and thus were in necessitous circumstances, were to share as beneficiaries.
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the court itself reflected some lack of assurance when it alluded to the
"difficulty ... encountered in determining which of the inconsistent
provisions of the will expressed the testator's dominant intent ... "17
It must be noted that the court, in discovering two provisions in
the will expressing inconsistent intentions, thought it proper to read
two successive clauses of a single sentence as distinctly separate directions to the trustee, though they obviously can be read together as
constituting a single statement of intent. Thus, it was asserted that
standing alone, the testator's injunction to the trustee to pay to each
child an equal share of the trust income twice yearly, could not be
construed as creating an educational trust. But to this, the words, "to
be used by such child in the furtherance of his or her obtainment of an
education" were appended. If these words were intended only as advice
to the youthful beneficiaries, they are of no operative effect. It would
seem, however, that they import something more-an underlying and
paramount desire to assist the children of the school in embarking
upon their educational careers. This conclusion appears even more
realistic when it is noted that the testator had no relatives nearer than
first cousins, whom he evidently did not wish to share his estate.
The court, however, seemed to be convinced that the trust, as
actually provided for in the will, could not in fact serve any real educational purpose, even if the testator's intent was that it should do so.
It was emphasized that "the trustee is given no power, control or discretion over the funds so received by the child. Full and complete
execution of the mandate and trust imposed upon the trustee accomplishes no educational purpose. ... It merely places the income irretrievably and forever beyond the range of the trust."' 8 This factor
was brought into play later in the opinion when the court distinguished
the English case of In re Mellody.19 There, the testator's will provided for an annual field day for the school children of a particular
village. The trustee, however, was to control and administer the income from the trust fund so that the designated purpose could actually
be accomplished. Further, the intended use bore a direct relationship
to the education of the children in that the field day would serve as
a supplement to classroom instruction.
The fact that the testator's own scheme in the principal case for
for providing educational benefits for the children could not effectively
"*Shenandoah Valley National Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 149, 63 S. E. (2d)
786, 795 (1951).
IsShenandoah Valley National Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 143, 63 S. E. (2d)
786, 791 (1951).
"[1918] 1 Ch. 228, 87 L. J. Ch. 185, 118 L. T. 155.
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be carried out does not necessarily negative a general charitable intent
which, it is submitted, was sufficiently expressed in the words "to be
used by such child in the furtherance of his or her obtainment of an
education." That a court is justified in indulging in any fair inferences
by which a purported charitable trust can be sustained is indicated
by the Virginia court's own assertion in Allaun v. First & Merchants
National Bank that "charitable gifts are viewed with peculiar favor
by the courts, and every presumption consistent with the language
contained in the instruments of gift will be employed in order to
sustain them. All doubts will be resolved in their favor."' 20 Similar lan-

guage is frequently used by courts of other jurisdictions, as in an Illinois decision which declared that "In construing such [charitable]
gifts, if there are two possible methods of construction, one of which will
render the gift valid and the other invalid, courts will adopt the con'21
struction which will sustain the gift."

If the court had been willing to decide that the words of the testator
in the principal case disclosed a general charitable intent, it was
conceded that the defects of the trust could have been cured by application of the cy pres statute passed in 1946,22 under which "beneficiaries [could have been] selected and determined upon, purposes
for the trust supplied, and suitable plans and details of execution
23
and administration adopted."
29igo Va. 104, 109, 56 S.E. (2d) 83, 86 (1949) [italics supplied]. See also, Thomas
v. Bryant, 185 Va. 845, 40 S.E. (2d) 487 (1946); Collins v. Lyon, 181 Va. 230, 24 S.E.
(2d) 572 (1943); Protestant Episcopal Education Society v. Churchman's Reps., 8o
Va. 78 (1885).
Walker v. Central Trust & Saving Bank of Geneseo, 318 Ill. 253, 149 N. E.
234, 235 (1925). See also 14 C. J. S. 441 and cases cited.
-"When any corporation, firm, association, partnership or person gives, bequeaths, grants, conveys or devises any real or personal property in trust to or for
any educational, charitable or eleemosynary purpose, the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the beneficiaries named in any instrument creating such a gift, bequest,
grant, conveyance or devise, or the indefiniteness of the purpose of the trust itself,
shall not defeat any such trust and, if the trust is in other respects valid under
the laws of this State, it shall be administered to conform as near as may be to the
purpose for which created, or, if impossible of performance for this purpose, for
some other educational, charitable, benevolent or eleemosynary purpose. However,
unless the maker of the trust has specifically designated some other body, committee, agency or entity to determine what that purpose shall be and to administer
the trust (in which event the determination and administration by that body shall
be valid), the determination of the purpose of the trust shall be made by a court of
equity in the county or city wherein the property or the greater part thereof is
located and the administration of the trust shall be under the direction of such
court." 8 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 55-31.
nShenandoah Valley National Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 149, 63 S.E. (2d) 786,
791 0950)
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Although no decided Virginia case had applied the cy pres doctrine
either before or after enactment of the 1946 statute, 24 the willingness
of courts of other jurisdictions to exercise their power to effectuate a
general charitable intent is demonstrated by a recent Indiana case in
which it was said, "Under the cy pres doctrine where the dominant
intent of the testator is determined and is about to fail because of
administrative provisions which render the general plan illegal,
courts of equity have the power and duty to modify the administrative
provisions so that the dominant purpose of the testator may be carried out." 25 Such a rule is consonant with the general purpose of cy
pres to effectuate the testator's intention "as near as may be."2 6 From
the whole tenor of the will in the principal case, it is submitted that
a general charitable intent on the part of the testator could have been
safely inferred and a suitable plan effected for administration of the
trust.
WILLIS M. ANDERSON

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY OF MALPRACTICING PHYSICIAN TO

INJURED EMPLOYEE WHO HAS BEEN PAID COMPENSATION AWARD BY

EMPLOYER.

[Virginia]

When an employee is injured in the course of his employment due
to the negligence of his employer, and then in the exercise of reasonable
care engages a physican who through negligent treatment aggravates
the injury, the victim had two distinct remedies at common law. First
he had a cause of action against the negligent employer for the full
extent of his injuries, since the courts find a proximate causal connection between the original injury and the later aggravation.1 Second, de-For a discussion of the somewhat unusual history of charitable trusts in
Virginia and the attitude of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals toward the
doctrine of cy pres, see Note (1938) 25 Va. L. Rev. iog.
"Quinn v. Peoples Trust & Savings Co., 223 Ind. 317, 6o N. E. (2d) 281, 286
(1945). See Restatement, Trusts (1935) § 399.
""The words 'cy pres' are Norman French for 'as near.' The phrase when
expanded to its full implication was 'cy pres comme possible,' and meant 'as near
as possible'." 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 1287.

"Atlas Portland Cement Co. v. Hagen, 233 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); Suelzer
v. Carpenter, 183 Ind. 23, 107 N. E. 467 (1915); Purchase v. Seelye, 231 Mass. 434, 121
N. E. 413 (1918); Goss v. Goss, 102 Minn. 346, 113 N. W. 69o (1907); Lyons v. Erie
Railway Company, 57 N. Y. 489 (1874); City of Dallas v. Meyers, 55 S. W. 742 (Tex.
Civ. App. 19oo); Selleck v. City of Janesville, 1oo Wis. 157, 75 N. W. 975 (1898);
Prosser, Torts (1941) 362.
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spite the fact that the employer was fully liable as the original wrongdoer, a cause of action lay against the physician for damages arising out
of the aggravation, recovery being confined to the aggravation itself. 2
Either one of these remedies was available regardless of whether the
court followed the joint tort or the several liability approach. However,
to prevent the employee from receiving a double recovery when the
several liability doctrine was applicable, the employer was subrogated
to the rights of the employee against the physician if the employee
proceeded against the employer for the full extent of his damages; 3
and if the employee first recovered damages from the physician for the
aggravated injuries, he could only collect damages from the employer
for the original injury.4 Under the joint tort doctrine, a recovery
from one joint tort-feasor necessarily released the other.5
With the adoption of Workmen's Compensation Acts by all American states, the common law liability of employer to employee sounding in tort has been abolished, and a fixed liability is predicated on the
mere employment relationship between the two. 6 However, a great
2At common law a physician is liable to his patient for any injury resulting
from his failure to use reasonable care and diligence or exercise his best judgment.
Hallam 8: Barnes v. Means, 82 Ill. 379, 25 Am. Rep. 328 (1876); Pike v. Honsinger,
155 N. Y. 201, 49 N. E. 76o (1898); Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 4o N. W. 228
(1888). However, since the physician was in no way responsible for the original
injury, he could only be liable for damages resulting from the aggravation. See McGough v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 206 Minn. 74, 287 N. W. 857, 864 (1939).
3In a case involving an original injury by a railway and light company and
subsequent aggravation by a malpracticing physician the court said: "The liability
of the defendant Rumph [the physician] to the light company does not arise by
reason of his liability for contribution in the event of a recovery against the light
company. His liability is a liability over and arises in favor of the light company
by reason of the fact that the light company is compelled to pay damages which
are primarily due to the alleged negligence of the defendant Rumph, and for which
the plaintiff might have maintained an action against the defendant Rumph. The
light company, being compelled to pay these damages, is subrogated to the plaintiff's rights against Rumph, as she may not twice recover compensation for the
same injury." Fisher v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. 8- Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 18o N. W..
269, 270 (1920).

'Viou v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn. 97, io8 N. W. 891 (19o6). See
Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., Inc., 267 N. Y. 410, 196 N. E. 308, 310 (1935).
5Prosser, Torts (1941) i1o6. See Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 523, 65 S. E. (2d) 575,
578 (1951). As to the unsoundness of considering the employer and physician as joint
tort-feasors, see Viou v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn. 97, io8 N. W. 891,
893 (19o6); Noll v. Nugent, 214 Wis. 204, 252 N. W. 574, 575 (1934). Most courts
have come to reject the joint tort doctrine and have adopted the several liability
approach as the correct rule. For a discussion, see Note (195o) 36 Va. L. Rev. 781, 783.
OProsser, Torts (1941) 520; 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (1941)
§§ 3, 6, and 7- See New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 201, 37 S. Ct.
247, 252, 61 L. ed. 667, 674 (1917).
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deal of controversy exists in the various jurisdictions as to the effect
of the statutes on third party liability. The lack of uniformity in the
decisions may be explained to some extent by the differences in the
wording of the statutes, but is due largely to the manner in which
they have been judicially interpreted. A few jurisdictions hold that the
statutory remedies are altogether exclusive of all common law actions,7
but the great weight of authority supports the view that the abrogation
of the common law actions applies only to the employer-employee relationship. s The third party's liability under the latter view is affected
only to the extent that the statutory provisions expressly or by necessary
implication manifest it to be changed. Therefore, within this statutory
formula, the essential problem arises as to how to give the employee
the assurance of his right to recover all that is due him, and yet prevent
his receiving any windfall-that is, to provide for just and due compensation under the law by properly placing the burdens and the benefits on the parties concerned, and still to prevent over-compensation.
The liability of the malpracticing physician was considered by
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for the first time in the recent
case of Fauver v. Bell. 9 Plaintiff, who had been injured in an accident
arising out of his employment, and had received benefits provided for
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, filed suit against a physician
for negligence in treating the injuries. The action was brought on behalf of "the plaintiff and his employer, as their interests might appear." 10 Defendant contended that plaintiff's acceptance of benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Act was a bar to the action under
the provision in the Virginia Act which states that "the employer shall
not be liable in damages for malpractice by a physician or surgeon
7
Roman v. Smith, 42 F. (2d) 931 (N. D. Idaho 193o); Ross v. Erickson Construction Co., 89 Wash. 634, 155 Pac. 153 (1916). Such a result would not seem desirable since the Acts were passed for the benefit of employees and not for the
protection of negligent third parties. Yet if the employee is denied any right to
recover against the third party wrongdoer causing the injury and the employer's
right of recovery against him is limited to the compensation referable to the aggravation paid the employee, which is less than the employer's common law tort
liability, the negligent third party will be paying a sum less than the actual damages
he inflicted.
8Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. (2d) 200, 148 P. (2d) 633 (1944); McGraw v. Seigel, 221
Iowa 127, 263 N. W. 553 (1935); Fournier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 128

Me. 393, 148 At. 147 (1929); J. F. Elkins Construction Co. v. Naill Bros., 168 Tenn.
165, 76 S.W. (2d) 326 (1934); Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 P. (2d) 68o (1939); Smale
v. Wrought Washer Manufacturing Co., 16o Wis. 331, 151 N. W. 8o3 (igi5). See
58 Am. Jur. 616.
9192 Va. 518, 65 S. E. (2d) 575 (1951)"°Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 52o, 65 S. E. (2d) 575, 576 (1951).
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furnished by him ... but the consequences of any such malpractice
shall be deemed part of the injury resulting from the accident and shall
be compensated for as such."'1 Defendant argued that since plaintiff
had received compensation under the Act for both the original injury
and the aggravation, he had been reimbursed fully for the total injury.
The trial court sustained defendant's plea, but plaintiff appealed on
the theory that the benefits received "did not include all the elements
of damage for which the defendant, as a third party tort-feasor, was
liable .... "12 The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
on the ground that the physician was a negligent third party within
the contemplation of the Act, and that the common law tort action
against a negligent third person remained unimpaired. It was necessary
to reconcile this ruling with the provision of the Act which expressly
declares that "The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee
... on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude
all other rights and remedies ... at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death."' 3 But since the Act is
clearly remedial and requires a liberal construction in favor of the
workmen and in accordance with the humane purposes behind it, 14 the
court reasoned that this section only had reference to the relationship
existing between the employer and his employee, and that the common
law actions remained unimpaired as against all persons not standing
within this status. Under the Compensation Act, a third person who
causes the original injury remains liable for the full extent of the
damage inflicted,' 5 and no basis was seen on which to make any distinction in favor of a negligent third party who aggravated the initial
injury.
The Virginia court in the principal case has merely held that the
injured employee can bring suit against the physician despite his
previous acceptance of compensation under the Act. No direct indication is given in its reversal of the lower court's ruling as to just how
the case must now proceed in order that all liable parties should bear
119 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 65-86.

"Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 52o, 65 S. E. (2d) 575, 577 (1951).
329 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 65-37 [italics supplied].
1"Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S. E. (2d) 7 (1946); Dixon v. Norfolk Shipbuilding 8- Dry Dock Corporation, 182 Va. 185, 28 S. E. (2d) 617 (1944); Griffith v.
Red Raven Ash Coal Co., Inc., 179 Va. 790, 2o S. E. (2d) 53o (1942).
19 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 65-38 and 65-39. Griffith v. Red Raven Ash
Coal Co., Inc., 179 Va. 790, 20 S. E. (2d) 530 (1942); Smith v. Virginia Ry. &Power
Co., 144 Va. 169, 131 S. E. 44o (1926).
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the proper burden for their liability, and that each party entitled to a
recovery should recover all, but no more than, he deserves.
In some jurisdictions an outright double recovery is allowed on
the premise that the two actions against employer and physician are
entirely separate, distinct, and unrelated.' 6 Thus, the employee can
collect his compensation award and also proceed directly against the
malpractitioner for damages resulting from the aggravation of the injury, without having to account to the employer for any recovery so obtained. Still other courts have taken the stand that the employee's acceptance of the statutory award excludes any other remedy, on the theory
that the result of the malpractice is merely an aggravation of the original
7
injury, and that the compensation received fully covers all injuries.'
The malpracticing physician is thereby absolved of all responsibility
for his direct negligence to the employee. In the other jurisdictions the
employee is allowed recovery against the physician as a third party
wrongdoer within the provisions of the Act authorizing actions against
such third persons, following which some adjustment must be made
to divide the recovery between the employee and the employer who
has already paid compensation referable to the aggravation of the original injury.'8
The Wisconsin court has ruled, under a statutory provision identical to the main section of the Virginia Code in issue in the principal
2"Smith v. Golden State Hospital, iii Cal. App. 667, 296 Pac. 127 (1931); Froid
v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 36 P. (2d) 156 (1934); McGough v. McCarthy Improvement
Co., 206 Minn. 1, 287 N. W. 857 (1939); Benson v. Sioux Falls Medical & Surgical
Clinic, 62 S. D. 324, 252 N. W. 864 (1934). In

support of this rule the Colorado

court observed: "It will aid our study, we think, if we shall keep in mind that the liability of a tort-feasor is predicated on fault; that of an employer, under the Compensation Act, on relationship. What plaintiff received from or through his employer resulted from relation; what he seeks from defendant is based on the latter's
alleged fault." Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 36 P. (2d) 156, 158 (1934).
' 7Hanson v. Norton, 340 Mo. 1012, 103 S. W. (2d) 1 (1937); Alexander v. Von
Wedel, 169 Okla. 341, 37 P. (2d) 252 (1934); Williams v. Dale, 139 Ore. 1o5, 8 P. (2d)
578, 82 A. L. R. 922 (1932); Ross v. Erickson Construction Co., 89 Wash. 634, 155
Pac. 153 (1916).

18
Huntoon v. Pritchard, 371 Ill. 36, 2o N. E. (2d) 53 (1939); Seaton v. U. S. Rubber
Co., 223 Ind. 404, 61 N. E. (2d) 177 (1945); Dettman v. Goldsmith, ii N. J. Super. 571,
78 A. (2d) 626 (1951); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Pugh, 2o6 Wis. 62, 238 N. W.
872 (193-). When the employer brings the action against the physician he is required to pay the employee any sum recovered exceeding the amount of compensation paid employee by employer as a result of the aggravation. Schumacher v. Leslie,
360 Mo. 1238, 232 S. W. (2d) 913 (1950). Under the California Act, as amended, the
employer is entitled to a lien, limited to the amount paid by the employer which can
be attributed to the malpractice, upon any judgment obtained against the malpracticing physician. Heaton v. Kerlan, 27 Cal. (2d) 716, 66 P. (2d) 857 (1946).
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case, that the statute has in effect created a cause of action in the
employer against the doctor for amounts paid to the employee as compensation for the aggravation, and has left unimpaired the employee's
cause of action against the doctor for damages for the malpractice, less
the amount the doctor is liable to the employer for the increased
compensation paid to cover the aggravation of the original injuries.' 9
That court, recognizing the practical difficulties involved in the proper
disposition of the two causes of action in this type of situation pointed
out that "it is open to the defendant ...

upon being sued either by the

employer or employee, to move that the other party be brought in, in
order that the 'closely related contentions may be disposed of in one
action.. ..
,,20 It was observed that the ascertainment of the amount due
the employer and employee presented a judicial question, but that
while the "prior determination of the Industrial Commission as to the
properseparationof damages between the original injury and the malpractice is not a condition precedent to the bringing of either cause
of action ...such a determination by the commission might well
be treated as of great, if not conclusive, effect by the court."2'
This question of proper apportionment is the essential difficulty
presented to the court in the Fauver case. This being the first malpractice case of its type under the Compensation Act in Virginia, the only
authority in this jurisdiction arises from analogy drawn to those cases
involving third party original tort-feasors. It was pointed out in the
principal case that no distinction can be made in the Virginia Act
between "the liability of a third person who causes the original injury
22
and that of a third person who causes an aggravation of such injury."
In the third party original tort-feasor cases, the statute provides for
subrogation between the employer and employee. If the employee
recovers from the third party, he is liable to the employer for the total
amount of compensation already paid by the employer for the injury,
but is allowed to retain the excess of his recovery. 23 Conversely, if recovery is had by the employer rather than the employee, he is entitled to keep as much as he has paid out in compensation himself, but
"Lakeside Bridge &Steel Co. v. Pugh, 206 Wis. 62, 238 N. W. 872 (1931).
2'Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Pugh, 206 Wis. 62, 238 N. W. 872, 874 (1931).
"Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Pugh, 206 Wis. 62, 238 N. W. 872, 874 (1931)
[italics supplied].
-2Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 527, 65 S. E. (2d) 575, 581 (1951). This is the same
view adopted in many other jurisdictions allowing a recovery from the malpracticing physician.
29 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 65-39.
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he must set aside any excess above that amount for the employee's
benefit. 24 In the case of Smith v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., the court
stated that "The most that he [the negligent third party original tortfeasor] could possibly claim is that after judgment he would be interested in having the proper apportionment made between the employer
who has paid the compensation and the employee, if the recovery
against him should exceed the amount paid to such employee under the
25
Compensation Act."
The situation necessarily becomes more complex where the negligent third party has only aggravated an injury previously attributable to
the employer, as occurred in the Fauver case. The question as to where
the line is to be drawn between the original injury and the aggravation
in the assessment of damages is a perplexing one for the jury's determination.26 Therefore, it seems that the inference may reasonably be
drawn from the court's decision, viewed in the light of the third party
original tort-feasor cases in Virginia and of the malpractice cases in
other jurisdictions, that a jury is left with the task of determining exactly how much the employer has paid as a result of the aggravation
caused by malpractice and deducting that amount from the the employee's recovery against the negligent third party physician and awarding it as a proper sum for reimbursement to the employer. This will
mean the employee has received statutory compensation for the original
injury and damages based on tort for the aggravation, the employer has
paid for the original injury, and the physician has paid fully for the aggravated damages. Under the circumstances, this woul& seem to affix the
burdens and benefits in the suit on the proper parties and provide the
most equitable means of apportionment between them under the law in
Virginia.
ROBERT J. INGRAM

9 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 65-38.
25144 Va. 16g, 178, 131 S. E. 440, 442 (1926).
OSee Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Pugh, 206 Wis. 62, 238 N. W. 872, 874 (1931).

